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Abstract 
 
 
The theory of choice receives formal treatment in decision theory, game theory and 
substantial parts of economics.  However there is cause for concern that the formal 
treatment of the subject has advanced beyond the substantive grounds on which it relies.  
For, the formal theories fundamentally rely on a concept of preference, which is itself lacking 
a viable substantive interpretation.   
 
Indeed the challenges to the substantive interpretation of ‘preference’ threaten to undermine 
the standard arguments used to justify the completeness and transitivity conditions on which 
Preference Theories rely. 
 
This discussion will explore whether a conception of rationality, anchored in a larger 
conception of practical reasoning, can justify the completeness and transitivity conditions. 
 
Specifically, this dissertation will draw on recent developments in philosophy of law, action 
theory and ethics to enumerate a conception of practical reasoning that takes reasons to be 
the basic normative concept.  It will then seek to offer an account of rationality that is distinct 
from, but complementary to, the role of reasons.  And from this foundation develop an 
account of preferences that includes many of the characteristics of standard accounts, yet is 
situated within this broader context.  From this vantage point, the discussion will explore 
possible justifications for the completeness and transitivity conditions.  Ultimately, it will be 
argued that both can be justified – though with different force – in specified domains. 
 
While the discussion will primarily focus on the justification of the completeness and 
transitivity conditions, it is in part motivated by the goal of exploring the connections between 
the treatment of choice in the distinct fields associated with Preference Theories and action 
theory broadly defined.  In so doing, the hope is to suggest that there is promise in drawing 
together formal and substantive treatments of choice which is deserving of greater attention.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The theory of choice receives formal treatment in decision theory, game theory 
and substantial parts of economics.  However there is cause for concern that 
the formal treatment of the subject has advanced beyond the substantive 
grounds on which it relies.  For, the formal theories fundamentally rely on a 
concept of preference, which is itself lacking a viable substantive interpretation.  
This poses a dual edge challenge to Preference Theories, as they will be called 
here.  For on the one hand without a viable substantive interpretation it is 
difficult to understand the empirical significance of these prodigious formal 
theories, and on the other hand there is little basis to understand how the 
theories themselves should change to account for the realities of their subject 
matter.    
 
This is the challenge that motivates this dissertation.  The source of this 
challenge can be stated concisely. 
 
Decision theory, game theory and substantial parts of economics regularly 
assume that rational preferences are complete and transitive. 
 
The difficulty is that there have long been questions about how to interpret the 
concept ‘preference’.  And, whether the completeness and transitivity condition 
are justified given these interpretations. 
 
Indeed, Mandler argues that the justification of the completeness condition 
relies on understanding preferences as choices, while the justification of the 
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transitivity condition relies on understanding preferences as welfare judgments.  
Poignantly he argues that preferences can either justify the completeness 
condition or the transitivity condition, but not both. 
 
For those theories that rely on preferences to be complete and transitive, this is 
a challenge that cannot be ignored.   
 
Rather than take issue with Mandler’s arguments1 this dissertation will explore a 
different alternative.  At least three possibilities suggest themselves and/or have 
been pursued before: 
1. Alter the formalism to make do with completeness or transitivity, but not 
both. 2 
2. Acknowledge the lack of justification for the transitivity and completeness 
condition, yet stipulate both conditions as idealizations.3 
3. Seek a justification for the completeness and transitivity conditions based 
on alternative substantive grounds.4 
                                                
1 If anything, Mandler’s argument understates the challenge.  The discussion will return to this 
point shortly. 
2 While this is a viable alternative, it will not be pursued here for two reasons.  First, the success 
of Preference Theories suggests there may be reason to preserve the formalism intact, if 
possible.  And second, even if it is possible to address the current challenge by jettisoning 
either the completeness or transitivity conditions, it leaves open the question of how to interpret 
‘preference’. 
3 It is undoubtedly true that there is a degree of idealization in Preference Theories.  Yet relying 
on this fact too broadly can limit Preference Theories’ ability to address interesting questions 
such as: how do, and should, agents choose in a normatively complex world characterized by 
uncertainty? 
 
There is at least one approach which maintains that Preference Theories are idealizations yet 
does not walk away from these questions.  On this approach Preference Theories describe the 
choices of idealized agents, yet it is acknowledged that actual agents are somewhat more 
limited and therefore may systematically deviate from the ideal. 
 
While this type of approach has garnered significant interest, and may prove useful, it is not the 
approach that will be followed here.  For it seems prima facie troubling for an account of choice 
to be based on a view that agents are limited because of their failure to live up to an unjustified 
ideal. 
4 This is one way to understand Broome’s focus on the betterness relation.  The discussion will 
return to this point shortly. 
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This current effort will explore the third of these alternatives.  Specifically, this 
discussion will explore whether a conception of rationality, anchored in a larger 
conception of practical reasoning, can justify the completeness and transitivity 
conditions. 
 
This may initially seem a cause for concern, because Preference Theories are 
often lauded for the limited grounds on which they rely.   However, parsimony is 
only one of the theoretical virtues that such theories may embody.  And the 
evidence suggests that Preference Theories do not embody the virtue of 
parsimony to the extent previously thought.  This raises questions of what other 
theoretical values may be realized. 
 
Whether this account is ultimately successful will not only depend on its ability 
to offer consistent justification of the completeness and transitivity conditions, 
but also on the extent to which it realizes other theoretical virtues. 
 
The following discussion will be preliminary in many respects.  It will seek to 
draw from current literature to provide an articulation of an emerging conception 
of practical reasoning, but will only discuss basic aspects of that view.  Further, 
it will offer possible justifications of the completeness and transitivity condition, 
but will inevitably leave many questions of theoretical fruitfulness to later 
exploration. 
 
Nonetheless, the aspiration is that this discussion will point towards a 
worthwhile avenue for further exploration. 
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-- 
 
This chapter is organized in two stages.  The first stage discusses the 
challenges facing Preference Theories; and the second describes the approach 
to those challenges that will be pursued in subsequent chapters. 
 
The first stage is comprised of three sections.  The first section succinctly 
describes Revealed Preference Theory and Sen’s critique of it to illustrate the 
long legacy of tension between interpretations of ‘preference’ and the 
justification of consistency conditions which apply to them.  The second section 
turns to Mandler’s argument which establishes that rationality cannot justify 
both the completeness and transitivity conditions.  And, the third section builds 
on this point by suggesting that Mandler may have understated the challenges 
to justifying the completeness and transitivity conditions in three ways: 
• the completeness condition is not a condition of rationality; 
• the transitivity condition is not justified by the standard argument used to 
do so; 
• the transitivity condition faces the threat of being vacuous. 
 
Recognizing the force of these challenges, the second stage introduces the 
approach that will be employed for the remainder of this dissertation for 
exploring a positive account of preference that can offer a (qualified) justification 
of the completeness and transitivity conditions.  The second stage is also 
comprised of three sections.  The first briefly describes three observations that 
will serve as a point of departure for the subsequent discussion.  The second 
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offers reflections on the nature of the current inquiry to suggest a broader scope 
for the discussion.  And the third, briefly lays out the strategy which will be 
pursued. 
 
Stage 1: The Challenges 
Decision Theory, Game Theory and economics regularly assume that rational 
preferences are complete and transitive.5 
 
Simplistically put, the transitivity condition reflects the idea that if an agent 
prefers an alternative, x, to another alternative, y, and he also prefers the 
second alternative, y, to a third alternative, z, then the agent also prefers the 
first alternative, x, to the third alternative, z.  Further, once the preference 
relation has been defined, transitivity can be easily formalized.  Take the 
preference relation to be denoted by the symbol >.  Following Mandler, the 
expression x > y means that the agent prefers x to y or is indifferent between 
the two.  Strict preference and indifference are defined in terms of >: x is strictly 
preferred to y, denoted x > y, if x > y and it is not the case that y > x, and x and 
y are indifferent if both x > y and y > x. 6  A preference relation > is defined to be 
transitive if, for all triples of consumption bundles (x, y, z), x > y and y > z imply 
x > z.7 
 
                                                
5 Since this is well established, it will not be discussed in detail here.  For a detailed discussion 
of completeness and transitivity in cardinal utility theories see Von Neuman and Morgenstern.  
For the ordinal representation theorem that proves that complete and transitive preferences 
can, with some additional conditions, be represented by a continuous utility function see Debreu 
1959, pg 55 – 9. 
6 Mandler “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg  9. 
7 For consistency throughout this chapter, Mandler’s formal definition of transitivity in “A Difficult 
Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or Transitivity but Not Both” has 
been used.  Other definitions could have been used as well. 
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Similarly, a simple way to understand completeness is that the completeness 
condition reflects the idea that an agent can rank any pair of alternatives.  
Further Completeness can be formalized as: a preference relation  > is defined 
to be complete if, for all pairs of consumption bundles (x, y), either x  > y or y  > 
x (or both).8 
 
The difficulty is that there have long been questions about how to interpret the 
concept ‘preference’, such that the relevant consistency conditions are justified.  
This can be illustrated through the example of Revealed Preference Theory, an 
early articulation of Preference Theories. 
 
Revealed Preference 
In Revealed Preference Theory which was introduced by Samuelson9, 
‘preference” was interpreted as choices.  In part the motivation for Revealed 
Preference Theory was to explain an agent’s behavior through observations of 
her other behaviors; and in so doing to avoid the difficulty of attributing 
troublesome mental states such as desires and beliefs, to the agent.10  The 
basic idea is that: “If a collection of goods y could have been bought by a 
certain individual within his budget when he in fact was observed to buy another 
collection x, it is to be presumed that he has revealed a preference for x over y.  
                                                
8 Mandler, M. “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 10. 
9 P. A. Samuelson (1938) “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour”, Economica, v. 
5: pp. 61-71. P. A. Samuelson (1948) “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference”, 
Economica, v. 15: pp. 243-253.  P. A. Samuelson (1950) “The Problem of Integrability in Utility 
Theory”, Economica, v. 17: pp. 355-385. 
10 In “A Revision of Demand Theory” by J.R. Hicks, (Oxford, 1956), Page 6, the following 
illustrative quote citing this motivation and the understood significance of revealed preference 
theory is offered: “the econometric theory of demand does study human beings, but only as 
entities having certain patterns of market behavior; it makes no claim, no pretence, to be able to 
see inside their heads.” 
                   12 of 229 
The outside observer notices that this person chose x when y was available and 
infers that he preferred x to y.”11 
 
To extend this approach to more than a single choice Samuelson developed the 
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) as a consistency condition12, 
which stipulates roughly that if an individual shows a preference for x over y in 
the way just described, then she cannot also reveal a preference of y over x.13 
 
Unfortunately, as Sen argued in “Behavior and the Concept of Preference”14, 
there is a tension in Revealed Preference from the outset.  For the justification 
of WARP depends on attributing preferences to the agent under consideration, 
which is one of the complications Revealed Preference was supposed to avoid.  
The reason for this is straightforward.  If preferences, understood as attitudes or 
judgments that underlie choices, are not attributed to the agent under 
consideration, then WARP would simply require that the agent’s choices be 
consistent.  Without appealing to something other than choices there is no 
justification for requiring that an agent’s choices be consistent.  However, if 
preferences are attributed to an agent, and the agent’s preferences remain 
constant, then if the agent’s choices are to be consistent with the agent’s 
preferences, the agent’s choices must also be consistent.  While attributing 
preferences to the agent provides adequate grounds to justify the consistency 
condition, failing to do so undermines the justification for WARP on which 
Revealed Preference depends. 
                                                
11 , A.K. Sen, Choice Welfare and Measurement, (First Harvard University Press, 1998) 
Pages 54-55  
12 P. A. Samuelson, “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior”, Economica, 5 (1938) 
13 For the sake of readability this discussion relies on the version of WARP put forth by Sen in 
Choice Welfare and Measurement on pg 55. 
14 A.K. Sen, Choice Welfare and Measurement, (First Harvard University Press, 1998), 
Pages 54-73 
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So even in this early articulation of Preference Theory there was a question of 
how to interpret ‘preference’, and this question posed a challenge for the 
justification of the key consistency condition on which it depends.  
 
It should be noted that questions of how to interpret ‘preference’ were not 
restricted to Revealed Preference Theory.  Sen continued to draw attention to 
the prevalence of different interpretations of ‘preference’ in the literature.  For 
example, “Certainly, there is no remarkable difficulty in simply defining 
preference as the underlying relation in terms of which individual choices can 
be explained . . . In this mathematical operation preference will simply be the 
binary representation of individual choice. The difficulty arises in interpreting 
preference thus defined as preference in the usual sense with the property that 
if a person prefers x to y then he must regard himself to be better off with x than 
with y.”15  And, “the normal use of the word permits the identification of 
preference with the concept of being better off, and at the same time it is not 
quite unnatural to define “preferred” as “chosen”. I have no strong views on the 
“correct” use of the word “preference”, and I would be satisfied as long as both 
uses are not simultaneously made, attempting an empirical assertion by virtue 
of two definitions.”1617 
 
Justification for the completeness and/or transitivity condition 
                                                
15 Sen, On Economic Inequality 1973. 
16 Sen, Rational Fools 1977. 
17 The two interpretations of ‘preference’ that Sen points to have been noted by economists and 
philosophers.  They have been referred to by a variety of labels and slightly different definitions.  
For example, in “Sympathy, Commitment and Preferences”, Hausman refers to these 
understandings of preference as ‘expected advantage ranking’ and ‘choice ranking’ 
respectively.  (Pg 34)  And in “A difficult choice in preference theory: rationality implies 
completeness or transitivity but not both”, Mandler refers to the welfare definition and choice 
definition of preferences respectively. (Pg 15) 
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In “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, Mandler makes a significant contribution by showing 
that the different interpretations of ‘preference’ do not merely cause difficulties 
for Revealed Preference Theory, but for Preference Theories more generally.  
For, as the title of his article suggests, depending on the interpretation of 
‘preference’ relied on, rationality can either justify the completeness condition or 
the transitivity condition, but not both. 
 
Mandler’s argument consists of two different claims that build on each other.  
The first claim is that there are standard justifications for the completeness 
condition and the transitivity condition which rely on different interpretations of 
‘preference’.  The second claim is that the justifications for the completeness 
and transitivity conditions are incompatible with one another, in the sense that 
they cannot both be based on a common interpretation of ‘preference’.  These 
two claims will be looked at in turn. 
 
The standard arguments for the completeness condition, which Mandler 
considers the strongest available, are based on the notion of preference as 
choice.  The basic idea is that any agent whose preferences are possibly 
incomplete between any two alternatives, x and y, can be forced to choose 
between x and y by putting the agent in a choice situation such that if he/she 
does not choose between x and y, he/she will end up with an alternative, z, 
which is much less preferred to either x or y.  Since z can be made sufficiently 
unattractive, choices will always result.  By identifying these choices with 
preferences, it is claimed that preference orderings are never incomplete.   
 
                   15 of 229 
It is important to note that the choice of x or y that occurs because of this 
‘forcing procedure’ does not reflect a welfare judgment of x over y or y over x.18  
In contrast, the most prevalent justification for the transitivity condition, which 
comes from the Money Pump argument, relies on the interpretation of 
preferences as welfare judgments.   
 
Mandler describes the Money Pump argument in the following way: “Here 
agents exhibit a more blatant violation of transitivity: for some triple of options 
(x, y, z) preferences satisfy x> y, y > z, and z > x. Because each of these 
preferences is strict, such an agent, when originally endowed with z, will agree 
to part with a small amount of money to switch to y, then pay more money to 
switch from y to x, and then pay more money still to return to z, thereby ending 
up with the original status quo but with less money. If the judgments x > y, y > z, 
and z> x are not altered by the loss of wealth, the agent can be subjected to 
more rounds of pumping.”19 
 
In order to establish a justification for the transitivity condition as a condition of 
rationality, an understanding of the relevant conception of rationality is required.  
 
Accordingly, Mandler offers a general statement of the relevant conception of 
rationality. “The claims of preference theory are also less ambitious than is 
sometimes supposed. Economic analysis does not assert the absurdity that 
agents always choose the preference maximizing action. The theory claims only 
                                                
18 It is interesting to question the force of the resulting claim.  For example, does Mandler’s 
conclusion offer a justification of the completeness condition as a condition of rationality or 
merely a positive claim that agents’ preferences will always be complete?  This question will be 
raised again later. 
19 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
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that when agents systematically violate the dictates of economic rationality – 
which posit that agents can rank any pair of options and  
that rankings are transitively ordered – they suffer harm. Consequently, given 
practice and opportunity to learn, their behavior will in time conform more 
closely to the axioms of rationality. For many, this long-run link to behavior 
explains the role of rationality in preference theory: rationality can be a force 
that ultimately guides action.”20 
 
This general statement can be sharpened.  For Mandler there is an intimate 
connection between rationality and harm, such that if an agent systematically 
violates the dictates of rationality, the agent will suffer harm.  Therefore, if one 
can show that agents who have preferences with certain features suffer harm, 
then one can justify considering those features of the agents’ preferences 
irrational.   
 
This can be codified into what may be called a Consequentialist Justification 
comprised of two elements: 
• Consequentialist Conditional: If agents, who have preference orderings 
with certain features come to harm, then those features are irrational. 
• Consequentialist Claim: Agents whose preference orderings have certain 
features, such as intransitivity, suffer harm. 
 
The Money Pump argument satisfies the Consequentialist Justification by 
satisfying both the Consequentialist Claim and the Consequentialist 
Conditional.  I.e., The agent ends up with the “original status quo but with less 
                                                
20 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 1-2 
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money”21.  And he does so as a result of the intransitivity of his preferences.  
According to the Consequentialist Justification, this provides grounds for 
considering intransitive preferences irrational.  I.e., the transitivity condition is a 
condition of rationality.   
 
Strictly speaking, Mandler’s argument falls short of establishing that the 
justification of the transitivity condition relies on an interpretation of 
‘preferences’ as welfare judgments.  While the claim that the agent suffered 
harm is a judgment about the agent’s welfare, it is not dependent on interpreting 
the agent’s preferences as welfare judgments.  This is easily remedied. 
 
Mandler’s discussion of the transitivity condition is concerned with the ‘Ordinal 
Theory of Preference’, in which there are no external standard regarding what is 
good or bad for the agent.  The agent is authoritative over his own ‘good’.  To 
establish that the agent has been harmed one turns to the agent’s own 
judgments about his welfare.  In order to establish that the agent in the Money 
Pump argument has been harmed requires interpreting his preferences as 
welfare judgments and showing that the agent ends up in a situation he prefers 
less to the original, as would be the case if the agent had a preference for more 
money rather than less. 
 
Therefore, the Money Pump argument does offer a justification of the transitivity 
condition as a condition of rationality based on the Consequentialist Justification 
and interpreting the agent’s preferences as welfare judgments. 
 
                                                
21 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
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Taken together, this constitutes Mandler’s first claim, that there are standard 
justifications for the completeness condition and the transitivity condition which 
rely on different interpretations of ‘preference’.  The completeness condition 
relies on interpreting ‘preferences’ as choices, and the transitivity condition 
relies on interpreting ‘preferences’ as welfare judgments. 
 
With this review of the standard justification of the completeness and transitivity 
condition, the discussion can now turn to Mandler’s second claim, that the 
justifications for the completeness and transitivity conditions are incompatible, 
in the sense that they cannot both be based on a common interpretation of 
‘preference’. 
 
There are two alternatives, either the completeness and transitivity conditions 
can both be justified based on interpreting ‘preference’ as choice or as welfare 
judgments. 
 
To begin, consider the possibility of justifying the completeness and transitivity 
conditions based on interpreting ‘preference’ as welfare judgments.  Since the 
Money Pump Argument that justified the transitivity condition relied on 
interpreting ‘preference’ in this way, the question is whether this interpretation 
can also offer a justification of the completeness condition. 
 
Unfortunately, the ‘forcing procedure’ does not offer a justification of the 
completeness condition if ‘preference’ is interpreted as welfare judgments.  To 
see this, consider an agent that is presented with the ‘forcing procedure’ 
described above, and declines to choose x or y and so ends up with z.  Such an 
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agent would end up with an alternative that he preferred less to either of the 
other alternatives that were also available.   
 
If the agent’s preferences are interpreted as welfare judgments, then the agent 
would have suffered harm.  The Consequentialist Claim is satisfied.   However, 
the feature of the agent’s preferences that this examples points to is the agent’s 
choosing contrary to his preferences.  I.e., contrary to his preference for x over 
z or his preference for y over z, if the agent can be said to have chosen at all, 
he chose z over either x or y.  The Consequentialist Justification offers a 
justification of choosing in line with one’s preferences.  But even in the case in 
which the agent chose in line with his preferences, by either choosing x or y, to 
attribute to the agent a preference, interpreted as a welfare judgment, between 
x and y, would be to over-reach.  Interpreting ‘preference’ as welfare judgments 
does not offer a justification of the completeness condition based on the 
standard argument. 
 
That leaves the question of whether interpreting ‘preference’ as choice would 
fair better.  Since the ‘forcing procedure’ justifies the completeness condition 
based on interpreting ‘preference’ as choice, the question is whether this 
interpretation can offer a justification of the transitivity condition. 
 
To explore this possibility, Mandler offers the following variation of the earlier 
example.  “When preference is defined as choice we may interpret the 
expression a > b to mean “out of the set {a, b}, a is chosen” and a > b to mean 
“out of the set {a, b}, a is chosen and b is not.” If we assume that at least one 
element is chosen out of every set – in accordance with the forcing procedure – 
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then this preference-as-choice relation must be complete. Consequently, a 
violation of transitivity implies there is a triple (x, y, z) that satisfies x > y, y > z, 
and z > x. We now deploy the same sequence of exchanges used earlier: if z is 
the original status quo, the agent will agree to switch to y and then to x.”22 
 
The agent’s preferences are intransitive.  And through a series of exchanges, 
the agent can “end up with an option that is never chosen directly over the 
original status quo.”23  However, as it is this example does not satisfy the 
Consequentialist Claim.  Since no welfare judgments are ascribed, there is no 
basis for asserting that the agent with intransitive preferences suffers harm. 
 
To address this, Mandler suggests introducing “sliver of psychological content 
will bridge the gap. If we suppose that a > b implies that the agent judges 
himself or herself to be better off with a than with b, then we may conclude that 
intransitive choosers are irrational: they end up with x even though they judge z 
to be superior.”24 
 
This revised interpretation of the strict preference relation provides the basis for 
satisfying the Consequentialist Claim.  For the agent ends up with an alternative 
he regards to be inferior to the status quo, and so can – on one understanding – 
be said to suffer harm. 
 
                                                
22 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
23 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
24 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
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However, as Mandler points out, this argument relies on the strong reading of 
the weak preference relation such that “a > b means that an agent will always 
choose a from the set {a, b}.  And if the agent is unable to arrive at welfare 
judgments between these alternatives, this reading is too artificially demanding.  
An agent in this situation may well display status quo bias, i.e., choosing to stay 
with an alternative until offered a different alternative which the agent judges to 
make him better off.  In such cases, an agent’s intransitive preferences may not 
lead the agent to suffer harm.   
 
Incorporating these points in the current example, consider the case in which “y 
is unranked in welfare terms relative to both x and z, but… z is ranked superior 
to x.”25  If z is the status quo again, the agent will not switch to y, and as a 
result, will not suffer harm.  The agent has intransitive preferences, yet does not 
suffer harm.  The Consequentialist Claim is not satisfied, and therefore the 
Consequentialist Justification is not satisfied.  This interpretation of preferences 
as choices with a “sliver of psychological content” does not offer a justification 
of the transitivity condition. 
 
Thus, Mandler concludes there is a tension between the justification of the 
transitivity and completeness conditions.26  “Taking a bird’s eye view of the 
various arguments in favor of the ordinalist theory of rationality, a curious 
symmetry in their flaws appears. If preference is defined as a set of welfare 
judgments, then rational agents will satisfy transitivity but need not obey 
completeness; if preference is defined as choice, then although agents will 
                                                
25 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 17. 
26 Importantly for present purposes, Mandler also argues that these results reflect challenges 
with applying Preference Theories across varied domains.  This is a suggestion that will come 
up again later. 
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definitionally satisfy completeness, rationality does not imply that they must 
obey transitivity.”27 
 
Mandler poignantly focuses attention on a challenge to Preference Theories.  
The fact that ‘preference’ is open to multiple interpretations raises questions 
about the justification of the completeness and transitivity conditions.    
 
Framing the challenge 
Mandler’s title concisely frames the issue: rationality justifies completeness or 
transitivity, but not both.  The main thrust of Mandler’s argument is persuasive.  
He has successful shown that there is a need to revisit the justification of the 
completeness and transitivity conditions.  And further that successful 
justifications of both conditions should rely on consistent interpretations of 
‘preference’.   
 
While the subsequent discussion is sympathetic to Mandler’s argument, this 
can be obscured by points of difference.  For example, contrary to Mandler, it 
will be argued that the standard arguments do not justify the completeness and 
transitivity conditions as conditions of rationality.  And a suggested approach for 
justifying both conditions based on a consistent interpretation of ‘preference’ will 
be offered.  This seems to directly conflict with Mandler’s first and second claim.  
While it is important to note the difference, too much should not be made of it.  
For the current discussion takes on board Mandler’s main contribution in 
accepting that the standard arguments are based on incompatible 
interpretations of ‘preference’ and do not jointly justify the completeness and 
                                                
27 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 20. 
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transitivity conditions.  If anything, the current account may be a sharpening of 
Mandler’s work. 
 
There are three main points of difference with Mandler’s account.  The first 
point is really a clarification.  While Mandler initially suggests that the 
completeness condition is justified by rationality, the ‘forcing procedure’ he turns 
to in order to explain this does not offer such a justification.  Mandler seems to 
acknowledge this in characterizing the situation in the following way: “agents 
will definitionally satisfy completeness”.28  It will be suggested that this is a 
feature of the completeness condition itself and not merely the result of the 
‘forcing procedure’ used to justify it.  Indeed, as a result, it may be fruitful to 
consider the completeness condition an idealization rather than a condition of 
rationality. 
 
The second point directly conflicts with arguments Mandler offers.  The Money 
Pump is widely regarded as the justification for the transitivity condition, and 
Mandler argues for this view.  However, it will be argued that the force of the 
Money Pump is often overstated, and that there is reason to question whether it 
offers any justification for the transitivity condition.  This leaves the justification 
of the transitivity condition an open question which will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
The third point of difference introduces a challenge to offering a justification of a 
meaningful transitivity condition that Mandler did not consider.  Broome argued 
persuasively that in the absence of additional rational requirements the 
                                                
28 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 20. 
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prospect of fine individuation threatens to make the transitivity condition 
vacuous.  While this is a distinct issue from those raised by Mandler, it goes to 
the rational justification of the transitivity condition and will be dealt with along 
side them. 
 
Taken together, this suggests the challenge can fruitfully be re-framed as 
follows: can a consistent interpretation of ‘preference’ offer a justification of the 
completeness condition and a meaningful transitivity condition? 
 
This section will expand on the challenges of offering an answer to this 
challenge by exploring each of the three points of difference with Mandler’s 
account.  
 
The completeness condition as a condition of rationality? 
The first issue is relatively straightforward.  While Mandler initially described the 
completeness condition as a condition of rationality, his argument does not 
support this claim.  As was already seen, Mandler relies on the 
Consequentialist Justification to justify conditions of rationality.  The 
Consequentialist Justification in turn relies on an interpretation of ‘preference’ 
as welfare judgments in order to satisfy the Consequentialist Claim.  The 
‘forcing procedure’, on the other hand, relies on an interpretation of ‘preference’ 
as choice.  Therefore, the ‘forcing procedure’ does not satisfy the 
Consequentialist Claim, and as a result, the Consequentialist Justification does 
not justify considering the completeness condition a condition of rationality.29  
 
                                                
29 Even if a ‘sliver of psychological content’ is imputed to ‘preference’ the Consequentialist 
Justification would justify considering choosing contrary to one’s preferences irrational, but it 
would not justify considering incomplete preferences irrational. 
                   25 of 229 
It is possible to look for other ways to justify the completeness condition as a 
condition of rationality, but this is likely the wrong place to look.  For, on the face 
of it, it would be surprising to find that the completeness condition is a condition 
of rationality.  The reason for this is simple.  Taken literally, the completeness 
condition is extremely demanding.  There are an infinite number of alternatives 
over which an agent may form a preference, and whether ‘preference’ is 
interpreted as choice or welfare judgments, it seems eminently plausible that an 
agent may be unaware of a possibility and therefore may rationally fail to form a 
preference between two or more alternatives. 
 
Moreover, there is little pretense that the completeness condition is actually a 
condition of rationality.  As Mandler says the ‘forcing procedure’ shows that 
“agents will definitionally satisfy completeness”30  Mandler is not suggesting that 
agents’ actual preferences are complete, but that agents can be ‘forced’ to 
make choices between any two alternatives.  And if ‘preference’ is interpreted 
as choice, then agents can be ‘forced’ to have preferences between any two 
alternatives.  Given this, it may not be objectionable to stipulate that agents’ 
preferences are complete.   This claim is an idealization for the sake of 
theoretical tractability, not a claim about the requirements of rationality.  
 
This raises an interesting question.  If the completeness condition is an 
idealization rather than a rationality condition, what does this do to the 
significance of Mandler’s argument?   
 
                                                
30 Mandler, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 20. 
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Mandler’s argument was based on the observation that the justification of the 
completeness condition and the transitivity condition relied on different 
interpretations of ‘preference’.  If the completeness condition is understood as 
an idealization rather than a condition of rationality, it should not be surprising 
that the two conditions have very different justifications.   
 
Nonetheless, Mandler’s argument still has force.  For it is reasonable to expect 
that even if the completeness condition is an idealization, it should apply to the 
same interpretation of ‘preference’ as the transitivity condition.  For example, if 
the transitivity condition is interpreted as welfare judgments and if those 
preferences are to be complete and transitive, then it would seem that there 
must be a justification for claiming that the completeness condition applies to 
‘preference’ interpreted as welfare judgments, even if as an idealization.  The 
‘forcing procedure’ does not provide such a justification.  Is there another 
justification for the completeness condition that is based on the same 
interpretation of ‘preference’ that justifies the transitivity condition?   
 
This question will be explored in more detail in the positive section of this 
dissertation in Chapter 4: Preferences.  For now it is important to note that the 
justification of the completeness condition is an open question. 
 
Does the Money Pump Argument justify the transitivity conditions? 
The Money Pump Argument is widely regarded as justifying the transitivity 
condition, but there are reasons to question this view. 
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This may be surprising given the discussion of the Consequentialist Justification 
above.  As was mentioned, the Money Pump Argument satisfies the 
Consequentialist Claim, and therefore if the Consequentialist Conditional holds, 
the Money Pump Argument offers a justification of the transitivity condition.  The 
issue is that there is reason to question the Consequentialist Conditional.   
 
Consider a generalized version of the Consequentialist Justification: 
• P1: If X leads an agent to suffer negative consequences, then X is irrational. 
• P2: X leads an agent to suffer negative consequences, in suitable 
circumstances. 
• C: Therefore X is irrational. 
 
The Money Pump Argument also satisfies this general version of the 
Consequentialist Justification.  I.e., the Money Pump offers a case in which P2 
holds, and if P1 holds, then the conclusion follows.  Next, notice that if we take 
X to be ‘false beliefs’, then P2 would also hold.  If P1 holds, then it would follow 
that having false beliefs is irrational.  Having false beliefs is not irrational, 
therefore P1 does not hold; and therefore the Money Pump does not offer a 
Consequentialist Justification for considering intransitive preferences irrational.   
 
Further, because of the gap between preferences and the consequences of 
choices based on them, there does not seem to be a way to refine P1 so that it 
would apply to intransitive preferences but not false beliefs.31  Of course it is 
                                                
31 Consider the following example: 
• P1`: If X leads an agent to suffer negative consequences even when he is ideal in every 
other way, then X is irrational. 
• P2`: X leads an agent to suffer negative consequences in suitable circumstances, even 
when he is ideal in every other way. 
• C: Therefore X is irrational. 
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possible to restrict P1 so it only applies to preferences, but such a change 
would be a mere ad-hoc addition with little grounds other than preserving the 
Consequentialist Justification of the transitivity condition.   
 
If the Money Pump Argument fails to justify the transitivity condition based on 
the Consequentialist Justification, this is because of challenges with the 
Consequentialist Justification, not the Money Pump Argument.32  Perhaps the 
Money Pump Argument can justify the transitivity condition in another way.   
 
The Money Pump example first appeared in a paper by Davidson, McKinsey 
and Suppes “Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I”33, as an illustration of the 
justification they offered for the transitivity condition.  Unfortunately, this is of 
little help for current purposes.  The justification of the transitivity condition 
offered by Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes would not rule out intransitive 
preference in many cases in which the transitivity condition is thought to apply.  
And, second, the Money Pump example is not an illustration of the justification 
offered in the paper.  Both these points can be seen quite quickly. 
 
Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes were concerned with a choice over a triple of 
alternatives, x, y, and z.  They argue that if an agent had intransitive 
                                                                                                                                          
 
Since P2` still holds for false beliefs, P1` should as well.  But it does not. 
32 There is a variation of the Consequentialist Justification which arguable would apply to 
preferences, but not false beliefs.  Unfortunately, it fails for other reasons. 
 
Briefly put, the argument proceeds as follows.  The consequences of the Money Pump are 
unambiguously negative.  It is unreasonable to have preferences which make one susceptible 
to such negative consequences.  Having such unreasonable preferences is irrational.  
Therefore it is irrational to have intransitive preferences. 
 
While the argument may be valid, it is certainly not sound.  One can quite rationally be 
unreasonable, and quite reasonably be irrational.  This variation does not provide grounds for 
considering intransitive preferences irrational. 
33 Davidson, D., McKinsey, J., and Suppes, P. (1955) “Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I” 
Philosophy of Science 22, pp. 140-160. 
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preferences between x, y, and z, then he would not be able to make a rational 
choice, defined as a choice in which the alternative chosen was not less 
preferred to another one also available.  Therefore, his preferences would be 
irrational.   
 
Putting aside any evaluation of the argument, it is clear that an agent with the 
relevant intransitive preferences could nonetheless make a rational choice 
between pairs of outcomes.  Therefore the Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes 
justification of the transitivity condition is limited to cases in which the agent is 
choosing between three or more options; and this leaves out many of the cases 
in which the transitivity condition is generally thought to apply. 
 
For instance, it rules out the choices in the Money Pump example itself.  The 
Money Pump example is comprised of a series of diachronic choices over pairs 
of options.  Further, in each choice situation, the agent is able to make a 
rational choice, as defined by Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, by choosing 
the more preferred option.  As a result, the Money Pump example does not 
illustrate the Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes argument for which it was offered 
as an example.34 
 
If the Money Pump Argument does not offer a justification of the transitivity 
condition based on the argument offered by Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, it 
is still a poignant example.  Perhaps this is why it has gained currency of its 
own.  Indeed, there is an extended version of the Money Pump Argument which 
                                                
34 Interestingly, according to Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, the inspiration for the Money 
Pump comes from Dr. Norman Dalkey of the Rand Corporation. 
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seems to reflect something of the tension inherent in having intransitive 
preferences. 
 
Consider an extended version of the Money Pump Argument in which the agent 
allows himself to be iteratively pumped for all of his money.  On its surface this 
seems absurd, and it may be tempting to think that the Money Pump Argument 
can offer a justification of the transitivity condition based on a reduction ad 
absurdum.  However, a closer examination of a potential reductio suggests this 
is not the case.  Consider three different ways that an agent faced with an 
extended Money Pump might react. 
 
In the first scenario, the agent recognizes that he faces a Money Pump, and this 
affects his evaluation of the options he is presented in the following way.  When 
presented with the opportunity to trade zn for yn for a little bit of money, the 
agent recognizes that he is not only being offered a choice between zn and yn, 
but he is also being offered a choice between being pumped or not.  In other 
words, he is being offered a choice between zn and avoiding a Money Pump or 
yn and submitting to a Money Pump.35  In the spirit of the example, it can safely 
be assumed that the agent would prefer to avoid the Money Pump and would 
thereby prefer zn and avoiding the pump to yn and submitting to the pump.  If an 
agent who re-individuated the options in the face of new information in this way 
continued to choose in accordance with the Money Pump, then his choices 
would be irrational, though not because of the intransitivity of his preferences, 
but rather because he chose a less preferred alternative.  Of course, if he made 
                                                
35 Note that this is quite different from Rabinowicz and McLennan’s focus on so-called 
sophisticated choosers, who recognize that they are facing a money pump and use backwards 
induction to navigate the choices that are offered.  This is a matter of the individuation of 
options. 
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the rational choice, the agent would not be susceptible to the extended Money 
Pump. 
 
In contrast, the agent may evaluate zn and yn solely on their relative merits, 
despite the fact that he recognizes that by choosing yn he would thereby be 
submitting to the Money Pump.  This would clearly be absurd.  But to claim that 
the agent’s doing so is irrational is to claim that rationality requires that the 
agent reindividuate the options.  This does not support the claim that the 
transitivity conditions is a requirement of rationality, but makes a further claim 
that rationality requires that agents individuate options in a certain way.36 
 
Finally it might be the case that the agent does not recognize that he faces a 
Money Pump, and as a result the individuation of options does not reflect that 
fact.  Such an agent would plausibly continue to choose in accordance with the 
Money Pump.  However, in this case the reductio seems to lose its force.  It is 
not obviously absurd for the agent to choose in accordance with the Money 
Pump, if the fact that he is being pumped is relatively obscured.  What is 
obvious is that such an agent would suffer negative consequences as a result 
of his preferences, but a Consequentialist Justification, which has already been 
discussed, is very different from a justification based on a reductio.  Once the 
consequences of the agent’s choices are obscured from the choice itself, it is 
difficult to see the basis for the reductio. 
 
In light of this, though the Money Pump does seem to offer the basis for a 
reductio, the reductio seems to offer little justification for the transitivity 
condition.   
                                                
36 This suggestion, raised by Broome, has further promise and will be returned to shortly. 
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This leaves two issues.  First, the Money Pump Argument does not seem to 
offer a justification of the transitivity condition.  And second, there is the 
uncomfortable fact that there is little explanation for why the Money Pump 
Argument seems to be such a compelling example. 
 
To venture a suggestion on the second point, it is possible that the Money 
Pump Argument is such a compelling example, because every case in which an 
agent suffers harm because of the intransitivity of his preferences is a broadly 
speaking a Money Pump type case.  I.e., the Money Pump Argument is an 
archetypal example of all cases in which an agent suffers harm as a result of 
his intransitive preferences. 
 
If the Money Pump Argument does not justify the transitivity condition, what 
does?  For now this is a pressing open question for proponents of Preference 
Theories.  A possible justification for the transitivity condition will be explored in 
more detail in the positive section of this dissertation in Chapter 4: Preferences. 
 
Is the transitivity condition vacuous? 
In two influential works37, Broome raised a significant challenge for justifying a 
meaningful version of the transitivity condition.  The object of Broome’s concern 
was broader than the transitivity condition.  His focus was on what he referred 
to as the Moderate Humean View (MHV), according to which no single 
preference can be irrational, though patterns of preferences may be.  This goes 
                                                
37 Broome, John, “Can a Humean be moderate?”, in: Frey, R G (ed), Value, Welfare, and 
Morality, Cambridge University Press : New York, 1993.  And, Broome, John, Weighing Goods, 
Oxford : Cambridge, Mass. : Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
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beyond merely an interpretation of ‘preference’ which has been the concern to 
this point. Consider the following brief description of MHV. 
 
Reason has a role in guiding people through life.  It helps people determine and 
modify their preferences; the ultimate basis of which is unconstrained by 
rationality.  While no specific preference can be irrational on its own, certain 
patterns of preferences can be.  Some preferences can give grounds for others, 
such that if a person has some preferences it would be irrational for her not to 
have others, (by transitivity, for instance).  The fundamental principle: a reason 
is always derived from a preference.  This fundamental principle is 
supplemented with requirements of practical rationality.  I.e., if an agent has 
inconsistent preferences, rationality requires her to resolve the inconsistency, 
but does not determine in which way this should be done.  As Broome concisely 
expresses it, according to MHV, “You may, rationally, have any preferences, 
provided only that they are consistent with each other.  And what consistency 
requires is spelled out in decision theory.”38 
 
Rather than an interpretation of ‘preference’, MHV is perhaps better understood 
as a conception of practical reasoning comprised of a conception of reason, the 
sources of reasons, and the limits of rationality.  It is perhaps one of the 
standard conceptions of practical reasoning used to ground the concept of 
preferences39. While MHV will not play a significant role in the remainder of this 
dissertation, the features of transitivity to which Broome points, and the 
attending requirements for offering a meaningful condition of transitivity are not 
                                                
38 Broome, John, “Can a Humean be moderate?”, in: Frey, R G (ed), Value, Welfare, and 
Morality, Cambridge University Press : New York, 1993.  And, Broome, John, Weighing Goods, 
Oxford : Cambridge, Mass. : Basil Blackwell, 1991, pg 69. 
39 The relation between the concept preference and conceptions of practical reasoning will 
receive more attention shortly. 
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limited to MHV.  They are features of transitivity itself and apply to conceptions 
of ‘preference’ more generally.  It is these aspects of Broome’s discussion that 
will be of interest here. 
 
There are roughly 3 steps to Broome’s argument. 
§ Step 1: The prospect of fine individuation poses a problem to the 
transitivity condition and thereby to MHV, which relies on it. 
§ Step 2: There are only two alternatives that can save transitivity from the 
problems posed by fine individuation. 
§ Step 3: These two alternatives are themselves inconsistent with MHV. 
§ Conclusion: Therefore, one can give up the transitivity condition, and thus 
give up MHV, or one can defend the transitivity condition by stipulating 
either of these two alternatives, and thereby give up MHV. 
 
If Broome is right, the Moderate Humean faces a damning dilemma.  Whichever 
option he chooses, he must give up MHV.  Since the current discussion is 
interested in exploring the general feature Broome points to, and not defending 
MHV per se, the following discussion will be focused on the first two steps of 
Broome’s argument.   
 
With this general background established, it is possible to carry on with an 
exploration of Broome’s argument. 
 
Step 1: The prospect of fine individuation poses a problem to the transitivity 
condition and thereby to the MHV, which relies on it.   
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The problem posed by the prospect of fine individuation is most easily 
illustrated through the example Broome considers: Maurice, when given a 
choice between going to the Alps (A) and going to Rome (R), he prefers to go to 
Rome (R).  When offered a choice between staying at home (H) and going to 
Rome (R), he prefers to stay at home (H).  And, when offered a choice between 
staying home and going to the Alps (A), he prefers to going to the Alps (A). 
 
Maurice’s preferences seem to be intransitive.  It appears that he prefers 
staying home to going to Rome, going to Rome to going to the Alps, and going 
to the Alps to staying home, which can be represented as follows: H > R, R > A, 
A > H.  This seems to be a classic case of intransitive preferences. 
 
However, Broome points out, that Maurice has a defense against the charge of 
irrationality.  It may be the case that Maurice sees four alternatives, instead of 
three.  For instance, Maurice may see staying home instead of going to the Alps 
as cowardly, while this does not apply to the choice between staying at home 
and going to Rome.  The alternatives over which Maurice’s preferences range 
can be represented as follows: 
§ Hr: Staying at home when going to Rome was the other alternative 
§ R: Going to Rome 
§ A: Going to the Alps 
§ Ha: Being cowardly by staying at home when going to the Alps was the 
other alternative 
 
When the alternatives over which Maurice’s preferences range are finely 
individuated in this way, his preferences can be represented as follows: R > A, 
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A > Ha, Hr > R.  It is easy to see that represented in this way Maurice’s 
preferences are transitive, and therefore Maurice is not guilty of an irrationality.  
 
If it is the case that whenever an instance of apparent intransitivity is 
encountered, it can always be explained away by individuating the outcomes 
more finely, transitivity will not constrain the practical preferences an agent can 
have.40  Unless, that is, there is some basis on which to limit fine individuation.  
Succinctly put, if finer individuation is always possible, then the transitivity 
condition does not constrain an agent’s practical preferences and seems 
crucially empty. 
 
Step 2: There are two alternatives that can save transitivity from the problems 
posed by fine individuation. 
 
The transitivity condition only constrains practical preferences, has content, 
when it is possible to determine that some agent’s preferences are intransitive, 
and therefore irrational.  If fine individuation is always possible, then every 
apparently intransitive set of preferences can be understood as a transitive set 
of preferences over more finely individuated outcomes.  To save transitivity, to 
restore its content, it must be possible, at times, to limit the prospect of fine 
individuation.  To understand what this involves, return to the example at hand. 
 
                                                
40 This is not to say that transitivity does not have any bite whatsoever, for in the example 
above, transitivity would still require that Maurice have the following preference: Hr > A.  In other 
words, Maurice prefers staying at home when going to Rome was the other alternative, to going 
to the Alps.  But of course this is a choice that Maurice could never face.  Preferences between 
such outcomes Broome calls a nonpractical preference.  The current discussion will not be 
concerned with nonpractical preferences here. 
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Maurice claims to be rational by more finely individuating outcomes.  Broome 
understands this claim to rationality to be a conjunction of two further claims.  
First, that Hr and Ha are different outcomes.  And second, that it is rational to 
have a preference between them.  To deny Maurice’s claim to rationality, one 
must deny the prospect of fine individuation by denying either of these claims.  
The two alternatives that Broome suggests can save transitivity, the Principle of 
Individuation by Justifiers (PIJ) and the Rational Requirement of Indifference 
(RRI), do so by offering the basis for denying claims of these kinds. 
 
PIJ is intended to offer the basis for denying claims like Maurice’s first claim, 
that Hr and Ha are different outcomes.  Succinctly put, it states that two 
outcomes should be individuated from one another, if and only if they differ in 
terms of a justifier; where justifiers can be understood to “mean a difference 
between two putative outcomes that makes it rational to have a preference 
between them.”41 
 
The basic idea is easy to grasp.  Given PIJ, if Hr and Ha do not differ in terms of 
a justifier then Maurice’s claim that Hr and Ha are different outcomes can be 
denied.  And, if Maurice’s preferences range over three outcomes (H, R, and 
A), rather than four (Hr, Ha, R and A) then Maurice’s preferences are intransitive 
and he is guilty of an irrationality.  That transitivity can establish that Maurice’s 
preferences are irrational with the help of PIJ, is an example of how PIJ can 
help save the substantive content of the transitivity condition. 
 
It is interesting to note that is not sufficient to establish the identity of Hr and Ha.  
The identity of (or indifference between) the other outcomes must also be 
                                                
41 Broome, Weighing Good, pg 103. 
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established to establish the agent’s preferences are intransitive.  To see this, 
consider an example concerning sequential choices over pairs of outcomes.42  
Tom is offered a choice between coffee (x1) and soda (y1), then later a choice 
between soda (y2) and beer (z2), and still later a choice between beer (z3) and 
coffee (x3).  In the first situation Tom chooses coffee because he prefers coffee 
to soda.  In the second he chooses soda because he prefers soda to beer.  And 
in the third situation he chooses beer, because he prefers beer to coffee.  It 
appears that Tom’s preferences may be intransitive, i.e. Tom prefers coffee to 
soda, soda to beer and beer to coffee.  What remains to establish that Tom’s 
preferences are intransitive? 
 
To establish that Tom’s preferences are intransitive it needs to be established 
that the coffee that Tom chose over soda in the first choice situation, x1, should 
be treated as the same as the coffee that Tom did not choose in the third choice 
situation, x3, and so on for soda and beer.43  In other words, for Tom’s 
preferences to be intransitive, it must be the case that x1 should be treated as 
the same as x3, that y1 should be treated as the same as y2, and that z2 should 
be treated as the same as z3.   
                                                
42 Discussions of (in)transitive preferences are generally concerned with sequential choices 
between pairs of outcomes.  Though Broome is not explicit about this, I presume he is 
concerned with sequential choices as well; not merely because it is a matter of convention, but 
also because Broome’s arguments only apply in such situations.   
 
To see this, consider what would be the case if we were not concerned with sequential choices 
between pairs.  For instance, consider Tom’s choice between x, y, and z, if Tom’s preferences 
were as follows: x > y, y > z, and z > x.  Here Tom’s preferences are intransitive.  Tom can 
choose x from the alternatives x, y and z, y from the alternatives x, y and z, or z from the 
alternatives x, y and z.  His preferences are intransitive, and they are irrational because there is 
no choice that Tom can make in which he does not choose an outcome that he prefers less to 
another that is also available.  Further, finer individuation of the outcomes will not help in this 
case.  As such, we can safely presume that Broome’s comments pertain to sequential choices 
between pairs of outcomes. 
43 The question of whether two outcomes are actually the same partially depends on the 
ontology of outcomes.  To discuss Broome’s arguments against the moderate Humean view 
without first settling questions regarding the nature of outcomes, a somewhat clumsily vague 
articulation ‘treated as the same as’ has been adopted in the hope that it can accommodate a 
variety of positions on the matter.  
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PIJ (and RRI) offers the basis for treating each member of these pairs in the 
same way, and in so doing enables one to defend a meaningful transitivity 
condition.44 
 
With this discussion of PIJ, it is possible to move on to the third step of 
Broome’s argument.   
 
Step 3: These two alternatives are themselves inconsistent with MHV.45 
 
There are two prima facie reasons to accept Broome’s claim that PIJ is 
inconsistent with MHV.  First, to the extent that PIJ itself suggests that it is 
irrational to have a preference between two alternatives if they do not differ in 
some respect, it seems to conflict with the MHV position that no specific 
preference is irrational. 
 
Second, PIJ depends on justifiers, and according to Broome’s definition of 
justifiers an agent is justified in having a preference between two outcomes 
‘only if the outcomes differ in some good or bad respect’.46  This is a definition 
                                                
44 At this point it is worthwhile to comment on the fact that there has been no discussion of 
Broome’s second alternative, RRI.  There are three reasons why PIJ has been the focus to the 
exclusion of RRI.  First, while Broome sees PIJ and RRI as being closely connected and is 
personally more inclined to pursue RRI, he notes that the literature generally focuses on the 
question of individuation, and so he follows this convention in focusing on PIJ.  Here it is 
Broome’s lead and the general convention by focusing on PIJ and the general convention which 
are being followed. 
 
Second, as was discussed earlier, in order to save the transitivity requirement, either PIJ or RRI 
will do.  Since the subsequent discussion will offer a basis for PIJ, it will be sufficient to address 
the challenge of fine individuation. 
 
Third, PIJ and RRI are intimately connected.  As a result, the suggested view has the resources 
to offer an account of PIJ or RRI.  So, focusing on both seems somewhat redundant. 
45 Of course, the discussion will only focus on Broome’s claim that PIJ is inconsistent with MHV. 
46 Broome, Weighing Good, pg 106. 
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of justifiers that includes substantive commitments about what preferences it is 
rational for an agent to  
have, and as such is inconsistent with MHV. 
 
This leads to Broome’s conclusion that MHV faces a damning dilemma: one 
can give up the transitivity condition, and thus give up MHV, or one can defend 
the transitivity condition by stipulating either of these two alternatives, and 
thereby give up MHV. 
 
Since the current discussion is not interested in defending MHV per se, the 
conclusion will not be pursued further here.  Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to 
note the force of Broome’s argument. 
 
Moreover, the challenge of fine individuation is a challenge that stems from the 
nature of transitivity itself.  And, any successful justification of the transitivity 
condition should deal with the problem of fine individuation.  The discussion of 
PIJ, and to a lesser extent RRI, suggest that Broome has presented a viable 
way of doing so.   
 
Challenge Reframed 
In light of this the challenge can be re-framed: Is it possible to offer a 
justification of the completeness and transitivity condition based on the same 
interpretation of ‘preference’ that answers the challenge posed by the prospect 
of fine individuation?  
 
Stage 2: The Approach 
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The strategy that will be pursued to address this challenge in the remainder of 
this dissertation is based on three observations, each of which has already 
been mentioned in passing.  It will be helpful to make them explicit. 
1. Formal / substantive distinction: The formal treatment of choice in 
Preference Theories can be distinguished from the substantive theories 
of choice on which they rely. 
2. Conception of practical reasoning, not merely interpretation: While the 
challenges have by and large been framed as a tension between the 
interpretation of ‘preference’ and the justification of the consistency 
conditions which apply to them, there is a broader context which is 
relevant.  The justification of the consistency conditions depend in part 
on the relevant understanding of other concepts such as rationality, 
reasons, value, which comprise a conception of practical reasoning. 
3. Conceptions of practical reasoning are inter-defined: Concepts such as 
rationality, reasons, value, beliefs and desires are often inter-defined 
such that taken together they comprise what will be called a conception 
of practical reasoning.47  More specifically, for present purposes a 
conception of practical reasoning will be taken to be comprised of 
conceptions of the relevant concepts such as reasons, rationality, value, 
beliefs and desires. 
 
Recognizing this, the current discussion will seek to enumerate conceptions of 
the basic concepts which make up a conception of practical reasoning that has 
been emerging in the moral philosophy and philosophy of action.  It will then 
                                                
47 As a result, it is often un-helpful to discuss them in isolation, or without at least tacit reference 
to the conception of practical reasoning in which they are situated. 
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seek to use this conception of practical reasoning as a foundation to justify the 
completeness and transitivity conditions. 
 
Formal / substantive distinction: 
Preference Theories are formal in character.  This is not to say that substantive 
commitments do not play a significant role.  The discussion above should attest 
to that.  Rather it is to say that the formal character is a central element in 
Preference Theories.  The formal aspects of the theories can be readily 
identified and may be consistent with different substantive commitments.   
 
More specifically the formal aspects of Preference Theories consist of the 
preference relations (defined above) and the consistency requirements or 
axioms that apply to it.  As elements of a formal theory, they are strictly 
separable from substantive commitments with which they are often associated.  
This was intended from the outset.  Debreu explains the point as follows.  
“Allegiance to rigor dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis where the theory, 
in the strict sense, is logically entirely disconnected from its 
interpretations…Such a dichotomy reveals all the assumptions and the logical 
structure of the analysis.  It also makes possible immediate extensions of that 
analysis without modification of the theory by simply reinterpretations of 
concepts…”48 
 
This provides a great deal of flexibility to the application of the formal elements 
of Preference Theory, as is illustrated by Broome’s use of them to examine 
questions in ethics.   
 
                                                
48 Debreu 1959 Pg x. 
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“I am thinking of the core theory of economics: ‘preference theory’ it is 
sometimes called, or ‘consumer theory’ or ‘utility theory’, or ‘expected utility 
theory’…  Formally, the theory is nothing more than the axioms and theorems.  
It can be reinterpreted by substituting in place of preference any other relation 
that happens to satisfy the axioms.  Take these two relations: 
 
 Betterness relation for a person. _ is better for the person than _. 
 General betterness relation. _ is better than _. 
 
I think each of these betterness relations satisfies the axioms fairly well, though 
not perfectly.  Each probably satisfies them better than people’s preferences do 
in practice.  So, provided we are careful, the whole of utility theory is available 
to provide an analysis of the structure of betterness.”49 
 
The current effort is less ambitious than Broome’s.  The formal treatment of 
choices in Preference Theories will not be directly applied to questions in ethics.  
But the subsequent discussion will examine the relation between these formal 
theories and the substantive grounds on which they depend.  For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that these aspects of Preference Theories can 
be distinguished from the substantive commitments. 
 
Conception of practical reasoning, not merely interpretation: 
To this point the discussion has focused on the question of the interpretation of 
‘preference’ and the tension with the associated consistency conditions.  For 
example, in the succinct discussion of Revealed Preference Theory, it was 
noted that Samuelson interpreted ‘preference’ as choice, and Sen showed that 
                                                
49 Broome, Ethics Out of Economics, pg 8,9. 
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this raised issues for justifying WARP, the consistency condition on which 
Revealed Preference depends.  And the force of Mandler’s argument stemmed 
from the fact the interpreting ‘preference’ as choice offered a possible 
justification of the completeness condition, while the standard justification of the 
transitivity condition relied on interpreting ‘preference’ as welfare judgments.  
Further, this presents a challenge for Preference Theory because the two 
interpretations are in a sense incompatible. 
 
There is, however, a larger context that is relevant, particularly if the 
completeness and/or transitivity condition are to be considered conditions of 
rationality.  The point is straightforward.  To offer a justification of conditions of 
rationality, a view of rationality and its connection, or possible connection, to 
other concepts such as preferences and choices is at least implicitly required.  
This became clear in the discussion of the Money Pump Argument’s possible 
justification, or lack thereof, of the transitivity condition.  It turned out that it was 
not only important whether or not ‘preference’ was interpreted as a welfare 
judgment, but whether the Consequentialist Justification was viable as a 
justification for a condition of rationality. 
 
A similar point was brought to light in Broome’s discussion of the transitivity 
condition.  The challenge posed by the prospect of fine individuation is a result 
of features of the transitivity condition that any successful account of preference 
will likely have to meet.  However, this posed damming dilemma to MHV, 
because of the substantive commitments MHV has regarding the relation 
between preferences and rationality.  The dilemma itself results from features of 
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MHV, not the transitivity condition.  Plausibly a different substantive conception 
of practical reasoning could avoid this dilemma. 
 
There are a collection of concepts related to practical reasoning, such as 
reasons, rationality, preferences, value, beliefs and desires.  These concepts 
can be understood or conceived of in different ways.  Taken together a given 
collection or set of conceptions of these concepts comprise a possible view of 
how agents choose, or a conception of practical reasoning. 
 
The examples above illustrate that the justification of the consistency conditions 
depends on the associated conception of practical reasoning. 
 
Conceptions of practical reasoning are inter-defined: 
In a sense, the relation between the consistency conditions and associated 
conception of practical reasoning is not unique.  The concepts that comprise a 
conception of practical reasoning are also inter-related. 
 
Take for example what Broome refers to as the Preference-Satisfaction theory 
of good.  “What is the substantive theory implicit in economics?  It is not a 
complete theory of good, but only a theory about what is good for a person.  It is 
specifically: 
Preference-satisfaction theory of good.  One thing A is better for a 
person than another thing B if and only if the person prefers A to B. 
 
(Actually, this biconditional does not express the preference-satisfaction theory 
completely.  The theory also requires the determination to go from right to left: 
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when a person prefers A to B, that makes it the case that A is better for her than 
B.)”50 
 
Here the good is defined in terms of an agent’s preferences.  In a similar vein, 
Fehige and Wessels define the rational and the moral in terms of preferences.  
“Preferences, so the received opinion, are the alpha and omega of practical 
reasoning: people are rational if they do what they believe will best satisfy their 
own preferences (parenthetical omitted); and people are moral if they do what 
will satisfy everybody’s preferences (parenthetical omitted).”51 
 
In contrast rationality may be thought to place independent limits on 
preferences.  For example, in the earlier discussion of the challenge posed by 
fine individuation suggested that saving the transitivity condition may require 
rationality to place limits on the individual preferences agent’s can rationally 
have. 
 
The possibilities are multiple52, and the point here is not to offer a catalogue of 
different approaches.  Rather for present purposes it is important to note that 
claims about what rationality requires, for instance, or what conditions can be 
justified, depend in part on the relevant conception of rationality.  And the 
relevant conception of rationality depends in part on the broader conception of 
practical reasoning.   
 
                                                
50 Broome, Ethics Out of Economics, pg 3. 
51 Fehige and Wessels, Preferences, pg xxv – xxvi. 
52 To provide a brief indication of the range of possibilities, it is possible to: 
• define reasons in terms of desires as Hausman does, or desires in terms of reasons as 
Scanlon suggests; 
• define value in terms of reason as Scanlon does or describe reasons as dependent on 
value, as Raz does; 
• define rationality in terms of reasons, or distinguish rationality from reasons altogether. 
                   47 of 229 
Further, since the conception of key concepts within a conception of practical 
reasoning is in part derived from its context within a conception of practical 
reasoning, there is little purpose to argue which conception is more appropriate 
simplicitor – that is to say without reference to the relevant conception of 
practical reasoning.   
 
To summarize, possible justifications of the completeness and transitivity 
conditions depend on the relevant conception of rationality.  The relevant 
conception of rationality in turn depends on the broader conception of practical 
reasoning.   
 
Strategy: 
In light of these observations this dissertation will seek to offer a justification of 
the completeness and transitivity condition by elaborating a conception of 
practical reasoning that has been emerging in moral philosophy, philosophy of 
law and action theory.  Specifically, the discussion will be comprised of three 
substantive chapters.  Chapter 2: Reasons is based on a conception of reasons 
introduced by Raz in Practical Reasons and Norms53.  Chapter 3: Rationality 
will seek to elaborate on a conception of rationality that builds on this view of 
reasons.  And Chapter 4: Preferences will offer an account of preferences 
situated within the context of these conceptions of reasons and rationality.  
From this vantage point the discussion will explore whether the suggested 
account can offer a justification of the completeness and transitivity conditions 
that addresses the challenge posed by the prospect of fine individuation. 
 
                                                
53 Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms, London : Hutchinson, 1975. 
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It is worthwhile to make a few comments before proceeding.  First, while the 
following the discussion will focus on core elements of a conception of practical 
reasoning, it will touch on others such as value and desires, and omit still 
others.  In this way the discussion will inevitably be incomplete.  The focus of 
the current work is to explore a possible justification for the completeness and 
transitivity conditions.  There is no pretense of offering an exhaustive 
elaboration of a conception of practical reasoning.  Further, while the discussion 
is in some way anchored by a conception of reasons introduced to Raz, it both 
draws together views currently in the literature and suggests others.  Effort will 
be made to distinguish between the two. 
 
That said, to say the goal of the current effort is to merely offer a justification of 
the completeness and transitivity conditions would be misleading.  There is a 
larger goal which the discussion seeks to serve.  The fields of study mentioned 
above deal with choice as a substantive matter.  For the moment they will be 
referred to as Substantive Choice Theories.  Preference Theories, on the other 
hand, deal with choice as a primarily formal matter.  While their domains of 
study often overlap, currently there is little connection between the two54.  This 
naturally raises the question of whether there is a relation between the two, and 
if so, what it is? 
 
The promise of elaborating a connection between Preference Theories and 
Substantive Choice Theories is greater than merely answering an intriguing 
intellectual curiosity.  As a prodigious formal theory, Preference Theories are 
widespread.  The conclusions that are drawn from them guide individual actions 
                                                
54 Broome’s work employing the formalism of Preference Theory to investigate the structure of 
the good may be a notable recent exception. 
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and national policies; and the questions to which they are applied continue to 
grow rapidly.  However, as evidenced by the current discussion, Preference 
Theories at times seem to lack the resources to adequately address complex 
normative challenges55.  On the other hand, Substantive Choice Theories offer 
the basis for a nuanced treatment of the complex normative challenges which 
are a regular feature of agents’ daily lives, but – possibly because of this – are 
often confined to the rarefied atmosphere of academic discourse; rarely 
effecting the issue which are the subject of their concern.   
 
Understanding the relationship, if any, between Preference Theories and 
Substantive Choice Theories, may provide this powerful and widespread 
formalism with the substantive resources to more adequately address the 
challenges with which it is tasked, while opening new domains for substantive 
exploration. 
 
It may be objected, that part of the allure of Preference Theories was precisely 
that they did not require such substantive commitments.  To this objection it can 
be said, that first as was already discussed, nothing herein suggests that 
Preference Theories need be committed to the suggested conception of 
practical reasoning.  They may be compatible with many others.  And second, it 
is hoped that the previous discussion showed this aspect of Preference 
Theories to be more mirage than virtue. 
 
Moreover, if the current effort can offer a justification of the completeness and 
transitivity conditions, it may have many other theoretical virtues to recommend 
                                                
55 It may be claimed that complex normative challenges are not the subject matter of Preference 
Theories.  But even the current question of how to justify the completeness and transitivity 
conditions is a complex normative matter in its nature and in its ramifications. 
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it.  For example, it will expand the explanatory powers of Preference Theories 
and show how Preference Theories fit well with other theoretical commitments. 
 
If this is part of the motivation for undertaking this challenge, it is nonetheless 
acknowledged that the current effort is only a small start. 
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Chapter 2: Reasons 
 
“It is generally agreed that the notion of a normative reason cannot be 
explained through an eliminative definition. That is, any explanation of it in 
which the word ‘reason’ does not occur will include another term or phrase 
whose meaning is close to that of ‘a reason’ so that those who puzzle over the 
nature of reasons will not be helped by the definition. It will raise similar puzzles 
in their mind. We explain the notion of a normative reason by setting out its 
complex inter-relations to other concepts. Not to explain, but to minimally locate 
what we are talking about, we can say that normative reasons, if there are such, 
count in favour of that for which they are reasons. They have the potential to 
(that is, they may) justify and require that which they favour.”56 
 
In seeking to enumerate a conception of practical reasoning consistent with 
Preference Theory this chapter will focus on the foundational concept of 
reasons. 
 
Acknowledging the methodological implications of Raz’s point the discussion 
will eschew attempts to offer an eliminative definition and instead proceed in 
two stages.   
 
The first stage will focus on the complex inter-relations between reasons and 
three key concepts often associated with Preference Theory, preferences, 
desires and value.  This section will help to focus on the relevant concept of 
reasons and locate the discussion relative to Preference Theory.  In two 
different ways this section is also something of a promissory note.  First in that it 
                                                
56 Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative”, pg 6. 
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introduces aspects of the relationship between reasons and peferences, desires 
and values that will only be fully described in subsequent chapters.  Second in 
that begins a broader reconsideration of commitments associated with 
Preference Theories that is a goal of this dissertation as a whole. 
 
The second stage turns its attention in the opposite direction.  Rather than 
examining the relationship between reasons and other concepts, the second 
stage focuses on the conception of reasons itself.  This stage will seek to 
expand upon an analysis of reasons offered by Raz in his seminal work 
“Practical Reasons and Norms” by offering an approach for unpacking the 
concept into its constitutive elements.  In so doing, this section seeks to 
demystify aspects of reasons talk; and provide more tools for ascertaining 
whether or not a fact is a reason, whether it is the same or a different reason 
than another fact, and what it contributes to the reasons of which it is a part.  
 
In so far as the second stage sheds light on the structure of reasons, it will also 
make another contribution to the larger goal of articulating a conception of 
practical reasoning that can anchor Preference Theories.  For Preference 
Theories themselves have a formal structure, and as such it will be interesting 
to reflect on the possible compatibility of the two, noting similarities and 
differences.  Indeed, it will be suggested that it is fruitful to understand reasons 
as having a structure that is consistent with the formal structure of preferences 
in an interesting way. 
 
-- 
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At first glance the suggested view of reasons would appear to be at odds with 
Preference Theories.  Not so much because of any obvious conflict with 
Preference Theories themselves, but because of conflicts with at least three 
views often associated with them, specifically: 
• Preferences prima facie provide reasons 
• Desires prima facie provide reasons 
• Something is good if it gives us reasons. 
 
Appearances, it will be argued, can be deceiving.  While the suggested view is 
at odds with each of these claims, the cost of giving them up is not as great as 
one may imagine for two reasons.  First, because some these claims are not as 
appealing as they may first appear.  And second, because in each of these 
cases the suggested view has the resources to describe the relationship 
between these concepts in a way that is consistent with what one might call the 
broader spirit of these claims.  Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
 
Do preferences prima facie provide reasons?  Discussion of this question will, 
by necessity, be limited at the moment as discussion of the relationship 
between reasons and preferences depends on much that will be addressed in 
the next three chapters.  Even so, the intuitive appeal of the claim that 
preferences do prima facie provide reasons may present a powerful objection to 
the suggested view and it is important to acknowledge this at the outset.   
 
The view that preferences prima facie provide reasons seems widespread, 
even if it is often unstated.  Consider the case of Tom and Jane deciding 
whether to go sailing or surfing.  Jane prefers sailing to surfing, and Tom is 
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indifferent between the two.  All other things being equal, Jane’s preferences 
seem to provide reasons for them to go sailing instead of surfing.  Indeed this 
intuition seems profoundly scalable.  It appears to apply to Jane’s individual 
preferences, e.g., Jane’s preferences seem to give her a reason to go sailing 
over surfing.  And it also seems to apply to societies or communities as a 
whole.  E.g., if some prefer state A over state B, and none prefer state B over 
state A, then there seems to be a reason for the society or community to 
choose state A over state B. 
 
Contrary to this intuition, on the suggested view preferences do not prima facie 
provide reasons.  Over the next two chapters it will be argued that this is a 
virtue and not a vice of the position.  More specifically, a view of reasons and 
preferences will be offered in which preferences do not prima facie provide 
reasons, but that can account for the fact that in some cases Jane may be 
irrational for not choosing to go sailing over surfing, that Tom may have reason 
to go sailing because of Jane’s preferences for doing so, and that the fact that 
some prefer A to B may be worthy of consideration when deciding between 
states.  Further it will be suggested that these are situations of very different 
kinds and that some characteristics in which they differ are normatively salient.  
That the suggested view is able to account for these differences and arrive at 
conclusions that resonate with many of our intuitive judgments seems to 
capture the spirit of the view that preferences prima facie provide reasons.   
 
Unfortunately explaining how and why the suggested view arrives at these 
conclusions requires significant groundwork that will begin with a discussion of 
the two other related but quite distinct claims rejected by the suggested view 
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mentioned above.  For the time being, fulfilling the promissory note of 
explaining the relationship between reasons and preferences will have to wait.  
 
Do desires prima facie provide reasons?  The intuitive appeal of the idea that 
desires prima facie provide reasons may be even stronger than the view that 
preferences do.  After all, in some cases an agent has a reason to take action 
because of the desires he has.  For example, in some cases an agent has 
reason to eat vanilla ice cream because he desires vanilla ice cream.  His 
desire to eat ice cream seems to provide him a prima facie reason to do so.   
 
To deny that an agent’s desires prima facie provide reasons seems significant.  
However, exploring this issue further will help put things in a different 
perspective57. 
 
First, it is important to identify the relevant concept of reasons.  For example, in 
a many cases it may be accurate to say of an agent that he ate the vanilla ice 
cream because he desired to do so.  In cases like this, when an agent acts on a 
reason, the reason is operative; and can be referred to as an operative reason.   
 
Alternatively there are reasons that an agent has to act whether or not he acts 
on that reasons.  These reasons are considerations that count in favor of an 
agent acting in one way or another.  These reasons indicate what the agent 
should or ought to do.  These reasons are normative reasons.   
 
                                                
57 This is a well established distinction discussed among other places in Raz, Practical Reasons 
and Norms. 
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A reason may be an operative reason without being a normative reason.  And a 
reason may be a normative reason without being an operative reason.  
Normative reasons and operative reasons can be strictly separable.  However, 
there are also times when an agent acts on his normative reason, in which case 
the agent’s operative reason is also his normative reason.  To the extent that 
these two different reason concepts are distinct, this chapter is concerned with 
normative rather than operative reasons.  Cached out in these terms, the claim 
associated with the suggested view is that the agent’s desires may give him no 
(normative) reason to eat the ice cream, even though it may be his (operative) 
reason for eating it. 
 
There is a similar but different distinction to be drawn between normative and 
explanatory reasons.  Explanatory reasons are answers to why questions.  For 
example, when asked why the agent drove to the train station, it may be 
appropriate to answer that the agent drove to the station because he had 
promised to pick up a friend.  In contrast, ‘(normative) reasons for an action are 
considerations which count in favour of that action’58.  Normative reasons ‘guide 
decision(s) and action(s), and form a basis for their evaluation’59   
 
At first glance the fact that explanatory and normative reasons play different 
roles would appear to be sufficient to draw a distinction between them.  But the 
situation is more complex.  For, in that same situation, the fact that the agent 
promised to pick up a friend may also be his normative reason.  One and the 
same fact, the fact that the agent promised to be go to the train station, is the 
explanatory and normative reason.   
                                                
58 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 186. The word “normative” has been added for the sake of 
clarity. 
59 Raz, “Reasons: explanatory and normative’, pg 1.  The plural form has been added. 
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This may raise questions about whether there is a difference between 
explanatory and normative reasons.  Of course, not every explanatory reason is 
also a normative reason.  For example, when asked why the agent drove to the 
train station, it may also be appropriate to answer that driving is the fastest way 
to get to the station, or that the agent is not concerned about the environment.  
Both may be perfectly acceptable explanations of the agent’s action.  However, 
they do not pertain to the same normative considerations, and – absent further 
elaboration – are not normative reasons.   
 
So if normative reasons are not just the same as explanatory reasons, perhaps 
they are a subset of explanatory reasons; specifically the explanatory reasons 
that explain normative considerations.  In “Reasons”, John Broome suggests 
something similar to this.  More precisely Broome defines two normative senses 
of ‘a reason’.  “A perfect reason for you to Φ is defined as a fact that explains 
why you ought to Φ.”60  And, "a pro tanto reason for you to Φ is a fact that plays 
the for- Φ role in a weighing explanation of why you ought to Φ, or in a weighing 
explanation of why you ought not to Φ, or in a weighing explanation of why it is 
not the case that you ought to Φ and not the case that you ought not to Φ." 61  
For Broome, reasons, whether perfect or pro tanto reasons, explain normative 
facts, specifically ought facts.  
 
Broome argues that this definition is an elaboration of the ‘common place’ 
description of normative reasons that Raz offers, in as far as he has offered a 
definition of what is it for a consideration to count in favor of.  “To count in 
                                                
60 Broome, “Reasons”, pg 6. 
61 Broome, “Reasons”, pg 10. 
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favour of Φ is to play a particular role in an explanation of why you ought to 
Φ.”62  Contrary to Raz, Broome claims that ‘counting in favor of’ cannot be the 
basic normative notion, “because it is complex.  It incorporates the two 
elements of normativity and explanation. The notion of a reason has the same 
complexity.” 63  And by extension, contrary to Raz, Broome argues that reasons 
cannot be the basic normative notion.64   
 
Disagreeing with the force of Broome’s point, Raz acknowledges the 
explanatory and normative dimension of reasons, and elaborates on them in a 
way that sheds light on the complexity of the relation between them.  Raz does 
this by distinguishing two different concepts, explanatory reasons and 
normative reasons.  Explanatory reasons are facts which explain why 
something or other is the case or has happened.  Explanatory reasons, as 
already mentioned are answers to why questions.  Further as Raz says, “For 
every fact there may be a reason-why question, in a correct reply to which it 
figures.”65  I.e., every fact may be an explanatory reason. And, to “refer to a fact 
as an explanatory reason is to refer, at least implicitly, to a relation it has to 
                                                
62 Broome, “Reasons”, pg 12. 
63 Broome, “Reasons”, pg 12. 
64 It should be noted that Broome’s argument is more extensive than this.  For example, 
Broome takes the concept of ought as primitive, and places an emphasis on ‘ought facts’ as a 
central normative concept.  Further, Broome introduces normative requirements, which govern 
wide scope oughts, as distinct from reasons.  (More reflections on normative requirements will 
be introduced in the next chapter.)  And, Broome codifies definitions of reasons, perfect reasons 
and pro tanto reasons, which are quite unique.  Raz, in “Reasons: explanatory and normative”, 
argues against each of these points.  While interesting in its own, the entirety of this debate will 
not be reviewed in the current discussion.  Instead, it will remark on the aspects of the debate 
that are important for identifying the concept at hand, normative reasons, and remark on some 
of the points of contention, such as the existence of normative requirements, when reflecting on 
the fruitfulness of the suggested view. 
 
Before moving on, it may be worthwhile raising the possibility that though Broome’s argument 
focuses on disagreements about specific concepts within practical reasoning, taken together, it 
may represent an alternative conception of practical reasoning.  And, in a line of argument 
amicable to some of his comments, the appropriate form of assessment may be the fruitfulness 
of the overall conception rather than debates about the specific concepts.  But be that as it may, 
nothing in this chapter turns on whether this is the case. 
65 Raz, “Reasons: explanatory and normative”, pg 2. 
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something else: it is a reason why this or that happened, etc.” 66  I.e., to refer to 
a fact as an explanatory reason is to refer to a fact as an element within the 
explanation relation.   
 
In contrast, normative reasons are facts which can justify or require, and can 
guide an agent’s action.  In Practical Reasons and Norms67 Raz analyzes 
reason statements as relations between facts and persons.  More specifically 
he represents atomic reason statements as statements that can be symbolized 
as follows: R(Φ)p,x.  Where ‘p’ is a fact, ‘x’ is a person and ‘R(Φ)’ is the reason 
to Φ operator.  This seems to track common reason statements.  For example 
as Raz writes ‘p is a reason for x to Φ’ asserts that p is a reason for x to Φ.  
Which neatly fits the symbolism R(Φ)p,x; and is true just in case p is true and it 
is a reason to Φ.  Referring to a fact as a normative reason is to refer, at least 
implicitly, to a relation it has to something else.  I.e., to refer to a fact as a 
normative reason is to refer to it as an element within the normative reason 
relation. 
 
There is no difficulty or great complexity in a fact playing a role in two different 
relations.  Reasons can be explanatory and normative.  One and the same fact 
can be an explanatory reason and a normative reason.  And there may be 
instances in which a fact is an explanatory reason in virtue of being a normative 
reason; as was the case with the agent who drove to the train station because 
he had promised to pick up a friend.  The agent’s promise to pick up his friend 
was both a normative and explanatory reason.  And it explained the agent’s 
                                                
66 Raz, “Reasons: explanatory and normative”, pg 2. 
67 Raz, J (1999), Practical Reasons and Norms, Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
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action because it was the normative reason on which he acted.68  Further that a 
fact cannot be a normative reason without possibly also being an explanatory 
reason does not mean that normative reasons are merely a subset of all the 
explanatory reasons.69  As we have seen, normative reasons can be 
distinguished from explanatory reasons in part through reference to the distinct 
relations which obtain.  To the extent that these two different reason concepts 
are distinct, this chapter is concerned with normative rather than explanatory 
reasons.70   
 
Having distinguished these different reason concepts, the claim at hand can be 
sharpened.  The suggested view denies that desires prima facie provide 
normative reasons.  As was seen, the suggested view has no qualms with 
desires as operative or explanatory reasons.  However, even the more modest 
claim that denies that desires prima facie provide reasons may strike those 
                                                
68 This begins to touch on a significant topic in its own right, the relationship between reasons 
and explanation.  Raz deals with this explicitly under the heading of the ‘explanatory/normative 
nexus’ in “Reasons: explanatory and normative”, and the topic is deal with at length by Williams, 
Frankfurt, Setiya, Brandom, etc.  
 
This topic will not be addressed further here for two reasons.  First, because the goal of this 
section is to specify the concept of reasons, normative reasons, that is of interest to the current 
discussion.  This can be accomplished by distinguishing normative reasons from explanatory 
reasons without fully exploring the nature of the possible relationships between the two.  
Second, because a more elaborate account of the relationship between normative and 
explanatory reasons involves concepts such as rationality and reason that will receive further 
elaboration in subsequent chapters of this current work.  Moving to a discussion that 
significantly relies on these concepts without the elaboration would be premature. 
69 For example, I am a son and a brother.  To refer to me as a son is at least implicitly to refer to 
my relation to others, e.g., my parents.  To refer to me as a brother is at least implicitly to refer 
to my relation to an other, e.g., my sister.  In part I am a brother in virtue of being a son.  And I 
cannot be a brother without being a son, but this is not to say that being a brother is a type of 
being a son, even if it is a subset of all sons who are brothers. 
70 It is important to note the scope of the current argument.  This is an argument against a 
negative argument Broome’s position could pose to the suggested view.  It is not an argument 
against Broome’s conception of ought facts as the basic normative concept and their 
relationship to reasons.  While this is a different view that the one suggested here, it is entirely 
possible that it can also be consistently articulated within a broader conception of practical 
reasoning.  And for the moment, it can be assumed that this is the case.  Supporting the 
suggested view does not require disproving all alternatives, only answering the poignant 
objections they may offer.  If more than one consistent conception of practical reasoning can be 
offered, adjudication between or amongst them may be based on such characteristics as 
fruitfulness.  
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coming from a grounding in Preference Theory as troublesome.  After all, 
normative reasons were said to ‘guide decision(s) and action(s), and form a 
basis for their evaluation’71, and this seems a role desires may play.  Why is this 
not a compelling objection to the suggested view? 
 
Reflect for a moment on what it may be for a something to be a prima facie 
reason.  One way to cache out the thought that desires prima facie provide 
reasons is to understand desires as sufficient for reasons.  I.e., if an agent has 
a desire to eat ice cream, he has a reason to eat ice cream.  But this is likely 
too strong as it does not capture the prima facie character of the reasons 
desires are supposed to provide.  A simple variation may be address this: 
desires are sufficient for reasons, if other competing or cancelling conditions do 
not obtain.   
 
While some may hold the view that desires (subject to appropriate 
qualifications) are sufficient for reasons, this view is not as widespread as 
Preference Theorist may initially think.  For example, Williams notably initiated 
one of the most prominent recent debates about reasons, the 
internalist/externalist debate, by arguing for an association between reasons 
and desires.  Yet in explaining his own view, Williams denied the claim that “A 
has a reason to Φ iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served 
by his Φ-ing.” 72; and argued that this view should not be attributed to Hume 
either.  Most proponents of the internalist position have similarly denied the 
claim that desires are sufficient for reasons. 
   
                                                
71 Raz, “Reasons: explanatory and normative’, pg 1.  The plural form has been added. 
72 Williams 1981, pg 101. 
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For Williams the connection between reasons and desires is necessary, not 
sufficient.  And while the view that desires are a necessary condition for 
reasons does strain the natural understanding of the view that desires prima 
facie provide reasons – or more accurately speaking: desires prima facie 
provide reasons.  However, it may be within the scope of the plausible to say 
that as a necessary condition, desires prima facie provide reasons in so far as if 
an agent has the relevant desire he has a necessary condition for there to be a 
reason.  But the suggested view denies even this weakened and strained 
version of the claim that desires prima facie provide reasons.   
 
Once again the suggested view is in good company.  While some internalists 
may hold that having actual desires is a necessary condition for having 
reasons, for many the relationship is far more nuanced.  For example for 
Williams, in order for an agent to have a reason73 it mush be appropriately 
related to an element or disposition in his subjective motivational set.  If it is not 
immediately obvious how far removed this is from the initial starting point, 
consider a relevant version of  desires in the context of the original example.  
For example, it seems far less intuitively attractive to claim that the rational 
possibility of being motivated to eat vanilla ice cream provides one a prima facie 
reason to do so.   
 
So in summary, while it is acknowledged that the view that desire prima facie 
provide normative reasons may be intuitively appealing, the fact that the 
suggested view denies this claim should not count heavily against it since it is 
                                                
73 For the moment I am taking liberties with the articulation, but the point should translate.  I.e., 
strictly speaking this is a composition of two distinct points Williams makes.  First in order for an 
agent to have an internal reason he must have the appropriate element of disposition in S.  And 
second, agents only have internal reasons. 
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not a claim that is as widely held as one may assume.  Even proponents of the 
internalist position who argue that desires have an important relationship with 
reasons do not embrace this claim.  And while the suggested view admittedly 
goes further than internalist such as Williams and denies that there is any 
necessary connection between reasons and desires – except in so far as this 
necessary connection is a stand in for the potential motivational efficacy of 
reasons – the fact that it denies the claim that desires prima facie provide 
reasons should not count significantly against its potential fruitfulness.   
 
While this is an argument to the effect that a consequence of the suggested 
view, i.e., that desires do not prima facie provide normative reasons, should not 
weigh heavily against the suggested view, it does not explain why this is a 
consequence of the suggested view, or why one should accept this position.  
Both will be coming shortly.  But first it is important to note that though the 
suggested view denies that desires prima facie provide reasons, it need not 
deny that in some instances an agent has reason to eat vanilla ice cream 
because of his desire to do so.  Even according to the suggested view desires 
can be reason effecting; and, it will be suggested, this may go a long way 
towards accommodating the intuitive appeal to the idea that desires provide 
reasons.  So for the moment the discussion of the relationship between reasons 
and desires concludes with two promissory notes: 1) why the suggested view 
denies that desires prima facie provide reasons and 2) an explanation of the 
role of the reason effecting role of desires.   
 
Payment of these promissory notes requires discussion of the third view, i.e., 
that something is good if it gives us reasons.  In its current articulation this claim 
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is perhaps the least obviously associated with Preference Theory of the three 
listed.  That is because this articulation comes from the buck-passing debate 
which itself is less connected to Preference Theories.  Consider instead an 
earlier variation of the claim in a position that has become known as FA-
Analysis74.  The basic idea behind FA-Analysis is that ‘to be valuable is to be a 
fitting object of a pro-attitude’75.  Here ‘pro-attitude’ can be broadly understood 
to include desires and preferences.  Understood in this way, the basic idea 
behind FA-Analysis is that something is valuable if it is a fitting object of an 
agent’s desires, preferences, or other pro-attitudes.  Or, in other words, 
something is valuable if an agent has reason to desire or prefer it.  In this form 
FA-Analysis, and by extension buck-passing, may seem much more closely 
associated with Preference Theories. 
 
Further, according to a recent history compiled by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen, FA-Analysis and variations thereof, are widely accepted.  
Proponents include: Brentano76, Ewing77, Rawls78, McDowell79, Chisholm80, 
Wiggins81, Gibbard82, Anderson83 and Rabinowicz84. 
                                                
74 In recent work by Heuer and others, it has become clear that there is significant reason not to 
associate buck-passing too closely with FA-Analysis.  There are a myriad of difficulties faced by 
FA-Analysis that buck-passing does not face.  The contrary may also be true.  At this point this 
should not be too great a concern.  The association of the two is meant to locate a family of 
views associated with Preference Theories.  Where relevant the challenges that each face will 
be addressed separately. 
75 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, pg 204. 
76 Brentano, Franz (1969 [1889]), The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, London 
and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
77 Ewing, A. C. (1947), The Definition of Good, London: MacMillan. 
78 Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 
79 McDowell, John (1985), “Values and Secondary Qualities” In Ted Honderich, ed., Morality 
and Objectivity, London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 110-129. 
80 Chisholm, Roderick M. (1986), Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
81 Wiggins, David (1987), “A Sensible Subjectivism?”, essay V in D. Wiggins, Needs, Values, 
Truth: Essays in the philosophy of value, Oxford: Blackwell. 
82 Gibbard, Allan (1998), “Preference and Preferability” in Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels 
(eds.), Preferences - Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
83 Anderson, Elisabeth (1993), Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 
84 Rabinowicz, W and Rønnow-Rasmussen, T (2004), “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-
Attitudes and Value’ Ethics 114 (3) 
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Given the illustrious list of proponent of FA-Analysis, and its contemporary 
variation, i.e., buck-passing, the fact that the suggested view rejects these 
positions can seem to count against it; but there is reason to think this is not the 
case.  To see this, the discussion will briefly discuss a challenge to buck-
passing and then turn to arguments proponents of buck-passing offer against 
the alternative adopted by the suggested view.   
 
Buck-passing only emerged in its own right when introduced by Scanlon in 
“What We Owe Each Other”85.  As Pekka Väyrynen86, Mark Schroeder87 and 
Roger Crisp88 have argued, buck-passing is comprised of two different and 
independent claims: BPA- and BPA+; the negative argument against 
alternatives and the positive argument for the approach respectively. 
• “(BPA-) The fact that something is good or of value is not itself a reason 
to respond to it favorably or to behave in certain ways with regard to it.” 89 
• “(BPA+) The fact that something is good or of value consists in the fact 
that it has some other property P which is a reason to respond to it 
favorably or to behave in certain ways with regard to it.”90 
 
Since it has already been acknowledged that more than one consistent 
conception of practical reasoning may be offered, potential difficulties facing 
BPA+ will not be discussed at length.  For present purposes, it can be assumed 
                                                
85 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998. 
86 Väyrynen, P. (2006), ‘Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value’, in Russ Shafer-Landau 
(ed), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol 1, 295-324. 
87 Schroeder, M. (2009), ‘Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis’ in Philosophical Explorations 12(3): 
341-47. 
88 Crisp, R. (2005), ‘Value, Reasons, and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing 
the Buck’ in Analysis 65: 80-85. 
89 Heuer, “Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value” pg 1. 
90 Heuer, “Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value” pg 2. 
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that these challenges can be overcome.  Instead, one drawback will be noted 
because it speaks to the fruitfulness of any such account.  
 
Taking for granted for the moment that there are versions of buck-passing that 
do not face the much discussed Wrong Kind of Reason challenge, there is a 
different challenge that may be more fundamental.  In defining value as that for 
which there are appropriate reasons, one needs the ability to offer a non-
circular description of reasons.  I.e., one needs to offer a description of reasons 
that does not crucially rely on the role of value.  This is perhaps clearest when 
articulated in terms of FA-Analysis.  If ‘to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a 
pro-attitude’91, what makes something a fitting object of a pro-attitude that is not 
itself something valuable or good?  For example, if eating vanilla ice cream is 
valuable because it is a fitting object of a pro-attitude such as preferences or 
desires, what makes it a fitting object of desires or preferences?  Possibly it is 
the fact that eating ice cream would be a refreshing desert on a hot summer 
day which makes it the fitting object of a desire or preference.    But isn’t the 
fact that eating the vanilla ice would be refreshing a good or valuable 
characteristic of eating vanilla ice cream?  Of course the answer to this question 
depends on the relevant view of the relationship between specific evaluative 
qualities such as ‘being refreshing’ and qualities such as goodness and value.  
For the buck-passing account of value to work, proponent must argue that 
either it is not specific evaluative qualities like “being refreshing” that make 
eating ice cream a fitting object of preferences and desires, or they must argue 
that in cases like these specific evaluative properties are not good or valuable.  
The first disjunct seems implausible.  Therefore in order to avoid circularity 
proponents of buck-passing or FA-Analysis are committed to a claim that 
                                                
91 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, pg 204. 
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qualities like being refreshing are not good or valuable.  And indeed some seem 
to be committed to this claim and have used it as the basis for BPA-.  As a 
result, the discussion of BPA- will serve to reflect on the negative argument 
offered by proponents of buck-passing as well as clarifying the challenge facing 
its proponents.  
Heuer’s discussion of BP- has helpfully identified three different variants that 
can be offered against opponents to buck-passing: 
• BP1 – ‘x is of value, iff it has other non-normative, natural properties that 
provide reasons for actions’ 
• BP2 – ‘x is of value, iff it has either (a) other evaluative or (b) non-
normative, natural properties that provide reasons for actions.  There are 
instances of both (a) and (b), but goodness itself is not a reason.’92 
• BP3 – ‘x is of value, iff it has other evaluative properties that provide 
reasons for actions, but goodness itself is not a reason.’93 
To begin, start with the shared thought in BP2 and BP3, namely that goodness 
itself does not provide reasons but other evaluative properties do.  Consider the 
possible relationships between value or goodness and the specific evaluative 
properties that appear to provide reasons.  Assume for the moment, as Scanlon 
does, that goodness is either distinct from specific evaluative properties or is a 
shared property of them.  If the first disjunct is true, and goodness provides 
reasons, then it must provide a further reason than the reasons provided by 
specific evaluative properties, but this does not seem to be the case.  To 
illustrate this point, Scanlon uses the example of cancer research which we 
                                                
92 This variation has been augmented slightly. 
93 Heuer, pg 2. 
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have reason to support because it sheds light on the causes of cancer.  “That 
the cancer research is good or valuable, Scanlon maintains, would surely not 
give us any further reason to support it in addition to the fact that it casts light 
on the causes of cancer.”94  Without a role in explaining the reasons for 
supporting cancer research, there is reason to doubt that goodness is a distinct 
reason providing property.   
If, on the other hand, the second disjunct is true, and goodness provides 
reasons, then goodness, understood here as a simple property, would appear 
to provide the only reason.  But there are a plurality of reason providing 
properties that provide a plurality of reasons, so goodness cannot be a simple 
property shared by the specific evaluative properties that provides reasons.  
If the assumed disjunction exhausts the possible relationships between 
goodness (or value) and specific evaluative properties, then the fact that 
goodness provides neither an additional reason, nor the only reason, suggests 
that goodness is not a reason providing property.  This conclusion just is BPA-, 
i.e., “The fact that something is good or of value is not itself a reason to respond 
to it favorably or to behave in certain ways with regard to it.” 95 
This is challenging, for it seems the assumptions of the argument are sound.  
Goodness does not provide a further reason, nor does it provide the only 
reason.  Does this mean opponents of buck-passing must come to accept it? 
Heuer offers reason to pause by questioning whether the stated disjunction 
exhausts the possibilities and offers an alternative understanding of the 
relationship between value or goodness and specific evaluative properties, the 
                                                
94 Heuer, pg 5. 
95 Heuer, “Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value” pg 1. 
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specification relation.  Where specification is understood as: “If E, F and G are 
variable for properties, then F specifies G iff: 
1) necessarily all F’s are G’s, but 
2) possibly some G’s are not F’s, and 
3) if a G is not and F, then necessarily there is some E such that necessarily all 
E’s are G’s, but possibly some G’s are not E’s.”96  
The suggestion is that specific evaluative properties stand in a specifying 
relationship to value or goodness.  That is to say that specific evaluative 
properties specify the way in which something is of value.  For example, to be 
delicious is a way in which food can be of value.  Obviously food can be of 
value without being delicious, but when it is, there is some other specific 
property which makes it so. 
 
Understanding this, what are the implications for Scanlon’s argument?  Heuer 
acknowledges the truth of Scanlon’s assumptions: goodness does not provide a 
further reason nor does it provide further reasons.  Yet she rejects the validity of 
his argument and denies the claim that therefore goodness provides no reason. 
 
As was discussed earlier, the buck-passing account relies on a further assumption that 
these are the only possibilities.  I.e., that if goodness provides a reason than it either 
                                                
96 Heuer, pg 20. 
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provides the only reason or a further reason.  Since it is acknowledged that value does 
neither of these, and these are the only possibilities, value does not provide a reason. 
 
The specification relation casts doubt on this assumption by showing how value 
can provide a reason without providing the only reason or a further reason.  
Consider the following example.  I have reason to read Heuer’s article because 
doing so would be valuable.  More specifically, my reason for doing so would be 
because it would be enlightening.  And, even more specifically my reason for 
doing so would be because it insightfully treats an important but challenging 
subject with sophistication and nuance.97   
 
The reason that I have to read Heuer’s article because doing so is valuable is 
not a further reason than the reason I have because doing so would be 
enlightening or the reason that I have because it treats an important but 
challenging subject with sophistication and nuance.  I.e., value does not provide 
a further reason.   
 
Nor is it the case that value provides the only reason.  Consider an addition to 
the example.  As in the previous version I have reason to read Heuer’s article 
because doing so would be valuable.  And I have reason to read Heuer’s article 
because doing so would be enlightening.  But in this case I have reason to read 
Heuer’s article because it introduces important new concepts which further my 
understanding of reasons.   
 
                                                
97 This is a variation of an example Heuer offers in “Explaining Reasons” pg 22.  
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Treating an important but challenging subject with sophistication and nuance is 
quite different than introducing important new concepts.  The reasons that these 
two facts provide are quite different.  Yet each is a reason for my reading 
Heuer’s article because doing so would be enlightening, and because doing so 
would be valuable.  In this case, being valuable provides two different reasons.  
I.e., value does not provide the only reason. 
 
It can be tempting for proponents of buck-passing to argue that these examples 
illustrate their point.  For in these examples it is not the case that the fact that 
reading Heuer’s article is valuable provides reasons and it is not the case that 
the fact that reading Heuer’s article would be enlightening provide reasons.  
Rather it is only the most specified versions of the facts, i.e., that it treats an 
important and challenging subject with nuance and sophistication and that it 
introduces important new concepts which further my understanding, which 
provide reasons.  But, as Heuer points out, this seems to rely on the further 
questionable claim that only the most specified facts provide reasons.   
 
The claim is questionable for at least two reasons.  First it seems an overly 
burdensome regimentation on how one thinks of reasons.  For example, if the 
claim is accepted, then much of what are commonly considered reasons would 
turn out not to be.  And second it is open to a continual regress.  For example, 
the fact that Heuer’s article treats an important but challenging subject with 
nuance and sophistication can be further specified to include characteristics 
such as clarity and the avoidance of pitfalls which have plagued other writers on 
the subject.  Indeed there may be no end to such further specification as 
nuance and sophistication are complex evaluative properties that can be 
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specified in possibly infinite number of different ways.  That this is the case 
should not lead one to conclude that I have no reason to read the Heuer’s 
article because it treats an important but challenging subject with nuance and 
sophistication.  So the claim that only the most specified facts provide reasons 
is questionable because it would introduce a costly and artificial regimentation 
on the understanding of reasons and possibly lead to absurd results. 
 
Absent this claim there is no difficulty understanding how value can provide a 
reason without providing the only reason, nor providing a further reason.  E.g., I 
may have many reasons to read Heuer’s article because doing so would be 
valuable.  The more specific evaluative properties specify these reasons.  And 
at some level of specification the specific evaluative properties can distinguish 
one reason from the other. 
 
By offering the specification relation, Heuer not only undermines Scanlon’s 
negative argument, but also provides the basis for showing the internal 
inconsistency of BP2 and BP3.  BP2 and BP3 both deny that goodness itself is 
a reason, yet rely on the possibility that evaluative properties provide reasons.  
If the specification relation holds between specific properties and goodness in 
general, then if evaluative properties provide reasons then goodness itself 
provides reasons.  Since both BP2 and BP3 rely on the possibility that 
evaluative properties provide reasons, but deny that goodness itself is a reason, 
both are internally inconsistent if the specification relation holds.   
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Further, if the specification relation holds, then those proponents of buck-
passing initially inclined to support BP2 and BP3 have reason to reject BPA- 
i.e., “The fact that something is good or of value is not itself a reason to respond 
to it favorably or to behave in certain ways with regard to it.” 98.  For if specific 
evaluative properties provide reasons, then goodness or value provides 
reasons. 
 
This leaves BP1, i.e., ‘x is of value, iff it has other non-normative, natural 
properties that provide reasons for actions’99.  To assess whether non-
evaluative properties provide reasons, Heuer offers the Universality 
Requirement: “…a property P which provides a reason in a given set of 
circumstances C must provide the very same reason, whenever P is present in 
C.”100  
 
The appeal of this requirement is relatively easy to grasp.  If the property in 
question remains the same and the circumstances remain the same, yet the 
reason varies, this suggests that it is not the property in question which 
provides the reason.   
 
                                                
98 Heuer, “Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value” pg 1. 
99 Heuer, pg 2. 
100 Heuer, pg 16. 
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Heuer offers an inductive argument to show that non-evaluative properties do 
not meet the Universality Requirement.101  Using Heuer’s example, consider 
whether the fact that the agent’s jumping in the canal is the only way to save 
her life when building is on fire, provides the agent with a reason to jump in the 
canal.  One clarificatory note.  The issue at hand is whether non-evaluative 
properties meet the Universality Requirement; i.e., whether the same non-
evaluative property provides the same reason in the same circumstances.  As a 
result, it would muddy the waters to assume that an evaluative property was 
part of the circumstances.  For if it is the evaluative property which provides the 
reason, and the circumstances (which include the evaluative property) stay the 
same, then the reason would also stay the same.  But this would be a reflection 
of the role of the evaluative property in the circumstances and not of the reason 
providing role of the non-evaluative property.  So for purposes of the example, 
assume the circumstances consist of non-evaluative properties such as the fact 
that the agent just lost her job and ended her relationship.   
 
Consider whether the fact that jumping in the canal is the only way to save her 
life would provide the agent a reason in the circumstances that the agent just 
lost her job and ended her relationship.  While it may appear that this non-
evaluative fact provides the agent with a reason, leaping to this conclusion 
would be too quick.  The fact that jumping in the canal is the only way to save 
her life may give her reason to jump, if, for instance hers was a life worth saving 
                                                
101 “To avoid confusion, my claim is not that P cannot be a reason in C, just because it would 
not be a reason in other circumstances, nor that the circumstances would have to be 
understood as parts of the reason. The claim is that, if P is a reason to φ in C, it is always a 
reason to φ in C. But for any set of non-evaluative circumstances C and any non-evaluative 
property P, it seems to depend on further circumstances whether or not P is a reason. Thus, 
there is inductive evidence that no normatively significant property P in a given set of non-
evaluative features of the circumstances will constitute a reason for action.” – Heuer, pg 16. 
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now that she had been liberated from her awful job and freed from her 
devastating relationship.  On the other hand, it may give her no reason at all, if 
for instance it was her job and relationship that gave her life meaning, and 
without either of them, there is little or any positive value to her life.  The 
example may be a bit colorful, but the point should be clear enough.  It may or 
may not be the case that the agent has reason to jump, given that she just lost 
her job and ended a long relationship.  The non-evaluative property may or may 
not be a reason in one and the same circumstances.  Whether or not it is a 
reason depends on the further evaluative property of whether or not there is 
positive value to her life.  “The root of the problem” as Heuer says, “is that any 
non-evaluative consideration can be cancelled as a reason.”102 The non-
evaluative fact does not meet the Universality Requirement; and therefore this 
non-evaluative property does not provide a reason. 
 
Admittedly this is an inductive argument.  It does not establish that non-
evaluative properties do not provide reasons.  But the extreme nature of the 
example does suggest that this is the case.  If the fact that jumping in the canal 
is the only way to save the agent’s life does not provide her with reasons, what 
kind of non-evaluative facts would?  So while this is not a conclusive argument 
against BP1, it is a compelling one.   
 
To this point the discussion of buck-passing has covered much territory.  It has 
provided reasons for rejecting BP1, BP2 and BP3, and shown reasons why 
                                                
102 Heuer, “Explaining Reasons”, pg 16,17. 
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proponents of buck-passing originally inclined to the latter two should reject 
BPA-.  However, it has not included an argument for the view that value 
provides reasons, but it has provided the resources to do so. 
 
Can value or evaluative properties satisfy the Universality Requirement “…a 
property P which provides a reason in a given set of circumstances C must 
provide the very same reason, whenever P is present in C”103?  Consider 
Heuer’s example, but this time the property P is that the agent’s life is a life 
worth saving and the circumstances C includes non-evaluative facts such as 
the agent’s jumping in the canal is the only way to save her life.  In this case P 
does give the agent to jump in the canal.  But, proponents of buck-passing may 
object, this does not parallel the exploration of whether a non-evaluative fact 
meets the Universality Requirement.  In the previous discussion there were 
three sets of facts, P, C and third variable V, which alternatively took as an 
argument that the agent’s life was worth living and that the agent’s life was not 
worth living.   
 
To parallel this discussion, the example can be restated as follows P: the 
agent’s life is a life worth living, C: the building is burning and V: which can 
either take as arguments that jumping in the canal is the only way to save the 
agent’s life or, for the purposes of simplicity, that jumping in the canal is the only 
way not to save the agent’s life.  In this case the agent would have a reason to 
jump in the canal when V took the non-evaluative fact that his was the only way 
                                                
103 Heuer, pg 16. 
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to save the agent’s life; and the agent would not have a reason to jump in the 
canal when V took the non-evaluative property that jumping in the canal is the 
only way not to save the agent’s life.  The evaluative property may or may not 
give a reason in one and the same circumstances.  Does this not show that 
evaluative reasons also fail to satisfy the Universality Requirement? 
 
Obviously this question turns on what counts as the same circumstances.  If the 
property V should be included in the circumstances, then an easy way of 
understanding the difference between these two cases is that the evaluative 
property provides different reasons in different circumstances.  And in this case 
there is no worry about muddying the waters that recommends separating V 
from C.  But the larger point can be made without splitting hairs about what 
should constitute part of the circumstances. 
 
The fact that the agent’s life is a life worth living provides the agent with reason 
to preserve her life.  The different versions of V merely determine what actions 
that will involve.  Importantly they do not cancel the reasons that she has.  
Evaluative properties are not subject to canceling conditions in the same way.  
As Heuer writes, “If an action is actually cruel (say) then there are no canceling 
conditions of there being a reason against it. If there is a canceling condition, 
e.g., if a cruel-looking action is in fact a necessary measure carried out in a 
somewhat rough way, the right conclusion to draw is not that cruelty does not 
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provide a reason in this case, but that the action was not cruel. If an action is 
cruel, its cruelty is always a reason against it.”104 
 
In other words, it is part of what it means to say that an agent’s life is a life 
worth living that it gives the agent reason to preserve her life.  And it is part of 
what it means to say that an action is cruel that it gives reason not to take the 
action.105  This suggests that, even without a detailed discussion of including V 
in C, at this high level of specification, evaluative properties meet the 
Universality Requirement.  And therefore evaluative properties provide reasons.  
And further, if the specification relation holds, value or goodness itself provides 
reasons. 
 
Returning to the initial motivation for this discussion of FA-Analysis and buck-
passing it is now easy to see the basis for the suggested view’s rejection of the 
third claim, i.e., something is good if it gives us reasons.  In contrast, on the 
suggested view, if something is good, it gives us reasons.   
 
It is now also possible to make good on some of the promissory notes issued 
earlier.  The first promissory note was to explain the relationships between 
reasons and preferences.  At this point it is only possible to make a partial 
payment on this promissory note by explaining why the suggested view denies 
that preferences prima facie provide reasons (i.e., the first claim) and how 
                                                
104 Heuer, “Explaining Reasons”, pg 11. 
105 Heuer codifies this claim in the Conceptual Link: The Conceptual Link. The (even partial) 
understanding of any evaluative concept requires understanding some of the non-derivative 
reasons that the evaluative property that the concept refers to provides.” Heuer, “Understanding 
Reasons”, pg 9. 
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preferences may be reason effecting.  It is also possible to make good on the 
second promissory note by explaining why the suggested view denies that 
desires prima facie provide reasons (i.e., the second claim) and how desires 
are reason effecting.  Since the arguments for both are the same, they will be 
dealt with together.   
 
Preference and desires are non-evaluative properties.  They are mental states 
which may reflect an agent’s evaluation of their object, but are not themselves 
evaluative properties.  I.e., preferences and desires are not specifications of the 
good.  As such preferences and desires do not provide reasons.   
 
While preferences and desires do not provide reasons, they can be reason 
effecting.  To see this, it will be illustrative to look more closely at the 
Universality Requirements.  To restate, the Universality Requirement is: “…a 
property P which provides a reason in a given set of circumstances C must 
provide the very same reason, whenever P is present in C.”106  
 
Straightforward on the surface, it can nonetheless benefit from being unpacked.  
To begin with, some points of clarification.  First of all, according to Heuer, ‘A 
property provides a reason, iff it is a reason when instantiated, e.g. the property 
of being cruel provides a reason iff the fact that an action is cruel is a reason 
(against it, in this case).’107 
 
                                                
106 Heuer, pg 16. 
107 Heuer, pg 1. 
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Next, consider: ‘property P … in a given set of circumstances C.’  This is 
perhaps most recognizable when reflecting on common reasons statements.  It 
has long been noted that the everyday use of the term ‘reason’ is flexible.  
Indeed, statements about reasons often invoke a common body of knowledge 
and only point to the salient aspects of a reason.  In situations of this sort one 
may point to some specific fact as a reason and one’s interlocutors will 
recognize it as a reason given the circumstances.  This is a familiar way to 
distinguish between a property and the relevant circumstances and reflects 
pragmatic consideration of communication situations.  While the property / 
circumstance relationship Heuer refers to is reminiscent of this, it is also quite 
different.  For it is not a matter of how one discusses reasons, but rather of what 
reasons consist.  (of course there is and ought to be a relation between these, 
but one does not reduce to the other.) 
 
The Universality Requirement is a regularity requirement with two conditions.  
The first condition calls for a property to provide a reason every time it is 
present in those circumstances.  The second condition calls for the reason that 
the property provides to be the same reason every time.   
 
As such, application of the Universality Requirement as a test of whether 
something provides a reason requires one be able to: 1) distinguish a property 
from a circumstance, 2) identify more than one property and more than one 
circumstance as being the same as one another, 3) identify whether something 
provides a reason, and 4) identify two or more reasons as being the same.  Of 
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course given this, strictly speaking it would be circular to apply the Universality 
Requirement as a test of whether or not something provides a reason, because 
one would need to know whether it provides a reason to apply the test in the 
first place.  But the test was evidently informative when Heuer employed it.  So 
one question that emerges is why was it informative?  What is the significance 
of the Universality Requirement? 
 
While Heuer uses the Universality Requirement to argue that non-evaluative 
properties do not provide reasons, an argument to that effect could have relied 
on the definition of ‘provides a reason’ itself.  According to the definition 
discussed earlier, being a reason when instantiated is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a property to provide a reason.  If the property can be 
instantiated without being a reason, then it does not provide a reason.  Since 
the property of being the only way to save Mary’s life could be instantiated 
without being a reason for Mary to jump in the canal, as would be the case if 
Mary’s life was without value, being the only way to save Mary’s life does not 
provide a reason.   
 
Rather the significance of the Universality Requirement for present purposes is 
the extent to which it reflects the role of non-evaluative properties in 
determining the reasons that evaluative properties provide.  To see this, it will 
be helpful to take a step back and begin by discussing the fact that evaluative 
properties provide reasons. 
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The fact that Mary’s life is a life worth living is a reason for Mary to live her life.  
It is part of the nature of being valuable that there are reasons to realize that 
value.  Value, as Raz argues, provides a general reason to realize or preserve 
that value which applies generally. 
 
As being a life worth living stands in a specification relation to being valuable, 
so too does the reason to jump in the canal stand in something like a 
specification relation to the reason to realize or preserve the value of that life.  It 
is likely uncontroversial to say that the facts, or non-evaluative properties that 
pertain determine the reason which the value of her life provides.  In other 
words, it is the specific circumstances that Mary is in that make it the case that 
the reason she has is a reason to jump into the canal, because so doing will 
realize or preserve the value of her worthwhile life.  The circumstances Mary is 
in determine how and what it would be to realize or preserve the value of her 
life, and in so doing determine of what Mary’s reason consists.   
 
This discussion makes it relatively straightforward to see the basis for the two 
regularity conditions of the Universality Requirement.  First, evaluative 
properties or facts provide a reason in each circumstance, because so doing is 
part of the nature of value.  Second, the evaluative property provides the same 
reason every time it pertains in the same circumstances because the same 
circumstances determine that taking the same action will realize or preserve the 
value.  If it does not, then the circumstances are not the same. 
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This also sheds light on a reason effecting role of desires and preferences.  
Consider a variation of the desire example discussed earlier.  Imagine the agent 
desires vanilla ice cream, and having vanilla ice cream would provide him with a 
sense of satisfaction.  However, the agent does not have a taste for chocolate 
ice cream, does not desire to eat chocolate ice cream and would not be 
satisfied if he did.  It seems the agent has a reason to eat vanilla ice cream, but 
not chocolate, precisely because of his desire to do so.  
 
This can seem paradoxical.  If desires do not provide reasons, how is it that the 
agent has a reason to eat vanilla ice cream because of his desire to do so?  
The explanation is straightforward.  It is not the agent’s desire to eat ice that 
provides his reason for doing so but the satisfaction he will have.  The agent’s 
desire to eat vanilla ice cream effects the reason that he has.  In this case the 
agent’s desire is directly analogous to the fact in that jumping into the canal was 
the only way to save the agent’s life.  In that case too it was the fact that the 
agent’s life was a worth living that provided the reason.  The non-evaluative 
property determined what action was called for by the reason.   
 
This example naturally prompts the question: does the satisfaction of every 
desire provide a reason?  If so, it would seem too much was made of denying 
that desires provide reasons when the second claim could have been re-
articulated in terms of desire satisfaction.  But the satisfaction of every desire 
does not lead to satisfaction.  Or put more broadly, it is not the case that the 
satisfaction of every desire is valuable.  The satisfaction of some desires, for 
example desires for an addictive drug, are not valuable.  Some desires can 
never be satisfied.  And the value of some desires is in the having of them, not 
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in their satisfaction; as in ‘every man’s reach should exceed his grasp’.  So 
while in some cases an agent’s desires determine what actions his reasons 
recommend, they do not provide reasons. 
 
While denying the claim that desires prima facie provide reasons, the fact that 
the suggested view can account for this common sense example of desires 
affecting the reasons an agent has, goes a long way towards accommodating 
the intuitive appeal of the idea that desires provide reasons. 
 
This also provides the basis for answering a natural question about the current 
discussion; and it is worth taking some time to address the point explicitly.  As 
was already noted, Preference Theories themselves are not committed to any 
specific conception of reasons.  That said, it is not uncommon to associate 
Preference Theories with internalist conceptions of reasons such as the view of 
reasons suggested by Williams.  This dissertation takes a different tack, and it 
is natural to question the motivation for doing so.  There are essentially three 
reasons for this. 
 
First, as discussed in the Chapter 1: Introduction, this dissertation seeks to offer 
a positive argument that illustrates the potential of situating Preferences 
Theories within a richer conception of practical reasoning.  It does not argue 
that this is the only conception of practical reasoning against which Preference 
Theories could be situated.  On the contrary, it was explicitly acknowledged that 
other conceptions of practical reasoning may also be consistent with Preference 
Theories.  So no claim is being offered here that Preference Theories cannot be 
situated against a background conception of practical reasoning that relies on 
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an internalist conception of reasons, but only that this is not the focus of the 
current discussion. 
 
Second, as the proceeding discussion shows, the internalist conception of 
reasons is not as congenial to Preference Theories as is often thought.  To 
make the point more explicit, it can be helpful to briefly walk through the reason 
for this in detail.   
 
It is common in decision theory to speak of the agent having a reason to choose 
an alternative that will lead to the most desirable outcome with the highest 
likelihood.  Implicit in discussions of this sort is the view that the agent has a 
reason to choose the more desirable outcome.  Or, to sharpen the point, the 
agent has reason because he desires the outcome.  The agent’s desire for the 
outcome provides the agent with a reason to choose the alternative that will 
lead to that outcome.  In discussions of this sort, there is a strong connection 
between the agent’s desires and the reasons that he has.  And the nature of 
that relationship is that the agent’s desires provide the reasons.  The agent’s 
desires are sufficient condition to provide reasons.108 
 
Reasons internalism is also committed to the view that there is a strong 
relationship between desires and reasons.  As such, there is often a 
presumption that reasons internalism is congenial to decision theory.  
Unfortunately, the nature of the relationship between desires and reasons that 
                                                
108 As has been discussed at length earlier, it is important to note that this view of the 
relationship between desires and reasons is not a necessary aspect of decision theory.  It 
seems to have emerged by historical tradition.  Many important figures in decision theory, e.g., 
Davidson, readily rely on a view of folk psychology in which desires play a central role, and are 
intimately connected to the explanation of operative reasons.  Unfortunately, too little notice has 
been made of the difference between operative and normative reasons, and seemingly as a 
result the limitations of folk psychology to contribute to normative reasons is sometimes not 
appreciated.  
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reasons internalism is committed to is quite different than the relationship 
presumed in discussions of decision theory.  Whereas the latter often presumes 
desires are sufficient (or would be jointly sufficient with the appropriate belief) to 
provide reasons, the former often denies this claim and instead is committed to 
the view that desires are a necessary condition for reasons.   
 
The reason most reasons internalists deny the view that desire are sufficient to 
provide reasons is that this view leads to a pernicious conclusion.  Specifically, 
an agent could have a reason to do bad simply because he has a desire to do 
so.  Avoiding the pernicious consequence, most reasons internalists do not 
claim that desires are sufficient to provide reasons.   
 
While it is common to think of decision theory as having a commitment to the 
relationship between desires and reasons, the relationship is quite different than 
the one to which reasons internalists are committed.  As a result, reasons 
internalism is far less congenial to decision theory than is often thought.  
 
And, third, variations of reasons internalism that significantly differ from the 
suggested view have a different unattractive consequence – what can be called 
a perverse consequence.  This point requires a little additional background on 
the internalist views.   
 
In its most basic form, reasons internalism amounts to a commitment to the 
claim that for all reasons there is a necessary relationship between the reason 
and elements of the agent’s subjective motivational set.  One can map a range 
of different internalist views by varying the nature of the relationship and the 
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understanding of the relevant aspects of the agent’s subjection motivational set. 
Even a brief reflection on the different possibilities demonstrates the broad 
range of possible internalist positions. 
 
There are a number of different ways to categorize internalist positions.  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to distinguish between meaningful and 
motivational internalism.  To understand the distinction at hand, consider the 
universe of possible reasons that may pertain to a given agent.  According to 
some internalist positions, a reason which would otherwise pertain to a given 
agent, will not, because of facts about the agent’s subjective motivational set, or 
because of the nature of the relation between the agent’s subjective 
motivational set and the reason.  Consider a simple example of such an 
internalist position according to which in order for an agent to have a reason, it 
is necessary that the agent have an actual desire that would be furthered by 
acting in accordance with the reason.  If the agent did not have an actual desire 
that would be furthered by acting in accordance with the reason, then the 
reason would not pertain to him.  For example, if the agent did not have an 
actual desire that would be served by refraining from murdering the helpless 
victim, then the agent would have no reason to refrain from murdering the 
innocent victim.   
 
For present purposes, internalist views like this one, which hold that the 
contents of the agent’s motivational set meaningfully constrain the reasons that 
pertain to the agent, can be considered meaningful internalist views. 
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In contrast, other internalist views do not hold that the contents of the agent’s 
motivational set meaningfully constrain the reasons that pertain to the agent.  
For example, consider a possible internalist position which holds that in order 
for an agent to have a reason, it is necessary that were the agent fully informed, 
perfectly rational and reasonable that he could form a motivation that would be 
furthered by acting in accordance with the reason.  Presumably, such a fully 
informed, perfectly rational and reasonable agent could form a motivation that 
would be furthered by acting in accordance with any reason he may have.  For 
example, since such an agent could form a desire that would be furthered by 
refraining from murdering the helpless victim, he would have reason to refrain 
from murdering the innocent victim.   
 
On internalist views of this kind, the contents of the agent’s subjective 
motivational set do not meaningfully constrain the reasons that pertain to the 
agent.  Rather, the connection to possible motivational sets stands in for the 
potential motivational efficaciousness of reasons that pertain to an agent.  For 
this reason, in the current discussion, views of these kinds will be referred to a 
motivational internalism. 
 
As the discussion above illustrates, meaningful internalism faces a challenge 
that motivational internalism does not.  Meaningful internalist views yield a 
perverse consequence in which agents that are sufficiently bad, for example, 
may have no reason to refrain from bad actions as a direct consequence of how 
bad they are. 
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While this perverse consequence is not in itself an argument against meaningful 
internalism it is an unattractive characteristic of views of these kinds and offers 
support to the decision to focus on other accounts of reasons. 
 
Further, to the extent that motivational internalism merely stands in for the 
potential motivational efficaciousness of reasons, even views that are often 
considered externalist, like the conception of reasons focused on in this 
chapter, can be considered motivational internalists. 
 
That said, there are three things to be said about the fact that this chapter does 
not focus on a meaningful internalist account of reasons.  First, it is 
acknowledged that this chapter could have focused on an internalist account of 
reasons; no argument was offered to suggest that this was not a possibility.  
Second, despite the common association between internalist view of reasons 
and preferences theories, internalist views of reasons are not nearly as 
congenial to preference theories as is often assumed.  And third, meaningful 
accounts of reasons internalism yield a perverse consequence that 
recommends exploring other accounts.  And the view under consideration is 
broadly consistent with motivational accounts of reasons internalism. 
 
If this helps clarify the nature of the relationship between desires and reasons 
on the suggested view, it is also worthwhile pointing out that on the suggested 
view preferences can be reasons in similar ways.  Consider a variation of the 
earlier example in which Jane prefers sailing to surfing, and Tom is indifferent 
between the two.  All other things being equal, Jane’s preferences seem to 
provide reasons for them to go sailing instead of surfing.  When deciding 
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between surfing and sailing, they have always chosen to go sailing because 
Tom was indifferent between the two so, he thought, they might as well go 
sailing.  In this instance, they may have reason to go surfing precisely because 
it is Jane’s preference.  To establish an equal healthy partnership, it is important 
for Jane’s preferences to sometimes carry the day.   
 
Here, as in the previous example, Tom and Jane have a reason to go surfing 
because of Jane’s preference for surfing, though her preference does not 
provide the reason.  It is the value of having a healthy partnership that provides 
the reason, and it is the non-evaluative fact that Jane prefers surfing that 
determines what action that reason recommends.   
 
While denying the claim that preferences prima facie provide reasons, the fact 
that the suggested view can account for the fact that Tom has a reason to go 
surfing because Jane prefers it to sailing resonates with intuitive judgments on 
the matter.   
 
This first stage of this chapter sought to focus on the relevant concept of 
reasons and locate the discussion relative to Preference theory by focusing on 
the complex inter-relations between reasons and three concepts often 
associated with Preference Theory.   
 
It acknowledged what may appear to be a challenge for the goal of offering a 
conception of practical reasoning based on the suggested view that can be 
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consistent with Preference Theory, i.e., the fact that the suggested view denies 
the following three claims that are often associated with Preference Theories. 
1. Preferences prima facie provide reasons 
2. Desires prima facie provide reasons 
3. Something is of value if is gives us reasons 
For each claim, it was argued that the challenge may seem larger than it is, for 
even if it denied the claims in question, it could accommodate the intuitive 
appeal that recommends each of them.  For example the suggested view has 
the resources to explain an agent’s preferences can be a reason, how desires 
can effect the reasons an agent has, and the intimate relationship between 
reasons and values.   
 
In the course of doing so, the first stage also focused attention on the relevant 
concept of reasons, distinguishing normative reasons from the closely related 
concepts of operative and explanatory reasons.   
 
This discussion also afforded the opportunity to address several negative 
arguments the suggested view will face.  For example, the claim that reasons 
cannot be the basic normative notion because it incorporates the normative and 
the explanatory was responded to by suggesting that the normative and 
explanatory reason relations are distinct.  And while one fact can serve as a 
relata in both a normative and explanatory reason relation, this need not create 
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any difficulties in understanding normative reasons as the basic normative 
notion.   
 
This stage also discussed the challenge posed to the suggested view by FA-
Analysis and buck-passing, namely the claim that value or goodness does not 
provide reasons.  Heuer’s articulation of the specification relation was used to 
argue for the view that if evaluative properties provide reasons, goodness or 
value itself provides reasons.  And employing Heuer’s Universality Requirement 
it was argued that both evaluative properties and goodness itself or value 
provide reasons, while non-evaluative properties do not. 
 
Since preferences and desires are mental states and not evaluative facts, this 
latter claim provided the basis to explain the suggested view’s denial of the 
claims associated with Preference Theory, that desires and preferences provide 
reasons.  However, an analogy with the specification relation was used to 
suggest that while preferences and desires do not provide reasons they can 
effect the reasons an agent has.  This, in turn, explained how the suggested 
view could accommodate the intuitions that recommend each of the three 
Preference Theory associated claims it denied without accepting the claims 
themselves. 
 
While the first stage helped identify the relevant concept of reasons and 
explored its relationship to other central concepts in practical reasoning, it did 
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not explore the conception of reasons itself.  That is the subject matter that will 
be taken up in the second stage of this chapter. 
 
The world is normatively complex.  Situated within relationships and societal 
constructs, living amongst institutions, traditions, cultural norms and practices, 
individuals face an array of choices that will realize values of different kinds in 
different ways.   There is little wonder that reasons, as the basic normative 
concept, are remarkably sophisticated.  Reasons compete and combine, they 
can reinforce one another and conflict, and they can even cancel one another.  
Unfortunately, in exploring this variety of complexity, discussions of reasons can 
be somewhat opaque, impeding understanding and progress in applying this 
powerful conceptual apparatus to important new domains.  This, in part, is a 
challenge taken up by the current work in seeking to explore whether 
Preference Theories can be situated within a conception of practical reasoning 
which embraces reasons as the basic normative concept. 
 
As a result, it behooves the current effort to try to shed light on aspects of 
reasons that have at times been elusive.  If this first stage helped to establish 
that evaluative properties provide reasons, it did not say much about the 
reasons that they provide.  For example, sometimes reasons statements 
include reference to evaluative properties, but often they do not.  Many reason 
statement simply point to non-evaluative properties.  E.g., the fact that James’s 
train is arriving is a reason for John to go to the station.  What role do non-
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evaluative facts play in reasons?  When is a fact a reason?  When do two facts 
refer to the same reason, and when do they refer to two separate reasons?   
 
The current stage will seek to provide a principled basis to answer these and 
other questions by focusing on the concept of reasons itself.  In particular this 
stage will focus on the concept of a complete reason.  Reason statements often 
include reference to individual facts, e.g., the fact that it is noon is a reason for 
John to go to the station.  But these facts in isolation are not reasons.  Their 
status as reasons depends on their relation to other facts.  A complete reason 
would be a relation that takes as arguments each of the facts that are required 
for the facts to be reasons.  The complete reason relation would explain why 
the facts are reasons.  As such this stage will focus on offering an analysis of 
complete reasons that is consistent with the discussion to this point, but goes 
beyond it to incorporate non-evaluative elements.  In the course of doing so, it 
will wrestle with the dual complexities of reason statement and reasons 
themselves.   
 
To set expectations, it is important to note that this discussion will not pursue an 
exploration of the nature of reasons, nor make much progress in describing how 
reasons interact.  Both are worthwhile subjects.  The former is already the 
subject of considerable attention in the literature, and the latter is no doubt 
worthy of similar.  However, to make progress towards the current aim the focus 
of this discussion will be narrowly prescribed. 
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In Practical Reasons and Norms109 Raz analyzes reason statements as 
relations between facts and persons.  More specifically he represents complete 
reason statements as statements that can be symbolized as follows: R(Φ)p,x.  
Where ‘p’ is a fact, ‘x’ is a person and ‘R(Φ)’ is the reason to Φ operator.  This 
seems to track common reason statements.  For example as Raz says ‘p is a 
reason for x to Φ’ asserts that p is a reason for x to Φ.  Which neatly fits the 
symbolism R(Φ)p,x; and is true just in case p is true and it is a reason for x to 
Φ.  While this analysis brings to the surface the fact that reason statements like 
the above depend on p, they obscure what is required for p to be a reason to Φ, 
which seems a pertinent desiderata for an analysis of reason statements. 
 
What became clear in the earlier discussion was that a number of different facts 
may play a role in a given reason.  For example, while evaluative properties, p, 
provide reasons, it is the non-evaluative properties incorporated in the 
circumstances, c, which determine reasons.110  This suggests a variation of 
Raz’s formalism: R' (Φ)p,c,x.  In other words, an evaluative fact p, provides a 
reason for x to Φ in c.   
 
Unfortunately R' still obscures what it is about the relations between Φ, p, c and 
x that make it the case that the reason relation obtains.  For example R' would 
take the following arguments: Φ: jump in the canal, p: the agent’s life is a life 
worth living, c: jumping in the canal is the only chance to save the agent’s life, 
and x: the agent.  For the fact that the agent’s life is a life worth living and 
                                                
109 Raz, J (1999), Practical Reasons and Norms, Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
110 Here properties are taken to be facts. 
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jumping in the canal is the only chance to save the agent’s life is a reason for 
the agent to jump into the canal.  Though R` would not take the following 
arguments: Φ: jump in the canal, p: the agent’s life is a life worth living, c: 
jumping in the canal is the only chance to not save the agent’s life, and x: the 
agent.  For the fact that the agent’s life is a life worth living and jumping in the 
canal is the only chance to not save the agent’s life is not a reason for the agent 
to jump in the river.  On the contrary it is a reason for the agent not to jump in 
the river because doing so would destroy something worth preserving.   
 
It would be useful if the analysis of the reasons relation made explicit the 
required relationship between its arguments.  Specifically, the aspect that 
appears to be missing is the fact that the agent’s taking the action will somehow 
realize or preserve the value of the evaluative property.  This may be articulated 
as : The reason relation obtains if an agent’s, x’s, taking an action, a, brings 
about an outcome or increases the likelihood of, o, which realizes or preserves 
some value, v.  Using another variation of Raz’s formalism, one can represent 
this as R'' (a),o,v,x; or perhaps as R'' (a),ov,x.  Returning to the same example 
R'' would take the following arguments: a: jump in the canal, ov: the 
preservation of x’s life which is a life worth living, x: the agent.  For the fact that 
x’s jumping into the canal would preserve x’s life which is a life worth living is a 
reason for x to jump into the canal.   
 
As stated, the R'' relation imposes the following conditions on its arguments.  
The reason is a reason for the agent, x, to take the action, a.  The action must 
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bring about, or at least make more likely, the outcome, o.  The valuable 
property, v, is realized in the outcome, o.111  
 
While there are doubtless other ways to formulate R'', this formulation, together 
with its conditions, wears the logic of the reason relation on its sleeve and 
makes explicit what is required to be argument of the reason relation.  Thus 
meeting the desiderata of a reason relation mentioned earlier.  
 
A tension may naturally arise with the earlier description of reasons in which it 
was discussed that evaluative properties, p, provide reasons and 
circumstances, c, determine the reasons that they are.  How does R'' relate to 
this description? 
 
For one thing, the R'' and the previous description of reasons differ in tense.  
Whereas the p and c were discussed in the present tense, the outcome and 
value that R'' admits are future tensed, broadly speaking.  I.e., the valuable 
outcome that the action will bring about.   
 
The earlier description bears revisiting.  Recall the first interpretation of the 
example.  P:  the agent’s life is a life worth saving.  On further reflection, it is 
perhaps misleading to describe P as present tensed.  Whether or not the 
agent’s life is a life worth saving must depend in part on the character and 
quality of the agent’s life after it is saved.  For example, if the agent’s life after 
being saved would not be worthwhile, it is difficult to see why the fact that her 
                                                
111 NB: Though the outcome in the example preserves the valuable life of the agent, it is not a 
condition of the reason relation that the valuable outcome must pertain to the agent undertaking 
the action.  Plausibly an agent may have reason to take an action that preserves or realize 
value for another. 
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life is now worthwhile is a reason to save it.  It may, on the other hand, be a 
reason to take other actions that would prevent the agent’s life from being a life 
in need of saving.  But this too would depend on the action’s effect on value.  
Taking another action that prevents the agent’s life from being a life in need of 
saving could be a reason precisely because it would preserve, in the future, the 
worthwhile character of the agent’s life.  In contrast, even if the agent’s life is 
not now a worthwhile life, the fact that it would be worthwhile after having been 
saved is a reason to save the agent’s life.  The truth of P relies on what will 
happen in the future.112   
 
At the heart of this is the fact that it is the action’s effect on value that is relevant 
to whether or not there is a reason to take the action.  And in the normal course 
of things, excluding cases at the limit where the temporal location of the action 
and the outcome become indistinguishable, this effect can be aptly described in 
the future tense.   
 
In this example the temporal signatures in C are more readily transparent.  
Recall that C includes non-evaluative facts such as that the agent’s jumping in 
the canal is the only way to save her life.  Here the fact itself describes events 
which are temporally elongated.  It includes a description of the action, jumping 
in the canal, and the outcome, saving of the agent’s life, which is the causal 
consequence of the action. 
 
                                                
112 Indeed this future orientation is reflected in Raz’s articulation of the most general reason that 
value provides.  Recall that Raz suggests value provides a general reason to realize or 
preserve that value which applies generally.  The reasons to realize and preserve value are 
both future oriented. 
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Despite appearances, it seems, R'' and the previous description of reasons 
incorporate the same elements.  The apparent differences may only be a result 
of their different purpose.  Whereas the previous descriptions of reasons sought 
to clarify which element provides the reasons, R'' seeks to elaborate upon the 
relationship between the elements of a reason. 
 
It is worth noting that R'' represents reasons as broadly speaking 
consequentialist.  That is to say that it is the value of the outcome or 
consequence that provides the reason.  There are at least three difficulties with 
this.  First, there are actions that are valuable in themselves.  Second, in some 
cases the character of the action is relevant to the reason.  Third, it is at least 
possible, and highly likely, that deontological considerations also provide 
reasons.  Each of these would seem to be at tension with a consequentialist 
formalism for reasons.  Each will be looked at in turn. 
 
There are some actions which are valuable in themselves.  For example, 
standing up for the welfare of a vulnerable group, may be valuable in itself even 
if doing so creates detrimental effects for oneself or others.  Admittedly the 
detrimental effects to oneself or others may be reason not to stand up for the 
vulnerable group, but this is a further reason and does not cancel the reason 
that there is for doing so.  Examples like this would seem to be a poor fit for R''.  
Rather it is tempting to offer a variation of the formalism to acknowledge the fact 
that the value in these cases accrues to the action.  R''', R''' (av), x, is a 
candidate for doing so. 
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While this is certainly a possibility, it will not be the alternative pursued here.  
Instead it will be suggested that R'' be applied broadly enough to accommodate 
case of this kind.  This can simply be accomplished by permitting the outcome, 
o, to take a description of the action, a, as an argument.  Note, this is not quite 
the same as saying that a and o can take the same argument.  For o includes 
an evaluative element, whereas a does not.  This is not as much of a stretch as 
it may first appear.  Consider the example in question where R'' would take the 
following arguments: a: stand up for the welfare of a vulnerable population, ov: 
stand up for the welfare of a vulnerable group which would be valuable in its 
own right, x: the agent.  Using the plain language description of R'' offered 
earlier this can be articulated as: the agent has a reason to stand up for the 
welfare of a vulnerable group if doing so would bring about or increase the 
likelihood of the agent’s standing up for the valuable group which would be 
valuable in its own right.  Or, less redundantly, the agent has a reason to stand 
up for the welfare of the valuable group if doing so would be valuable in its own 
right.  In this way, by permitting the outcome, o, to take as an argument a 
description of the action which incorporates the evaluative element, R'' can 
accommodate cases in which an action is valuable in and of itself. 
 
This is somewhat different from cases in which the character of the action itself 
is relevant to the reason.  For example, consider the case of Lance Armstrong.  
Plausibly, as a cyclist Lance Armstrong had reason to win the Tour de France, 
which is regarded as the most difficult cycling race in the world and the winning 
of which would indicate he had become the best in the world at his chosen 
profession.  For arguably one has reason to become the best in the world at 
one’s chosen profession, particularly if it is a competitive sport like cycling.  Yet 
                   101 of 229 
the way in which Lance Armstrong wins the Tour de France, the character of 
the action, is relevant to the reason he had.  For Lance Armstrong did not have 
a reason to win the Tour de France by taking steroids and cheating; he had 
reason to win the Tour de France through honest effort.  How is this to be 
understood in terms of R''? 
 
Rendered in the formalism, R'' would take the following arguments: a: win the 
Tour de France by cheating, ov: indicate Lance Armstrong had become the best 
in the world at his chosen profession which would be valuable, x: Lance 
Armstrong.  Using the plain language description of R'' this would yield:  Lance 
Armstrong has a reason to win the Tour de France by cheating if doing so 
would bring about or increase the likelihood of indicating that Lance Armstrong 
had become the best in the world at his chosen profession, which would be 
valuable.  But it is precisely because winning the Tour de France by cheating 
would not indicate that Lance Armstrong had become the best in the world at 
his chosen profession that this is not a reason for Lance Armstrong to win the 
Tour de France by cheating.  Whereas, he did have reason to win the Tour de 
France through honest effort.  In cases of this kind, the character of the action is 
relevant to the reason in that it effects whether the action can bring about the 
outcome or make it more likely that it comes about.   
 
The issue with deontological consideration is quite different.  There likely are 
deontological considerations which provide reasons.  The prohibition on murder 
is an obvious candidate.  And in any event, the formalism should not pre-judge 
the matter.  It should be acknowledged that the current analysis of reasons 
pertains to value based reasons.  If deontological considerations provide 
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reasons, the suggested view should be augmented to incorporate them.  
However, this is a large topic in its own right and will not be addressed here.  
While a limitation of the current account, it is not an overwhelming drawback as 
many of the reasons agents have are value based.   
 
This limitation not withstanding, for the domain to which it pertains, the current 
analysis and the associated conditions provide an account of complete value 
based reasons that wears its logic on its sleeve. E.g., 
• Formal analysis: R'' (a),ov,x, where R'' is the reasons relation, a is an 
action, ov a valuable outcome, and x is an agent. 
• Conditions: 
o The reason is a reason for the agent, x, to take the action, a.   
o The action must bring about, or at least increase the likelihood of 
the outcome, o.   
o The valuable property, v, is realized in the outcome, o. 
• Plain language description: The reason relation obtains if the agent’s, 
x’s, taking an action, a, brings about or increases the likelihood of a 
valuable outcome, ov. 
 
While it should be clear from methodological statements to this effect 
throughout this chapter, no attempt has been made to argue that this is the way 
of describing complete reasons, the elements that comprise them, and the 
relation that holds amongst the elements.  Rather it is being suggested that this 
is a fruitful way for doing so.  And this approach meets at least two desiderata 
for such an effort.  It makes clear the conditions for a fact to qualify as an 
                   103 of 229 
element of a complete reason.  It lays out the relation between the elements.  
And it brings to the fore the force of the reason.  It is a further question whether 
the analysis is useful in understanding reasons statements.  And that is the 
subject which will next be considered.  
 
To begin with, this treatment of complete reasons can provide a systematic 
basis for dealing with some preliminary questions about reasons that stem from 
the pragmatic way that they are discussed.  As was already noted, in making 
statements about reasons, it is common practice to mention some pertinent 
facts, but not elaborate the complete reason itself.  While usually sufficient for 
the purposes at hand, this can and does lead to questions of whether two 
statements about facts refer to the same or different reasons.  A brief 
discussion of an example Raz introduces can be instructive: “When asked why 
he goes to the station, John may say that (a) James will be arriving there, or 
that (b) James will be pleased to be met at the station, or that (c) he would like 
to please James… and that then John says that (d) he has promised James 
that he will meet him at the station, that (e) one ought to keep one’s promises, 
and that (f)  one ought to please one’s friends.” 113 
 
By way of explanation, Raz says, “(a) to (c) state parts of a reason which John 
has for going to the station.  (d) states not a further part of the same reason but 
a part of a second reason for the same action.  (a) may well be a statement of 
part of the second reason as well, but not (b) or (c).  (e) and (f) are quite 
                                                
113 Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms pg 22,23 
                   104 of 229 
different again.  They are not parts of the reasons which John has for going to 
the station.  They explain in two different ways why John has or regards himself 
as having two reasons for going to the station.” 114 
 
In many ways, Raz’s comments are straightforward and reflect the discussion to 
date.  Nonetheless, it will be helpful to elaborate briefly.  For example, as Raz 
says (a) through (c) may be one reason for John to go to the station.  But it is a 
very different reason than the reason John has to in virtue of making James 
happy.  Relying on the recent discussion of complete reasons can make this 
clearer.  The first reading can be rearticulated as: John has a reason to go to 
the station because by going to the station he will make James happy and 
satisfy John’s desires to make James happy.115  The valuable outcome that 
provides this reason is the value that comes from satisfying the desire to make 
James happy.  Whereas the second reading can be rearticulated as: John has 
a reason to go to the station because by going to the station he will make 
James happy.  The valuable outcome that provides this reason is James’ being 
happy.  In the first reason, James’ happiness is instrumental to satisfying John’s 
desire, whereas in the second reason it is the end which provides the reason. 
 
Pressing on, what then of the question raised earlier, whether statements 
referring to two facts refer to the same or different reasons.  Recall that earlier it 
was noted that two different fact statements may refer to one and the same 
                                                
114 Raz, pg 23. 
115 Recall the earlier discussion about the difference between satisfying a desire and the value 
which can result from satisfying a desire.  Strictly speaking it is the latter which is relevant here.  
But, for present purposes Raz’s articulation will be followed to parallel the example.   
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reason and that a single fact statement can be used to refer to more than one 
reason.  To elaborate on how this was possible it was shown that a single fact 
may stand in two different complete reason relations and that two different facts 
can stand in one and the same complete reason relation.  This may suggest 
that the complete reason relation can serve as the basis for identifying and 
distinguishing reasons.  Perhaps through what may be called the Complete 
Reason Identity Relation (CRIR): the complete reason R'' (a1),ov1,x1 is identical 
with the complete reason R'' (a2),ov2,x2 if an only if a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2.  
However, because the CRIR depends on the specification of the elements of 
complete reasons and the identity relations that hold amongst them, resting with 
CRIR without further elaboration would be too quick. 
  
Consider the following example.  Mary has reason to go to the symphony if 
Mary’s attending the symphony would bring about or increase the likelihood of 
Mary’s engaging with the artistry of the music.  As a result of the specification 
relation discussed earlier, one can regiment this reason in the following way: 
Mary has reason to go to the symphony, if attending the symphony would be 
valuable.  This reason statement includes references to each of the elements of 
the complete reason, i.e., the agent (x1) : Mary, the action (a1): going to the 
symphony, and a valuable outcome (ov1): attending the symphony would be 
valuable.  However, it is altogether possible that Mary may also have another 
reason for going to the symphony, for example, to appropriately engage with 
the artistry of the conductor which would also be valuable.  One can regiment 
this reason statement in the following way: Mary has reason to go to the 
symphony if Mary’s attending the symphony would bring about or increase the 
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likelihood of Mary’s engaging with the artistry of the conductor.  Once again, 
because of the specification relation, one can regiment this reason statement in 
the following way: Mary has reason to go to the symphony, if attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  This reason statement includes references to 
each of the elements of the complete reason, i.e., the agent (x2): Mary, the 
action (a2): going to the symphony, and a valuable outcome (ov2): attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  It is the case that: a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2.  
Yet the reason statements refer to two different reasons.  Put more succinctly, 
even complete reason relation can be ambiguous if not articulated at the 
appropriate level of specification.  When this is the case, identity amongst the 
elements of complete reasons relation is not sufficient to establish that two 
reason statements refer to the same reason.  This will be referred to as the 
false positive challenge, because CRIR yields false positive result that the 
complete reason R''(a1),ov1,x1 is identical with the complete reason R''(a2),ov2,x2.  
 
Consider another variation of an earlier example: John has a reason to drive his 
car to the station because by going to the station he will make James happy.  
This reason statement includes references to each of the elements of the 
complete reason, i.e., the agent (x1): John, the action (a1): driving his car to the 
station, and a valuable outcome (ov1): making James happy.  However it is also 
true that John has a reason to drive the car that is parked in his garage to the 
station because by going to the station he will make James happy.  This reason 
statement also includes references to each of the elements of the complete 
reason, i.e., the agent (x2): John, the action (a2): driving the car that is parked in 
his garage to the station, and a valuable outcome (ov2): making James happy.  
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Since it is John’s car that is parked in his garage, the complete reason 
R''(a1),ov1,x1 is identical with the complete reason R''(a2),ov2,x2.  Yet if a1 is not 
identical to a2, then CRIR would not hold.  So identity between elements of 
complete reason statements is not a necessary condition for two reason 
statements to refer to the same reason.  This will be referred to as the false 
negative challenge, because CRIR yields false negative result that the complete 
reason R''(a1),ov1,x1 is not identical with the complete reason to by R''(a2),ov2,x2.  
 
Yet this is surprising, because CRIR appears to be trivially true.  Complete 
reasons, on this account, are constituted by the elements standing in a reason 
relation.  When the same elements stand in the reason relation they constitute a 
reason, i.e., one and the same reason.  The issue here is that CRIR turns on 
the identity relation between elements of complete reasons.  This helps to 
locate the question.  The question is how to establish the identity between 
elements of complete reasons?  Or, conversely, the question is how to 
distinguish between two different actions and/ or two different outcomes? 
 
Both of the previous examples turned on facts not explicitly referenced in R''.  
This may suggest that R'' is in some way incomplete.  If these facts had been 
included in R'' CRIR would have held.  However, there is a difficulty with this 
thought.  As was discussed earlier, there may be no end to specification.  In 
these case there would be no complete articulation of R'', which would not 
possibly be subject to further augmentation through the addition of another fact.  
This is a poignant challenge, for if there is no complete articulation of R'', then 
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there may not be a systematic basis for establishing the identity or difference of 
reasons.  Identity statements about reasons, even complete reasons, would be 
dispositive.116 
 
Rather than propagating the facts that are included in the reason relation, there 
is another possibility.  It is worthwhile considering the ontology of the elements 
of complete reasons.  What type of things are the elements of complete 
reasons such that they can be described in such different ways? 
 
Indeed the root of the problem seems to be that the non-evaluative aspects of 
the action and the outcome admit to different levels of description in a way that 
is similar to evaluative facts.  For present purposes this will be referred to as 
level flexibility.  Yet, facts themselves do not stand in a specification relation to 
one another.  Facts do not share level flexibility.  This suggests it may not be 
fruitful to think of actions and events of having the ontological character of facts.  
What is the ontology of the action and the outcome? 
                                                
116 Raz suggests that this is the case for explanations of reason statements. “As you see I am 
using ‘reason’ to refer to any fact which figures (nonredundantly) in an explanation, and not 
merely to the totality of facts all of which figure (non-redundantly) in an explanation. It is 
tempting to call the totality of all the facts which figure non-redundantly in an explanation a 
complete reason. I may occasionally use the term in order to avoid complex formulations. But if 
taken literally it implies more than is warranted: it implies that there is at least one 
comprehensive way of individuating facts, such that relative to any such scheme of individuation 
an object of explanation, it is either true or not, regarding each fact, that it belongs to the 
explanation of that object. There is reason to doubt that the explanation relation is such that it is 
ever true that regarding any object of explanation there is a set of explanatory facts such that it 
explains that object, and that adding any other fact to it is redundant so far as that explanation 
goes. It seems that our ways of individuating facts and the notion of explanation are such that 
any explanation can always be nonredundantly amplified, clarified and expanded.” “Reasons: 
explanatory and normative”, Raz, pg 3.  The difference between Raz’s point and the issue here, 
is that the current focus is on reasons, and the identity statements that hold between them, 
rather than on explanations of reasons statements.  Even if explanations of reason statements 
may always be subject to augmentation, one may wonder whether reasons themselves are.  
Indeed, the following discussion will suggest an approach for addressing the fact that the 
elements of complete reasons can be referenced with so many different statements of fact. 
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The common description of reasons as facts is often meant to offer a contrast 
with views of reasons as statements or beliefs, i.e., with reasons as “what is the 
case”117 rather than as “what they (agents) believe to be the case”118 or what 
agents say.  Facts in this sense are to be understood broadly to include: “…the 
occurrence of events, processes, performances and activities.”119  The ontology 
of the elements of complete reason then is an open question. 
 
In keeping with the spirit of the current work, the following attempt to arrive at a 
plausible answer to this question will be offered in full recognition of the 
possibility that there may be more than one adequate way of accounting for the 
ontology of the elements of a complete reason.  Indeed exploring the ontology 
of the elements of complete reasons raises questions about the delineation of 
elements of complete reasons offered so far.  Is it appropriate and useful to 
distinguish between the agent, the action, and the valuable outcome?  Why 
should one think that this division carves things at the joints? 
 
Reflecting on the ontological characteristics of the elements of complete 
reasons will go some way to allaying these concerns.  Practical reasons are 
action guiding.  They are, frequently, reasons for an agent to act with intention 
to bring about an outcome.120 Indeed, the elements discussed can be 
distinguished by their temporal markings.  While the agent persists through 
                                                
117 Raz, pg 17. 
118 Raz, pg 17. Parenthetical added 
119 Raz, pg 18 
120 At least this is the case for the subset of reasons of interest here. 
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time, the action and outcome happen at a time.  While the agent may persist 
throughout the outcome, with the onset of the outcome the action (begins to) 
expires.  As a result, the agent can be distinguished as ontologically distinct 
from the action and outcome.  On the other hand, the action and outcome can 
be distinguished from one another by temporal order and the relevance of 
intentionality.121  Even if this suggests that the elements of complete reasons 
have different temporal characters, it leaves open the question of the ontology 
itself.  However, it does suggest that a viable ontology for the present account 
of complete reasons respect these differences. 
 
A plausible ontology should serve Raz’ original motivation of speaking of 
reasons as facts, i.e., that which is the case, respect the different ontological 
character just discussed and be consistent with the explication of pragmatic 
consideration offered.  Given the most recent discussion, the ontology of events 
Davidson relied on in “Paradoxes of Irrationality”122 is one possibility.   
 
Events for Davidson are particulars, i.e., that which is the case.  As particulars, 
events admit to descriptions at a multitude of levels, as an infinite number of 
facts are true of any event.  This fits well with the fact that elements of a 
complete reason can be referenced at many different levels of specificity.  
Particulars share the characteristic level flexibility with the elements of a 
complete reason. 
                                                
121 With the exception, of course, of cases discussed earlier in which the action is valuable in 
and of itself. 
122 Davidson, Donald “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, 1982, in Problems of Rationality, Oxford 
University Press. 
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The remainder of this section will explore the potential of this approach.  There 
is a real possibility that it may ultimately prove too limiting to suggest that one 
can provide an account of reasons based on an ontology of events. If so, 
nothing above should turn on this.  Indeed there is a problem with the 
suggested ontology.  Elements of complete reasons seem to have a second 
dimension of flexibility that Davidson’s particulars do not share.   
 
Earlier it was mentioned that the particulars Davidson mentioned fit well with the 
fact that elements of a complete reason can be referenced at many different 
levels of specificity.  Still, the action and outcomes elements of complete 
reasons have a different dimension of flexibility that particulars do not share.  
For example, consider the case of John’s driving to the station.  While the 
particular in which John drives to the station wearing a blue hat is different than 
the particular in which he drives to the station wearing a red hat, both are 
elements of John’s reason.  That is to say that it is not the case that John has a 
reason to drive to the station wearing a red hat and a further reason to drive to 
the station wearing a blue hat.  John has one and the same reason to drive to 
the station whether he is wearing a red or a blue hat.  Indeed there are possibly 
an infinite number of such variations.  And the action that John has a reason to 
undertake is possibly consistent with an infinite number of different particulars.  
Thus it seems particulars are a poor candidate for the ontology of the action 
and outcomes of a complete reason.  Does this mean that the ontology of 
events should be discarded out of hand?  If not, how can it accommodate this 
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second dimension of flexibility, which for present purposes will be referred to as 
breadth flexibility, of actions and outcomes? 
 
Action types and event types123 share breadth flexibility while maintaining the 
level flexibility of particulars.  For example, the particular in which John drives to 
the station wearing a blue hat and the particular in which John wears a red hat 
are tokens of the event type John drives to the station.  As an event type, 
John’s driving to the station is also consistent with an infinite number of different 
particulars.  E.g., John’s driving his car and John’s driving the car that is parked 
in his garage are also tokens of this type.  So event types share the 
characteristic level and breadth flexibility of elements of a complete reason.   
 
This raises the question of how to establish identity between event types, but a 
detailed discussion of identity relations amongst event types would take things 
far afield from a discussion of reasons.  One possibility will be offered later, but 
it is acknowledged that this approach relies on the claim that such identity 
conditions between event types can be established.  If they cannot, this 
approach will have to be adjusted. 
 
                                                
123 From here on action types and event types will be referenced as event types.  This is not 
intended to signal that the events are not actions in Davidson’s sense.  Presumably most if not 
all will be.  But rather it sill be helpful to distinguish action types from the action elements of 
complete reasons.  Further, since actions, for Davidson, are events that are intentional under 
some description it is not inaccurate to describe them in this way, even if does so obscures the 
intentional character of the action. 
                   113 of 229 
There is a related question which pertains more directly to reasons which are 
the current focus of discussion.  How are the event types defined?   
 
The definition of event types can also occur at different levels.  Consider the 
following example.  The agent has reason to go to the marionette theater since 
doing so would be valuable.  This is ambiguous between two different reasons 
that the agent has.  The agent has reason to go to the theater to perform as a 
puppeteer, or manipulator as they are called, since it would provide the agent a 
valuable opportunity to practice the craft he has long studied.  The agent has 
reason to go to the theater to as an audience member since it would be 
valuable to engage with the artful production.  The first reason statement is 
ambiguous between the two subsequent reasons, which in turn are exclusive of 
one another.  I.e., the agent can either practice his craft or can engage with the 
artful production, but he cannot do both.  This is not an issue that stems from 
the current analysis of reasons.  It is a natural consequence of the specification 
relation that holds amongst values.  Recall the specification relation: “If E, F and 
G are variable for properties, then F specifies G iff: 
1) necessarily all F’s are G’s, but 
2) possibly some G’s are not F’s, and 
3) if a G is not and F, then necessarily there is some E such that necessarily all 
E’s are G’s, but possibly some G’s are not E’s.”124 
 
                                                
124 Heuer, pg 20. 
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F and E are complete subsets of one G, but some F’s may be exclusive of E’s.  
In this case a statement of G would be ambiguous between F’s and E’s (and 
possibly others).   
 
While this issue does not stem from the current analysis of reasons, it is an 
issue that the analysis should accommodate; and it raises a question about the 
level at which event types are defined.  For, if the action, for example, is defined 
at the too high a level it may also be ambiguous.  An extension of this example 
makes the problem clearer.  The agent has reason to go to the theater since it 
would provide the agent a valuable opportunity to practice the craft he has long 
studied.  As a reason statement this may be unproblematic, but at the level of 
the complete reason, it is.  If the action is defined as the event type, going to the 
theater, the reason relation, R'', will not hold.  In this case R'' would take the 
following arguments: a: going to the theater, ov: practice the craft he has long 
studied, x: the agent.  Using the plain language description of R'' this can be 
articulated as: the agent has a reason to go to the theater if doing so would 
bring about or increase the likelihood of the agent’s practicing the craft he long 
studied.  But there are tokens of the type “going to the theater” in which the 
agent goes to the theater as an audience member.  And, as per the example, in 
these instances the agent does not have an opportunity to practice the craft he 
long studied, so the reason relation would not hold. Is this a problem for the 
current analysis of complete reasons?  Are event types too flexible?   
 
On the contrary, this illustrates one of the implications of the conditions of the 
reason relation.  Recall the conditions of the reason relation:  
• Conditions: 
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o The reason is a reason for the agent, x, to take the action, a.   
o The action must bring about, or at least increase the likelihood of 
the outcome, o.   
o The valuable property, v, is realized in the outcome, o. 
 
The second and third conditions impose a requirement among elements of a 
complete reason.  If the event type of the action is defined at higher a level than 
other elements in the complete reason, it may include tokens that will not bring 
about or increase the likelihood of the valuable outcome.  And if the event type 
of the outcome is defined at higher level than other elements in the complete 
reason, it may include tokens that will not realize the valuable property.  Note 
this requirement is asymmetrical.  In other words, if the event types of the action 
and outcome are defined at a lower level than other elements in the complete 
reason they will include only tokens that bring about or increase the likelihood of 
the valuable outcome, and tokens that realize the valuable property, but they 
will exclude others that do as well.   
 
This is the result of the relation that holds between the relevant event types.  It 
has already been acknowledged that event types can be defined at different 
levels.  Consider two event types, one defined at a higher level and one defined 
at a lower level.  For the event type defined at a lower level to be consistent 
with the event type defined at a higher level the tokens of the lower level event 
type must be tokens of the higher level event type.  For if it did not, the lower 
level event type would include tokens that were not tokens of the higher level 
event type and so would be inconsistent with it.  On the other hand, the lower 
level event type need not include as tokens all the tokens of the higher level 
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event type.  If there are tokens of the higher level event type that are not also 
tokens of the lower level event type, there is presumably another lower level 
event type of which they are tokens.  This is just the specification relation.  So 
the specification relation holds amongst relevant event types.   
 
This makes it relatively easy to enumerate a consistency condition that reflects 
the consistency condition imposed by the second condition of the reason 
relation.  Specification Consistency: For the reason relation, R'', to obtain the 
event types which comprise the action and outcome must be specified at a level 
that is a least as low as the specification of the evaluative property. 
 
 
Articulating Specification Consistency, it is easy to see that event types are not 
too flexible.  The current analysis can accommodate the fact that the 
specification relation holds amongst evaluative properties because the 
specification relation also holds between the relevant event types.  The reason 
relation, R'', simply requires that the evaluative element and event types of the 
action and outcome elements to be specified at consistent levels. 
 
But what of the asymmetrical character of this requirement?   If the event type 
of the action is described at a lower level than other elements in the complete 
reason then it will exclude tokens that bring about or increase the likelihood of 
the valuable outcome.  Similarly if the event type of the outcome is described at 
a lower level than other elements in the complete reason then it will exclude 
tokens that realize the valuable property.  Neither would be a full articulation of 
the complete reason. 
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To this point, the assumed standard for completeness that anchored discussion 
of complete reasons and the reason relation was that the reason relation should 
include all the arguments required for reasons to be the reasons that they are.   
The standard of completeness was, so to speak, analytic.  In contrast there is 
another standard of completeness which would be extensional.  A complete 
reason relation would be extensionally complete if it applies to all cases in 
which the reason would apply. 
 
Whereas Specification Consistency is required by analytic completeness, 
extensional completeness can anchor a different requirement.  For the reason 
relation to be extensionally complete the event type must be defined at a high 
enough level that it includes all the tokens that will bring about or increase the 
likelihood of the valuable outcome.  And the event type of the outcome must be 
defined at a high enough level that it includes all the tokens that realize the 
valuable property.  Since it was already shown that if the event types of the 
action and outcome are defined at a lower level than other elements in the 
complete reason they will exclude tokens that bring about or increase the 
likelihood of the valuable outcome, and tokens that realize the valuable 
property, it is relatively easy to enumerate a condition that that reflects the 
Extensional Completeness: For the reason relation, R'', to be extensionally 
complete the event types which comprise the action and outcome must be 
specified at a level that is a least as high as the specification of the evaluative 
property. 
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The conditions of R'' can be restated as follows:  
• Conditions: 
o The reason is a reason for the agent, x, to take the action, a.   
o The action must bring about, or at least increase the likelihood of 
the outcome, o.   
o The valuable property, v, is realized in the outcome, o. 
• Requirements: 
o Specification Consistency: For the reason relation, R'', to obtain 
the event types which comprise the action and outcome must be 
specified at a level that is a least as low as the specification of the 
evaluative property. 
o Extensional Completeness: For the reason relation, R'', to be 
extensionally complete the event types which comprise the action 
and outcome must be specified at a level that is a least as high as 
the specification of the evaluative property. 
 
With an understanding of the elements of complete reasons as event types, 
Specification Consistency and Extensional Completeness address both the 
false negative and false positive challenges to CRIR.    
 
Recall the false negative problem arose when the action element of 
R''(a1),ov1,x1 was specified at a different level than the action element of 
R''(a2),ov2,x2, thus CRIR yielded the false negative result that R''(a1),ov1,x1 and 
R''(a2),ov2,x2 were different reasons.   
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Assume that R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 satisfy Specification Consistency 
and Extensional Completeness.  As a result, the elements a1, ov1, x1 are 
specified at the ‘same’ level of specification as one another; and the elements 
a2, ov2, x2 are defined at the ‘same’ level of specification as one another.  
Further if the specification of the evaluative element of R''(a1),ov1,x1 is specified 
at the same level as the evaluative element of R''(a2),ov2,x2, then each of the 
other elements of the R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 are also specified at the 
same level of specification of their counterparts.  Further, note that if two 
consistent even types, i.e., event types that stand in a specification relation to 
one another, are specified at the same level, then they share the same tokens.  
For if they do not, then they are either not specified at the same level; or they 
are not consistent and represent different event types.  Further, two event types 
that share all the same tokens just are the same event type.  Together this 
leads to the following conditional claim: 
• if R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 independently satisfy Specification 
Consistency and Extensional Completeness 
• and if the evaluative elements of R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 are 
specified at the same level,  
• then the complete reason R'' (a1),ov1,x1 is identical with the complete 
reason R'' (a2),ov2,x2 if an only if a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2. 
 
Since CRIR just is the consequent, CRIR holds if the conditions of the 
antecedent obtain.  When the Specification Consistency and Extensional 
Completeness requirements are met, CRIR does not face the false negative 
challenge. 
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Specification Consistency and Extensional Completeness also show why the 
false positive challenge is not a challenge that plagues CRIR, but is a matter of 
interpretation of reason statements.  Recall the false positive challenge 
emerged when two different reason statements were rendered at too high a 
level of specification.  The reason statement “Mary has reason to go to the 
symphony if Mary’s attending the symphony would bring about or increase the 
likelihood of Mary’s engaging with the artistry of the music” was regimented in 
the following way: Mary has reason to go to the symphony, if attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  This reason statement includes references to 
each of the elements of the complete reason, i.e., the agent (x1) : Mary, the 
action (a1): going to the symphony, and a valuable outcome (ov1): attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  However, the different reason statement, which 
apparently referred to a different reason, “Mary has reason to go to the 
symphony if Mary’s attending the symphony would bring about or increase the 
likelihood of Mary’s engaging with the artistry of the conductor” was regimented 
in the following way: Mary has reason to go to the symphony, if attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  This reason statement includes references to 
each of the elements of the complete reason, i.e., the agent (x2): Mary, the 
action (a2): going to the symphony, and a valuable outcome (ov2): attending the 
symphony would be valuable.  It is the case that: a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2.  
The complete reason R''(a1),ov1,x1 is identical with the complete reason 
R''(a2),ov2,x2, yet the reason statements refer to two different reasons.  How are 
we to understand this?  
 
The discussion of Specification Consistency and Extensional Completeness 
sheds light on the problem.  The elements of R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2, 
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take as tokens all and only the tokens that realize the valuable property of 
attending the symphony.  This includes the value of engaging with the artistry of 
the music and the value of engaging with the artistry of the conductor.  That 
R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 are ambiguous between two reason statements is 
not a challenge for CRIR.  CRIR holds. R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 are 
identical reasons.  It is just that they are reasons for more than one action that 
bring about or increase the likelihood of more than one valuable outcome.  This 
is a challenge of interpreting reasons statements, not a challenge at the level of 
complete reasons.  For CRIR to be fruitful, it will be helpful to interpret reason 
statements at the appropriate level of specification.  As was mentioned earlier, 
there is likely no correct level of specification of a reason.  The level of 
specification appropriate will be determined by the reasons one is comparing. 
 
It is not the case that identity statements about reasons, even complete 
reasons, are dispositive.  CRIR can establish the identity or difference of two 
complete reasons R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 that satisfy Specification 
Consistency and Extensional Completeness.  This is based on understanding 
the ontological character of actions and outcomes as event types.  And fruitful 
application of CRIR will depend on the appropriate level of specification of the 
elements of complete reasons in question which can be determined by context 
and pragmatic considerations. 
 
This second stage of this chapter sought to make discussions of the remarkably 
sophisticated basic normative concept reasons tractable by focusing on an 
analysis of reasons themselves.  In particular, to complement the earlier 
discussion, this stage targeted three aspects of reasons discussions which can 
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be troublingly opaque, i.e., when is something a reason, what is the relationship 
between the elements of a reason and how does one establish the identity or 
difference of two reasons? 
 
 
The discussion began with a candidate for the complete reason relation 
suggested by Raz, R(Φ)p,x, but argued that it did not meet a pertinent 
desiderata for an analysis of reason statements because it obscures what is 
required for p to be a reason to Φ.  Noting that the earlier discussion showed 
that a number of different facts may play a role in a given reason, a variation of 
Raz’s formulation, R' (Φ)p,c,x was offered.  Unfortunately R' (Φ)p,c,x still 
obscured what it is about the relations between Φ, p, c and x that make it the 
case that the reason relation obtains.  So a further variation of Raz’s formulism, 
R'' (a),ov,x, was offered which can be articulated as : The reason relation 
obtains if an agent’s, x’s, taking an action, a, brings about or increases the 
likelihood of an outcome, o, which realizes or preserves some value, v.  Unlike 
R and R', R'' wears the logic of the reason relation on its sleeve and makes 
explicit what is required to be an argument of the reason relation.  The reason 
relation and its attending conditions were initially crystallized as follows: 
 
• Formal analysis: R'' (a),ov,x, where R'' is the reasons relation, a is an 
action, ov a valuable outcome, and x is an agent. 
• Conditions: 
o The reason is a reason for the agent, x, to take the action, a.   
o The action must bring about, or at least increase the likelihood of 
the outcome, o.   
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o The valuable property, v, is realized in the outcome, o. 
• Plain language description: The reason relation obtains if the agent’s, 
x’s, taking an action, a, brings about or increases the likelihood of a 
valuable outcome, ov. 
 
With the suggested view in hand, several challenges to it were explored.  To 
start with it was acknowledged that the suggested view differed from the 
previous discussion both in form and in tense, i.e., the previous discussion 
spoke of reasons in the present tense, whereas the suggested view speaks of 
elements of reasons as future tensed.  Upon closer examination, it was 
suggested that difference in tense may be merely superficial.  For the previous 
description of reasons also included elements that were temporally elongated.  
The differences in form may reflect a difference in their purpose.  Whereas the 
previous descriptions of reasons sought to clarify which element provides the 
reasons, R'' seeks to elaborate upon the relationship between the elements of a 
reason. 
 
Still, it was acknowledged that the broadly speaking consequentialist 
representation of reasons by R'' presents three challenges.  First, there are 
some actions which are valuable in themselves.  Second, there are other 
actions in which the character of the action is relevant to the reason.  And third, 
it is highly likely that deontological considerations also provide reasons.   
 
After looking at each of these in turn, it was argued that the first two challenges 
do not present a problem for the suggested view.  For by permitting the 
outcome, o, to take as an argument a description of the action which 
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incorporates the evaluative element, R'' can accommodate cases in which an 
action is valuable in and of itself.  And cases in which the character of the action 
are relevant to the reason simply require that this aspect of the action is 
incorporated into the specification of the action element of R''.  However, the 
third challenge shows a limitation of the suggested view.  If there are 
deontological considerations which provide reasons, and there likely are, then 
the suggested view should be augmented to account for them.  In its current 
incarnation the suggested view pertains to value based reasons. 
 
Understanding the significance of these challenges and noting the fact that the 
suggested view meets a desiderata for an analysis of complete reasons, the 
discussion explored whether R'' could be used to shed light on complications 
that arise from the pragmatic way reasons are often discussed.  In particular, 
can R'' be used to offer a principled basis to determine whether two reason 
statement refer to the same or different reasons? 
 
In considering this possibility it was noted that two different fact statements may 
refer to one and the same reason and that a single fact statement can be used 
to refer to more than one reason.  Since the reason relation was fruitful in 
explaining how this could happen, it was suggested that it may be similarly 
fruitful as a basis for identifying and distinguishing reasons.  This suggestion 
took the shape of the Complete Reason Identity Relation (CRIR): the complete 
reason R'' (a1),ov1,x1 is identical with the complete reason R'' (a2),ov2,x2 if an 
only if a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2.   
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Unfortunately it was quickly recognized that CRIR appeared to face both a false 
negative and a false positive challenge.  It was noted that both challenges 
turned on facts not explicitly referenced in R''.  However, since there may be no 
end to specification it may always be possible to augment R'' through the 
addition of another fact.  In these case there would be no complete articulation 
of R'' and as a result there may not be a systematic basis for establishing the 
identity or difference of reasons.  This is a poignant challenge because identity 
statements about reasons, even complete reasons, would be dispositive. 
 
Rather than seeking to address this challenge by propagating the facts that are 
included in the reason relation it was suggested that it may be worthwhile to 
reconsider the ontology of the elements of complete reasons.   
 
The root of the problem was identified as the fact that the action and the 
outcome of the complete reason admit to different levels of description in a way 
that is similar to evaluative facts, which was referred to as level flexibility. 
 
Since facts do not share level flexibility with actions and outcomes, it was 
suggested that they may not be a fruitful candidate for the ontology of elements 
of a complete reason.  Indeed, it was noted, the original motivation for 
describing reasons as facts was not so much to ascribe an ontology to the 
elements of a complete reason but to distinguish them from beliefs or 
statements.  An alternative ontology which respected this difference would be in 
keeping with the original motivation. 
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Inspired by Davidson’s ontology of events as particulars, an ontology of event 
types was proposed for the elements of complete reasons.  And it was shown 
that event types share the characteristic level and breadth flexibility of actions 
and outcomes.  Further it was shown that the specification relation, that holds 
amongst evaluative properties, holds amongst consistent event types.   
 
Recognizing this, it was easy to enumerate two requirements of the complete 
reason relation: 
• Specification Consistency: For the reason relation, R'', to obtain the 
event types which comprise the action and outcome must be specified at 
a level that is a least as low as the specification of the evaluative 
property. 
• Extensional Completeness: For the reason relation, R'', to be 
extensionally complete the event types which comprise the action and 
outcome must be specified at a level that is a least as high as the 
specification of the evaluative property. 
 
Based on an understanding of the ontological character of the actions and 
outcomes as event types, it was shown that CRIR can establish the identity or 
difference of two complete reasons R''(a1),ov1,x1 and R''(a2),ov2,x2 that satisfy 
Specification Consistency and Extensional Completeness.  It is not the case 
that identity statements about reasons are dispositive.  R'' can offer a principled 
basis to determine whether two reason statement refer to the same or different 
reasons. 
 
-- 
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This chapter sought to contribute to the larger goal of enumerating a conception 
of practical reasoning consistent with Preference Theory by focusing on the 
concept of reasons.  For normative reason, on this conception, is the basic 
normative concept. 
 
While there is much worthwhile discussing about normative reasons, this 
chapter stayed narrowly focused on three points that will be pivotal to the 
subsequent chapters.   
 
Normative reasons, on this conception, are value based.  While non-evaluative 
facts may be reasons, it is evaluative facts and value itself that provides 
reasons.  Desires, preferences and even beliefs do not.  While it was 
acknowledged clearly that this puts the current conception at odds with those 
often associated with Preference Theory, it was argued that this is not as large 
a detriment as it may at first appear.   
 
Further, this chapter laid out a straightforward formalism for complete reasons 
based on an ontology of event types.  While other formalisms can be provided, 
and other ontologies may suffice, the suggested view clearly establishes what is 
required for something to be a reason and articulated a relationship between 
elements of a complete reason. 
 
The suggested complete reason relation also provided a means for establishing 
the identity or difference of reasons.   
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Cumulatively these points provide the means for addressing a number of 
questions not yet posed in this chapter.  For example, it provides a means for 
understanding at least three different ways that reasons can compete based on 
kind of value, extent of value and likelihood of realizing the valuable outcome.  
The significance of this will become clearer in subsequent chapters. 
 
If this chapter contributed to the larger goal of this dissertation, it ultimately 
ended with an outstanding promissory note of explaining the relationship 
between reasons and preferences.  Payment of this note is forthcoming, but will 
first require a discussion of rationality, the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Rationality 
If reason125 is the basic normative concept, rationality is the coin of the realm of 
preference theories.  Preferences, after all, are said to be rational or irrational.   
But what is the relationship between reasons and rationality?  What makes 
certain preferences rational and justifies the conditions of rationality?  This 
discussion will seek to offer an account of rationality that can serve as the basis 
for answering these questions.   
 
Rationality is central to many areas of study such as action theory, ethics and 
economics.  The fact that each of these fields discusses different characteristics 
of rationality may suggest to some that these fields employ different concepts of 
rationality.  In keeping with the spirit of the current work, this project goes in a 
different direction.  This chapter will seek to articulate a conception of rationality 
that can serve to anchor Preference Theories yet draws from developments in 
action theory and ethics. 
 
To begin, it will be helpful to be more specific about the notion of rationality this 
chapter is concerned with.  For example, humans are described as rational, but 
dogs and cats (on most accounts) are not.  On different accounts this rationality 
is attributed to a rational capacity or the fact that people are rational creatures.  
Though a person acts irrationally or has an irrational belief, she may 
nonetheless remain a rational creature or retain her rational capacity.  This 
paper will be concerned with the rationality of people’s actions, not with the kind 
                                                
125 NB: ‘reason’ here refers to reasons, not to the faculty of reason. 
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of creatures they are nor their rational capacity, except in so far as the two are 
connected.126 
 
The concept of rationality that will be dealt with here has been called subjective 
rationality to contrast it with objective rationality.  This label can be misleading 
and should not be read to mean that the question of whether an agent’s action 
is rational is not an objective fact.  Instead, it points to the fact that the 
rationality of an agent’s action is determined by the contents of the agent’s 
mind, as it were, and not whether the agent arrives at the correct judgments 
based on the reasons that he has, for example. 
 
Naturally this raises a question of why this is the focus of the current chapter.  
First, as was mentioned in Chapter 1: Introduction, the subject of this 
dissertation is a conception of practical reasoning, which in turn is comprised of 
conceptions of subsidiary concepts that play distinct but complementary roles. 
Second, the conception of reasons enumerated in the Chapter 2: Reasons 
addresses many of the motivating factors for an objective view of rationality.  In 
other words, in many instances, questions of objective rationality can be cached 
out in terms of reasons.  As a result, using an objective understanding of 
rationality here would be duplicative and confusing.   
 
Further, the objective account of reasons leaves much territory to be explained.  
For example, consider an agent who would be made better off by choosing A 
over B, and who has all things considered reason to choose A over B because 
of this.  Yet the agent arrives at the judgment that choosing B over A would 
                                                
126 While the (ir)rationality of action will be the ostensive focus of our attention, parallel 
arguments can be offered for the irrationality of beliefs. 
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make him better off, and concludes he has most reason to choose B over A for 
this reason.  The agent’s reasoning is faulty.   
 
On an objective account of rationality, some may claim his conclusion is 
irrational, for choosing B would not make him better off.  This fault can also be 
explained by noting that the agent’s judgment is not in accord with the balance 
of reasons.   
 
Further, imagine that despite his judgment to the contrary the agent chooses A 
over B.  Despite making the right choice, the choice in line with the balance of 
his reason, the agent’s choice is also faulty in a way.  This is not a fault of being 
objectively irrational.  After all, the agent chose the option he had most reason 
to choose.  This fault can be described as a fault of subjective rationality which 
is distinct from choosing in accord with the balance of reasons and reflects a 
fault in how the agent proceeded from judgment to choice.   
 
Employing a subjective account of rationality in concert with an objective view of 
reasons offers the benefit of this explanatory breadth and clarity.   
 
This is not intended as a refutation of objective views of rationality.  And this is 
not an argument about vocabulary.  If others seek to use ‘rationality’ to refer to 
objective rationality, nothing herein argues against the ability to do so.  It is only 
an explanation of the view of interest here and an indication of a reason that 
recommends this choice. 
 
                   132 of 229 
It should also be noted that the choice between objective and subjective views 
of rationality are likely not exhaustive.  Parfit, in On What Matters127, appears to 
employ a compound view of rationality according to which an agent can be 
perfectly rational, i.e., subjectively and objectively rational, or partially rational, 
i.e., either subjectively or objectively rational.  While this may be a plausible way 
of dividing the terrain, it seems to run a risk of difficult ambiguity.   
 
As a result the present focus will remain on subjective rationality.  It is this 
understanding of rationality that specifies requirements that are violated when 
an agent knowingly holds contradictory beliefs, fails to take the means he 
deems necessary to an end he intends, or is akratic.  It is the understanding of 
irrationality exemplified in the following example. 
 
To commit the murder he intends, the murderer believes it is necessary to buy 
an axe.  By not forming the intention to buy the axe, the murderer is at fault. 128  
This is true even if the murderer has no reason to buy the axe, because for 
instance, he has no reason to murder the victim.  This cannot be the fault of 
failing to comply with the reasons he has.  Rather the murderer is guilty of being 
irrational. 
 
In addition to indicating the concept of rationality this project is concerned with, 
this example also illustrates one of the more informative strategies to pursue in 
exploring rationality.   That is to focus on failures of rationality and draw out 
from these the distinctive features of rationality.  This is a well established 
approach and one the current effort will adopt. 
                                                
127 Parfit, On What Matters, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
128 This is a variation of an example Raz suggests in “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality”, 
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1,  April 2005. 
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This discussion will proceed in three stages.  The first will provide background 
by reviewing three very different approaches to irrationality which each make 
seminal contributions.  The second will enumerate the suggested account.  And 
the third will explore whether the suggested view can account for cases of 
irrationality.  
 
Stage 1: Background 
In setting out to review these treatments of irrationality it will be useful to reflect 
on the criteria an adequate account should meet for present purposes.  This 
can serve as something of a guiding star for subsequent discussions.   
 
Over time, as the focus on irrationality has progressed, so too have the goals 
for offering an account of irrationality.  For example, a chief concern of 
Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons and Causes”129 was to explain how reasons 
could be causes, or how the mental could be causally efficacious.  Discussion 
of irrationality in this context sought to explain the riddle posed by akratic 
choices: how an agent could intentionally act, i.e., act for a reason, contrary to 
his reasons all things considered.  As a result, an account that rendered the 
possibility of irrational action intelligible, as Davidson’s account did, was an 
adequate account of irrationality. 
 
This account will have to go further.  The goal is to offer an account of 
rationality that is distinct from, but complementary to, reasons, which can serve 
to anchor Preference Theories by serving as basis to justify the completeness 
                                                
129 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 23, 
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Sixtieth Annual Meeting (Nov. 7, 1963), 
pp. 685-700. 
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and transitivity conditions.  As a result, it should offer an account of the kind of 
failures that constitutes irrationality which are common to all and only to cases 
of irrationality.  Further, since rationality is distinct from reasons, which is the 
basic normative concept, this account should explain why cases of irrationality 
often carry the hallmark of normativity. 
 
An account of irrationality that explained a failure that was common to all and 
only cases of irrationality, yet was distinct from the failure to comply with 
reasons, and did so in a way that described the unique normative force of 
irrationality would be sufficient in describing how rationality is complementary to 
reasons. 
 
With this background, two requirements for an account of irrationality can be 
offered, which will collectively be referred to as the Riddle of Irrationality: 
1. The Descriptive Requirement: It will offer a descriptive account of the 
failure of irrationality that is common to all and only cases of irrationality. 
2. The Normative Requirement: This common failure needs to be of a 
special kind that can explain the normative force of irrationality. 
 
These requirements offer criteria to evaluate accounts of irrationality.  The 
literature on the subject is too extensive to deal with exhaustively.  A review of 
how the works of Davidson, Scanlon and Broome fare in meeting these 
requirements will help provide an understanding of what has yet to be 
accomplished.  Each of these works, it will be argued, fails to meet the 
combination of the Descriptive and Normative requirements.  That they do so 
reflects the force of these requirements and further recommends their 
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significance.  How they do so, points to benefits of the account that will be 
suggested subsequently. 
 
This stage will proceed in four sections, looking at the work of Davidson, 
Scanlon and Broome respectively before returning for a brief summary on how 
each faired in answering the riddle of irrationality. 
 
Davidson 
In “Actions, Reasons and Causes” 130 Davidson produced seminal work that 
offered a descriptive account of irrationality that is common to cases of practical 
and theoretical rationality, specifically to cases of weakness of the will (or 
akrasia) and weakness of the warrant.  However, in order to meet the 
Normative Requirement, he had to elaborate on his descriptive account by 
positing the existence of an unlikely second order principle, i.e., the Principle of 
Continence, that agents were supposed to have adopted.  The violation of the 
Principle of Continence was supposed to anchor the normativity of irrationality.   
 
In addition to the fact that this principle was descriptively inadequate, in that it 
produced problematic results131, it did not have the resources to explain the 
normativity of irrationality.  Specifically, it could not answer why violations of this 
particular principle carried the normative force of irrationality.  To understand 
this, it will be necessary to look at Davidson’s work in more detail. 
 
                                                
130 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 23, 
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Sixtieth Annual Meeting (Nov. 7, 1963), 
pp. 685-700. 
131 For example, on Davidson’s account an agent who did not happen to accept the principle 
could not be guilty of irrationality 
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In deliberating about whether to S, an agent considers her reasons for S-ing.  
She may believe she has reasons for and against S, though the conditional 
form of the agent’s attitudes, Davidson suggests, ensures that even in such 
cases the agent will not thereby be entertaining a contradiction. Following 
Davidson, we can call these attitudes prima facie judgments (PF-J’s), and they 
can be represented as follows: pf(evaluative judgment; evidential grounds) or 
as pf(action type; reasons).   
 
An agent may simultaneously arrive at conflicting PF-J’s such as pf(s, r1) and 
pf(not s, r2).  In such cases, the agent resolves the conflicts by arriving at an all 
things considered judgment (ATC-J), which is a single conditional attitude 
based on all the relevant reasons, i.e., pf(s, r1 and r2). 
 
In contrast, intentions, the attitudes on which an agent acts, are unconditional in 
form.  Such intentions, or sans-phrase judgments (SP-J’s), can be represented 
as follows: sp(s).132 
 
The question remains, how does an agent arrive at an SP-J from her PF-J’s?  
Davidson offers an answer in the form of the Principle of Continence, which 
stipulates that an agent arrives at an SP-J based on the reasons he considered 
to arrive at his ATC-J. 
 
                                                
132 There is a further contrast between PF-J’s and SP-J’s according to Davidson.  Whereas PF-
J’s concern action types, SP-J’s concern specific actions.  Bratman suggested that this 
difference is a result of the emphasis Davidson places on present directed intentions, and 
creates difficulties for Davidson in dealing with future directed intentions.  This difficulty can be 
overcome by taking SP-J’s to range over action types as well.  This position will not be argued 
for here, but because of this possibility nothing will be made of this difference between PF-J’s 
and SP-J’s on Davidson’s account. 
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This discussion provides the basis for Davidson’s account of akrasia.   
Concisely put, in cases of akrasia an agent arrives at an SP-J from a subset of 
the reasons he considers in arriving at his ATC-J, which recommends an action 
different from the one recommended by his ATC-J.  I.e., an agent arrives at an 
SP-J to S, to smoke for instance, based on r2 though his ATC-J, recommends 
not smoking, based on r1 and r2. 
 
Davidson’s descriptive account made a significant contribution to understanding 
akrasia.  It shows how an agent can act intentionally, i.e., for a reason, though 
irrationally, i.e., against his better judgment.  Further, in showing that his 
account could be applied to cases of weakness of the warrant as well as cases 
of weakness of the will, or akrasia, Davidson shows that his descriptive account 
picks out a failure of rationality that is common to two canonical cases of 
irrationality. 
 
However, in order to meet the Normative Requirement, that is to show that the 
failure he points to can explain the normativity of rationality/irrationality, 
Davidson needs to say more, and for this he turned to the Principle of 
Continence. 
 
Davidson explains that it is in virtue of having this principle, that an agent’s 
action is irrational. “If the agent does not have the principle that he ought to act 
on what he holds to be best, everything considered, then though his action may 
be irrational from our point of view, it need not be irrational from his point of 
view – at least not in a way that poses a problem for explanation.”133134   
                                                
133 Davidson, Problems of Rationality, “Paradoxes of Irrationality” pg 177 
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With the riddle of irrationality in mind, Davidson can be read as saying that the 
normative force of rationality stems from the agent’s violation of the Principle of 
Continence.  Specifically, he claims that it lies in the agent’s ignoring of the 
principle because of a reason against acting on the principle, rather than on a 
reason against the principle.   
 
The problem with this is that this kind of failure, if it is a failure, is not unique to 
cases of irrationality.  Consider the following example.   An agent may adopt 
honesty as a principle, yet when faced with a situation in which it would be 
advantageous to lie, the agent may choose to do so.  Though the agent violated 
his principle based on a reason against acting on the principle rather than on a 
reason against the principle the agent is not thereby irrational, even if he is less 
than virtuous. 
 
Since the failure that Davidson points to is not unique to cases of irrationality, 
his account ultimately fails to meet the Descriptive Requirement even though 
his account makes a seminal contribution to the understanding of how akratic 
action is possible.  
 
Scanlon 
For present purposes Scanlon’s account of irrationality makes a very different 
contribution, as he appears to be the first in the literature to make an interesting 
suggestion regarding the normative force of rationality and irrationality.  
                                                                                                                                          
134 In characterizing the agent’s action as possibly irrational from our point of view, though it is 
not from his, Davidson seems to slip into a wider conception of irrationality than will be 
employed later in this paper. 
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Unfortunately, as will be explored in the following discussion, it is unlikely that 
Scanlon’s account will meet the Descriptive and Normative Requirements. 
  
In “Structural Irrationality” 135  Scanlon posited that commitment is a constitutive 
part of intending 136.  That is to say, in deciding to do A at T, or intending to do A 
at T, one commits oneself to take one’s doing of A at T into consideration in 
subsequent deliberation.  If one intends to do A at T, then, according to Scanlon 
it is irrational not to take the fact that B would contribute to doing A at T as a 
reason for doing B, since one has committed to do so.  And, it is irrational to 
form the intention to A at T if one judges that one does not have sufficient or 
conclusive reason to A at T, since doing so would commit one to taking the fact 
that B contributes to doing A at T as a reason to do B, though one does not 
judge it to be such a reason.  In both cases, the agent has committed himself to 
take a fact as a reason, though he does not judge that it is one.  This then is 
how Scanlon caches out two locations of irrationality in terms of commitment. 
 
The difficulty with Scanlon’s account for present purposes is that it does not 
meet the Descriptive Requirement.  For instance, arguably there are present-
directed intentions, i.e., intentions to achieve and end that do not require an 
agent to take a further action as a means to the end.  And such intentions can 
also be irrational. The constitutive role of commitment in intention Scanlon 
describes cannot account for this failing of irrationality137.  As a result, Scanlon’s 
                                                
135 Scanlon, “Structural Irrationality” in Common Minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip 
Pettit, Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007, pg 84–103. 
136 This is a feature that Scanlon shares with Bratman.  Bratman, M., Intention, plans, and 
practical reason, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1987. 
137 This is not to suggest that this is the only challenge that faces Scanlon’s account.  There are 
many others, but this is sufficient to note for current purposes. 
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account, does not describe a failure of rationality that is common to all cases of 
irrationality, and therefore does not meet the Descriptive Requirement.  
 
Despite the limitations of Scanlon’s descriptive account, he appears to be the 
first in the literature to raise an interesting explanation of the force of 
rationality138.   
 
Scanlon suggests that the normative force of rationality/irrationality stems from 
the tension between the agent’s judgments139and what one takes to be a 
reason.  For instance, in the first location of irrationality that Scanlon points to, it 
is irrational not to take the fact that B contributes to A as a reason to B, if one 
intends to A, because one has committed oneself to do so.  The irrationality 
arises between one’s intention and the reasons one takes their to be.  The 
same issue can be pointed to in the second location of irrationality Scanlon 
points to.  This is an account of irrationality based on the agent’s reasoning and 
is quite independent from the question of what reasons there are.   
 
For present purposes there is much promising in Scanlon’s account, and the 
suggested account will share much in common with it, though it will suggest the 
source of the failure which constitutes irrationality is almost the reverse of the 
one Scanlon points to. 
 
Broome  
                                                
138 Strictly speaking, Scanlon offers two different accounts of the normativity of 
rationality/irrationality, but for our purposes one can safely be ignored. 
139 For present purposes intentions will be understood as judgments.  Though, if there is reason 
to question this categorization of intentions nothing should turn on this. 
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On the other hand, Broome’s rational requirements provide an ingenuous 
answer to the Descriptive Requirement.  Rather than pointing to an underlying 
failure that constitutes irrationality, Broome’s rational requirements are a list of 
necessary conditions for rationality such that if an agent violates a rational 
requirement, then he is irrational.  Here are four examples of Broome’s rational 
requirements140 that basically correspond to contradiction, modus ponens, 
instrumental reasoning, and an expansive version of akrasia:   
• First requirement: Rationality requires of you that you do not both believe 
p and believe not-p.141 
• Second requirement: Rationality requires of you that, if you believe p and 
you believe (if p then q), and if it matters to you whether q, then you 
believe q. 142 
• Third requirement: Rationality requires of you that, if you intend to G, and 
if you believe your F-ing is a necessary means to your G-ing, and if you 
believe you will not F unless you intend to F, then you intend to F. 143 
• Fourth requirement: Rationality requires of you that, if you believe you 
ought to F, and if you believe you will not F unless you intend to F, then 
you intend to F. 144 
 
A complete enumeration of the rational requirements would presumably rule out 
every possible case of irrationality.  Because such a complete list would specify 
a failing common to cases of irrationality, namely violating a rational 
requirement, it provides a plausible response to the Descriptive Requirement. 
                                                
140 Broome exercises care in the specific form of the rational requirements he presents, often for 
good reasons.  However, this involves a level of granularity that is not required for current 
purposes.  Where convenient minor changes have been made for consistency and readability. 
141 Broome, B., "Reasoning", unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 75. 
142 Broome, B., "Reasoning", unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 75. 
143 Broome, B., "Reasoning", unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 77. 
144 Broome, B., "Reasoning", unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 79. 
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Until relatively recently, Broome had a straightforward answer to the Normative 
Requirement.  The Requires relation found in rational requirements was 
normative, he argued.  The Requires relation was different from, but akin to the 
reason relation.   
 
Recently, he seems to have backed away from this claim and begun to look for 
an argument to substantiate it.  However, in order to offer a substantial 
response to the Normative Requirement Broome will have to answer the 
question: what do the rational requirements share in common such that they 
can explain the normativity of rationality?145  As such an answer will need to 
point to a failing that is common in cases of irrationality, it will sacrifice one of 
the significant benefits of his answer to the Descriptive Requirement, namely, 
not pointing to a common failing of this kind.   
 
Broome’s response to the Normative Requirement comes at the expense of his 
ingenuous answer to the Descriptive Requirement.  As such, it would seem that 
Broome’s account in its current form can either meet the Descriptive or the 
Normative Requirement, but not both, and so does not provide a successful 
response to the Riddle of Irrationality.  To be clear, this is not to say that 
Broome’s rational requirements are inconsistent with a successful response to 
the Riddle of Irrationality146. 
                                                
145 It is worthwhile questioning the how one determines how one should enumerate a list of the 
rational requirements.  E.g., "How can we test whether some putative requirement is genuinely 
a requirement of rationality? It would be nice to have some general criterion to apply, or at least 
some general method. But I am sorry to say I do not have one. Several philosophers have 
argued that rational requirements must be somehow inherent in the nature of the mental states 
they are concerned with. I am sure they are right in some way." Broome, B., "Reasoning", 
unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 71-72. 
146 Indeed, to the contrary, later it will be argued that Broome-style rational requirements are 
consistent with the account of rationality that will be suggested. 
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For example, as Ulrike Heuer and Christian Piller pointed out, there may be 
other approaches that provide the basis for augmenting Broome’s account.  
Specifically they suggest a possibility that Broome mentions in “Reasoning”147, 
namely that rational requirements must be somehow inherent in the nature of 
the mental states with which they are concerned.  Could an account based on 
this insight successfully answer the Riddle of Irrationality? 
 
This is certainly a possibility.  While Broome himself has not developed this 
position, there are other accounts of this type that suggest this possibility may 
be worthy of consideration.  Christine Korsgaard’s account of instrumental 
reasoning is perhaps the most notable example.   
 
While Korsgaard’s account offers the basis for a distinctive response to the 
Normative Requirement – namely that the Instrumental Principle, an aspect of 
the Categorical Imperative, is constitutive of autonomy itself – it would need to 
be developed further to offer a response to the Descriptive Requirement.   
 
The challenge here is to augment Korsgaard’s account to apply to all and only 
cases of irrationality.  For example, Korsgaard presents the Instrumental 
Principle as: “practical rationality requires us to take the means to our ends”148.  
While this is in the general spirit of the third of Broome’s rational requirements 
listed above, in its current form it is both too broad and too narrow.  This is too 
broad for precisely the reasons that Broome’s requirements are more specific. 
Namely that in many instances rationality may not require us to take the means 
                                                
147 Broome, B., "Reasoning", unpublished manuscript, 2005, pg 71-72. 
148 Korsgaard, Christine, Constitution of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2008, 5. 
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to our ends.  For example, at present there may be no means we can take to 
accomplish our ends.  In such a case, rationality would not require of us that 
which is not possible.  It is exactly these types of specific considerations that 
Broome takes care to take into consideration when formulating his specific 
rational requirements.   
 
Further, Korsgaard’s Instrumental Principle is too narrow as the sole basis for 
rational requirements for it does not apply to other cases of irrationality such as 
cases of akrasia.   
 
Neither of these are arguments against the possibility that Korsgaard’s position 
could be developed to offer answers to the Descriptive and Normative 
Requirements.  They only point out questions that would need to be answered 
in order to do so. 
 
Setting this aside for future exploration, it is important to note that Broome’s 
rational requirements have been fruitful in unearthing a number of features of 
rationality.  Two are particularly relevant to the current discussion, specifically 
that unlike the reasons relation, the Requires relation is both broad and strict. 
 
Consider a case of means ends reasoning.  If an agent has a reason to intend 
an end, and a means is necessary to achieving that end, then the agent has 
reason to take the means.  The Reason relation is narrow. 
 
However, if an agent intends an end, and believes that a means is necessary to 
achieving the end, he is not required to take the means.  Rather, what is 
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required of him is not to be in a state in which he intends the end, and believes 
the means necessary, but does not intend the means.  He can avoid being in 
such a state by coming to intend the means, or by dropping the end, or by 
coming to believe that the means is not necessary.  Any of the three will fulfil 
the Requires relation.  The Requires relation is broad.149 
 
Further, while the agent has a reason to take the means, this is consistent with 
his not intending to take the means, because he may have more reason not to.  
The Reason relation is slack.  In contrast, the Requires relation is strict.  
Though there are three different ways in which the agent can comply with the 
Requires relation in the current example, the strictness of the Requires relation 
demands that he do so in one of the three ways. 
 
Even if Broome’s account does not meet the Normative requirement, it looks 
like any account of rationality/irrationality that does will have to accommodate 
these features of the Requires relation. 
 
Riddle of Irrationality 
While none of these accounts answers the Riddle of Irrationality, they each 
shed light on important aspects of irrationality.  In what follows the discussion 
will try to offer an account of irrationality that answers the Riddle of Irrationality 
by building on Davidson’s descriptive account.  The suggested account is 
consistent with the insight Scanlon expressed about the connection between 
the normativity of reasons and the normativity of rationality, and can serve as a 
                                                
149 It is important to note that there is significant debate about whether the rationality is broad.  
Unfortunately a full discussion of the topic goes beyond the scope of the current effort.  The 
later discussion will point to the resources the suggested account offers to defend the broad 
scope position from the most prominent criticism. 
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basis for enumerating rational requirements that are similar in kind to those 
discussed by Broome.150 
 
Stage 2: Suggested Account – Rationality 
This stage will proceed in three sections.  The first section will concisely 
introduce the suggested account of rationality based on the notions of 
‘recognizing something as a reason’ and ‘taking something to be a reason’.  
The second section will focus on the notion of ‘recognizing something as a 
reason’, addressing two key objections before exploring the unique character of 
recognition on which the account depends.  The third section will focus on the 
notion of ‘taking something to be a reason’, addressing multiple forms of a key 
objection before reflecting on the nature of deliberation. 
 
Suggested Account of Rationality 
Rationality consists in being ruled by reason.  To be ruled by reason, reason 
must be directive and efficacious. 
 
Reason is directive when an agent recognizes that a consideration counts in 
favor of a proposition or an action; that is when an agent recognizes a reason 
as a reason. 
 
Reason is efficacious when an agent takes a consideration to count in favor of a 
proposition or an action in deliberation; that is when an agent takes a reason to 
be a reason. 
 
                                                
150 Though the rational requirements that will be discussed differ than those discussed by 
Broome in that he posits that they are analytically prior to rationality whereas on the suggested 
account they are a consequence of rationality. 
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For an agent to be rational, to be ruled by reason, reason must be directive and 
efficacious.  To be rational, the agent must recognize a reason as a reason, and 
take it to be the reason that he recognizes it to be. 
 
To hold this view, more should be said about what it is to recognize something 
as a reason, and what it is to take something to be a reason. 
 
Recognizing something as a reason 
In exploring the possibility that rationality involves recognizing a reason as a 
reason, it will be helpful to address two likely objections before exploring the 
unique character of recognition. 
 
The first objection imputes too much to the distinctive characteristics of 
recognition, and the second too little.  Both will be looked at in turn.  
 
The first objection stems from the veridical character of recognition151.  In 
essence, the claim is that as a result of its veridical character, recognition is too 
demanding to play a meaningful role in an account of rationality.   
 
The second objection has essentially the opposite force, claiming that 
recognition is not distinctive enough from belief to warrant a meaningful role in 
an account of rationality.  I.e., any role that recognition can play can also be 
played by the concept of belief, and doing so has the added benefit of not 
needlessly propagating mental states.  These objections will be addressed in 
turn.   
 
                                                
151 This was first raised by Raz in conversation. 
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To clarify the force of the objection, it will be helpful to offer reflections on the 
veridical character of recognition.  Roughly speaking, for an agent to 
successfully recognize something, the thing which is recognized must be the 
thing it is recognized to be.  This point can be more easily grasped through 
example.  Consider the case of two friends, Tom and Michael.  In order for Tom 
to have recognized his friend in the crowd, it must be the case that Michael was 
in the crowd.  Or, illustrating the other side of the veridical character or 
recognition, it would be inappropriate to claim that ‘Tom recognized his friend in 
the crowd’, if the friend in question, Michael, was not in the crowd.  In such a 
situation, a more qualified version of the claim would be appropriate, such as 
‘Tom thought he recognized his friend in the crowd’.  In this instance the act of 
recognition did not have the requisite success, and therefore this is not an 
example of recognition.  This is reflective of the veridical character of 
recognition. 
 
If, as a result of the veridical character of recognition, an agent can only 
recognize as a reason that which is a reason, then recognition may be a poor fit 
for an account of rationality.  Recall the case of the axe murderer who could 
rationally intend to buy an axe, or irrationally fail to form this intention despite 
believing it necessary to achieve the end he intends.  The axe murderer’s 
rationality or irrationality is quite independent of the reasons he has (or in this 
case the reasons he does not have); for he has no reason to buy the axe.  If it is 
the case that an agent must have the reason in question in order to recognize it 
as a reason, then recognition does not seem to play much of a role in 
rationality.   
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But this objection seems forceful because the objection itself makes too much 
of the veridical character of recognition.  Consider a further variation of the 
example such that Michael was in the crowd.  However, contrary to Tom’s 
beliefs, Michael was not his friend.  Michael had been merely pretending to be 
Tom’s friend.  In this case, it would not be inappropriate for Tom to say he 
‘recognized his friend in the crowd’; even if from a third person perspective it 
may be more appropriate to say ‘Tom recognized someone he had mistakenly 
come to view as a friend’.  Nonetheless there was an act of recognition.   
 
The failure in this example lies somewhere else; not with the act of recognition, 
but with the background conditions upon which the recognition was predicated.  
The veridical character of recognition does not extend to the background 
conditions of recognition. 
 
Plausibly there are other limits to the demands of the veridical character of 
recognition.  For example Tom may have successfully recognized Michael even 
if he was mistaken to believe that there was a crowd.  From a third person 
perspective it may be appropriate to say ‘Tom recognized a friend in what he 
mistakenly believed to be a crowd’.  There was a successful act of recognition, 
even though Tom had mistaken beliefs about the circumstances.  The veridical 
character of recognition does not demand all such beliefs about the 
circumstances be true.   
 
The veridical character is demanding, but limited.  In order for Tom to have 
recognized Michael, it must be Michael that Tom recognized.  But Tom’s beliefs 
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about the background conditions and circumstances need not have been true, 
in order for Tom to have successfully recognized Michael. 
 
This same point explains why the veridical character of recognition is not too 
demanding to play a role in rationality.  However, when making the same point 
in respect to reasons, the limitations of reasons-language can create confusion.  
As a result it will be helpful to walk through the point step by step. 
 
The previous chapter discussed the structure of complete reasons in some 
detail.  Recall that it was suggested that complete reasons are comprised of 
elements, such as an agent, an action and a valuable outcome, which stand in 
a reason relation to one another.  As a result, one can understand an example 
of a common reason statement such as: That I am thirsty gives me reason to 
drink that glass of water, because doing so would quench my thirst, in the 
following way: 
• A agent: I (or me) 
• An action: drinking that glass of water 
• A valuable outcome: quenching my thirst. 
 
To be a reason, each of these elements is necessary.  Simply negating or 
changing one element or another should be enough to show this.152  For 
                                                
152 It is important to remember two points from the discussion of the topic in the previous 
chapter.  First there is more to be learned about the elements of reasons by considering which 
kinds of changes change the reason in question.  I.e., some changes will just offer a different 
specification of the same reason, while others will offer a specification of a further reason, while 
others still will cease to make these elements a reason.  Second, there are arguably many 
different ways to individuate the elements of a reason.  Indeed individuation itself is a subject 
worth considerable attention at the level of beliefs, actions and events, not only at the level of 
reasons.  Needless to say this involves considerable questions of ontology.  The current effort 
does not presume to claim that the suggested approach represents the only way, or even a 
canonical way of individuating reasons and there elements.  The claim here is merely that this is 
a fruitful and robust way for doing so.  Further, any approach to individuating reasons and their 
                   151 of 229 
example:  If drinking that glass of water would not quench my thirst, but, for the 
sake of the example, make me more thirsty, then my being thirsty would not 
give me reason to drink it.  We can recognize the importance of each of the 
other elements by negating or excluding each of these in turn.153 
 
Further, the elements themselves are not sufficient to comprise a complete 
reason.  The elements of a complete reason must also stand in the reason 
relation.  To claim that ‘the fact that I am thirsty gives me reason to drink that 
glass of water in order to quench my thirst’, is a further claim than to claim: ‘I am 
thirsty, and drinking that glass of water will quench my thirst’.  Present in the 
first statement, but not the second, is the claim that the reason relation obtains; 
i.e., that the elements of the reason stand in such a relation to one another that 
they can be arguments for the reason relation. 
 
With this brief description of reasons, the discussion can return to the question 
of whether the veridical character of recognition is too demanding.  Consider 
what would be involved in recognizing something as a reason.  Here it will be 
helpful to make three points.  To recognize a reason: 
• it is not sufficient to recognize the reason relation, one must also have 
subsidiary propositional attitudes about the elements of the reason154; 
                                                                                                                                          
elements should offer an explanation of the unique normative force of a complete reason.  That 
the suggested view meets this criteria, counts in its favor. 
153 This should not be taken to mean that in referring to a reason we need to refer to all of its 
elements.  Many are simply supplied by context.  So in the current example, if someone asked 
why I planned to drink the water, I might simply respond, that I was thirsty.  My belief that the 
water would (partially) quench my thirst is understood from the context. 
154 If additional elaboration would be helpful, a variation of the earlier exercise can illustrate this 
point.  Imagine the possibility of an agent reporting that ‘he had a reason’.  When pressed to 
explain further, he merely insisted that he had a reason, but could not explain the reason with 
reference to any of its elements.  For the present purposes assume the agent is not merely 
being coy – by relying on the context to reference a reason, nor is he merely reporting the fact 
that he accepts that there is a reason based on authority.  If the agent simply did not have 
propositional attitudes about the elements of a reason, it is non-sensical to claim that he 
recognized a reason.  Just as it would be to claim that Tom recognized his friend Michael in the 
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• it is not sufficient to recognize the elements, one must also recognize 
that the reason relation obtains155; 
• it is not necessary to recognize the elements. 
 
Since it is the last point that is critical to the question at hand, it is worthwhile 
elaborating further.  In recognizing a reason, the subsidiary propositional 
attitudes about the elements play the analogous role to the beliefs about the 
circumstances and background conditions in the previous example.  For any 
putative case of recognition of a reason this provides a principled means for 
understanding the demands of the veridical character of recognition, and based 
on this distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful cases of 
recognition.   
 
To be clear, an agent can successfully recognize a reason when his beliefs 
about the elements of the reason are true, and he can successfully recognize a 
reason when his beliefs about the elements of the reason are false.  Further, an 
agent can fail in recognizing a reason156 when his beliefs about the element of 
the reason are true, and he can fail in recognizing a reason when his beliefs 
about the elements of the reason are false.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
crowd, if Tom had no belief about such a person as Michael, or that he was a friend.  This 
would not constitute an act of recognition because the preconditions for such an act do not 
obtain.  To think that an agent can recognize a reason by merely recognizing that the reason 
relation obtains, but without having propositional attitudes about the elements of the reason is to 
make too little of recognition. 
155 In just the same way that facts which comprise the elements of a complete reason are 
distinct from the fact that the reason relation obtains, so too is the recognition of the elements 
distinct from the recognition of the reason.  I.e., if the agent does not recognize that the reason 
relation obtains, while he may recognize the elements of a reason, he does not recognize the 
reason itself for he does not recognize that the elements stand in the reason relation. 
156 This locution is intended to pick out cases of unsuccessful recognition, as opposed to merely 
cases in which an agent fails to recognize a reason through omission, as it were. 
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To distinguish between successful and unsuccessful cases of recognition, the 
critical question is not whether the agent’s beliefs about the elements of the 
reason are true, but were his belief true, would they stand in the reason relation 
to one another, and is this the relation the agent recognizes. 
 
To illustrate the point, it will be helpful to step through an example that may put 
intuitions to the test.  Consider a few slightly regimented variations of the axe 
murderer example: 
 
Variation 1:157 
• Belief 1: The axe murderer believes that buying the axe is a necessary 
means to commit the axe murder. 
• Belief 2: The axe murderer believes that committing the axe murder 
would not be a valuable outcome. 
• Recognition: It is not the case that the axe murderer recognizes that the 
reason relation obtains between the first and second belief. 
 
In this variation the axe murderer’s beliefs are true and he does not recognize 
that a reason relation obtains between these two beliefs.  There is no act of 
recognition.  And from a third person perspective it would be appropriate to say 
‘The axe murderer did not recognize a reason to buy the axe.’ 
 
Variation 2:  
• Belief 1: The axe murderer believes that buying the axe is a necessary 
means to commit the axe murder. 
                                                
157 Of course it is possible for an agent to successfully recognize a reason based on true beliefs.  
This is case does not receive explicit treatment here because it is not at issue.  However, this 
should not be read to suggest that such a case is not possible. 
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• Belief 2: The axe murderer believes that committing the axe murder 
would not be a valuable outcome. 
• Recognition: The axe murderer recognizes that the reason relation 
obtains between the first and second belief. 
 
In this variation the axe murderer’s beliefs are true and there is a putative case 
of recognition.  However, the putative case of recognition is unsuccessful 
because the first and second beliefs do not stand in the reason relation to one 
another.  This is an example in which the demands that stem from the veridical 
character of recognition are not met, and therefore this is not an example of 
recognition.158  And from a third person perspective it may be appropriate to say 
‘The axe murderer thought he recognized a reason to buy the axe.’ 
 
Variation 3: 
• Belief 1: The axe murderer believes that buying the axe is a necessary 
means to commit the axe murder. 
• Belief 2: The axe murderer believes that committing the axe murder 
would be a valuable outcome.159 
• Recognition: The axe murderer recognizes that the reason relation 
obtains between the first and second belief. 
                                                
158 Consider, for a moment, how strange this situation would be.  It is not merely the case that 
the axe murderer has failed in his reasoning, rather it is that reasons themselves do not seem to 
have requisite traction with the axe murderer.  For this reason, it can be suggested that this is 
not a case in which the agent is irrational, but a case in which the agent is unreasonable.  This 
is deserving of more discussion, but for the moment it is worth pointing out that this is an 
example of one of two ways in which an agent can be unreasonable.  I.e., an agent an be 
unreasonable by steadfastly seeing a reason relation as obtaining between elements that do 
not stand in a reason relation, or by being unable to recognize a reason relation as obtaining 
between elements that do stand in a complete reason relation – given that suitable conditions 
apply. 
159 The proposition is so repugnant as to make it difficult to entertain the possibility that an agent 
would genuinely believe it to be true.  But, in order to avoid undermining the axe murderer, for 
present purposes that it is exactly the prospect to entertain, i.e., the axe murderer believes that 
committing the axe murder would be valuable. 
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In this variation the axe murderer’s second belief is false and there is a putative 
case of recognition.  Despite the fact that it is based on a false belief, the 
putative case of recognition is successful because were the axe murderer’s 
beliefs true they would stand in the reason relation to one another, and this is 
the relation that the axe murderer recognizes.  This is an example in which the 
demands that stem from the veridical character of recognition are met, and 
therefore this is a successful example of recognition.  And from a third person 
perspective it may be appropriate to say ‘The axe murderer recognized what he 
thought was a reason to buy the axe.’ 
 
These variations illustrate that the veridical character of recognition is 
demanding, but not too demanding to play a role in rationality.160  Paradoxical 
as it might sound, an agent can recognize a reason to phi, even though he has 
no such reason.  Reflecting on the veridical character of recognition has shown 
that this is because the relevant question is not whether the agent’s beliefs 
about the elements of a complete reason are true, but if they were true, would 
they stand in a reason relation. 
 
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to point out that there are some parallels and 
differences between this view and the well known account of rationality Parfit 
offered in “Rationality and Reasons”161 and elsewhere. 
 
                                                
160 I.e., despite the fact that the axe murderer had true beliefs in Variation 2, he did not 
recognize a reason because the reason relation did not obtain between his beliefs; whereas in 
Variation 3 the axe murderer had a false belief yet nonetheless he was successful in 
recognizing a reason to buy the axe. 
161 'Rationality and reasons', in Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Björn Petterson & Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.) Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001, pp. 17-39. 
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Parfit similarly marks a distinction between domains in which the truth or 
rationality of the underlying beliefs are relevant from those in which they are 
not.  
 
Leave aside for the moment the fact that Parfit is discussing the rationality of a 
desire, and the discussion to this point has been concerned with whether or not 
an agent successfully recognizes a reason – this is a reflection of the different 
conceptions of practical reasoning being pursued – and the parallels become 
obvious.   
 
Parfit argued that an agent can form a rational desire based on false or 
irrational non-normative beliefs.  Earlier in this chapter it was argued that an 
agent could successfully recognize a reason based on false beliefs (the same 
arguments would hold regarding irrational beliefs) about the elements of the 
reason. 
 
Further, Parfit argued that an agent could not form a rational desire based on a 
false or irrational normative belief.  In this instance a normative belief could be a 
belief about whether there is a reason, of for present purposes, whether the 
reason relation obtains.  In the current discussion, it was argued that an agent 
could not successfully recognize a reason based on a false (or irrational) belief 
about whether the reason relation obtained. 
 
The parallels are evident, but so are the differences.  Perhaps the greatest point 
of difference between the current account and Parfit’s is that on the current 
account rationality reflects not only the reasons that an agent recognizes, but 
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also the role this reason plays in the agent’s deliberation.  Indeed, the current 
account will suggest that in cases of irrationality there is a tension that emerges 
between the reasons the agent recognizes and the role those reasons play in 
deliberation.  For Parfit, this second important element is not a focus of 
discussion.  Focusing, as he does, on mental states obscures the question of 
how the agent wrestles with the reasons he recognizes, which seems the more 
substantial and interesting aspect of rationality to explore.  Unfortunately this 
seems a general feature of accounts that focus too much on the agent’s mental 
states. 
 
If the discussion to this point shows how the suggested view is similar to, and 
different from Parfit’s view, it also offered an answer to the first objection.  In so 
doing, it also suggests the answer to the second objection, i.e., that the 
difference between recognition and belief is not significant enough to warrant 
the propagation of mental states relied on in an account of rationality.  For one 
of the ways beliefs and recognition differ is that beliefs do not share the 
veridical character of recognition.  What then is the relationship between 
recognition and belief? 
 
While it may be natural to think that recognition implies belief, but belief does 
not imply recognition, it turns out that recognition and belief are strictly 
separable.  That is to say that an agent can recognize something without 
believing it, and can believe it without recognizing it.  To see this, consider an 
example of each type of case. 
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Presumably, to believe that something is a reason, an agent must be familiar 
with the notion of a reason.  Therefore, if a person is not familiar with the notion 
of a reason, he cannot have a belief that something is a reason.  An agent who 
is unfamiliar with the notion of a reason, a child for instance162, can nonetheless 
act for a reason.  In order for an agent to act for a reason, he must recognize 
the reason.  That is to say he must recognize that a consideration counts in 
favor of an action.  Therefore, an agent can recognize a reason even if he does 
not believe that it is a reason.   
 
One can also believe that X is a reason, without recognizing it as a reason.  
This may be the case, when one takes something on authority or faith.  For 
example, an agent considers x, but does not come to the view163 that x is a 
reason to take an action because he does not understand the relevant 
considerations.  A figure of authority orders the agent to take an action based 
on x.  Even without understand the basis for the reason, the agent comes to 
believe that x is a reason.   This is a case in which the agent believes x is a 
reason, but does not recognize it as a reason.164 
                                                
162 As Parfit points out the fact that children who are unfamiliar with the notion of a reason can 
nonetheless act for a reason, counts against the primacy of believing that something is a 
reason.  See: Parfit, On What Matters, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
163 For present purposes, this term is intended to be ambiguous between believing x is a reason 
and recognizing x as a reason. 
164 While this is a case in which an agent believes there is a reason without recognizing a 
reason, the presence of the second-order reason from authority may raise doubts.  A brief 
discussion of this complexity should allay concerns. 
 
According to the position advanced so far it might seem that if the agent takes the action in 
question for a reason, then he recognizes a reason.  Why does this not argue against the 
conclusion just offered?  Succinctly put because in this case the agent recognizes the second-
order reason and forms a beliefs about the first order-reason, he does not recognize the first-
order reason.  As a result this is still an example of the fact that an agent can believe that x is a 
reason, without recognizing that x is a reason.   
 
Further support for this conclusion can be generated by reflecting on which considerations 
would change the agent’s assessment of the reasons he has.  For example some reasons have 
cancelling conditions, i.e., conditions which cancel the reason.  Reasons based on promises are 
of this kind.  When the promised party releases the promising party from carrying out the 
promise, the promising party no longer has reasons based on the promise for carrying it out.  
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As these examples illustrate an agent can recognize a reason without believing 
he has one, and can believe he has a reason without recognizing a reason.  
And this answers the second objection.  While belief and recognition may be 
connected in many instances, they remain quite distinct. 
 
The distinctive character of recognition importantly helps answer a criticism 
leveled at externalist accounts like the one presented here.  Christine 
Korsgaard puts forward the following poignant version of this criticism in 
“Constitution of Agency”165: according to realism “there are facts, which exist 
independently of the person’s mind, about what there is reason to do; rationality 
consists in conforming one’s conduct to those reasons… we must explain why 
the person finds it necessary to act on those normative facts, or what is it about 
                                                                                                                                          
Based on this, consider an elaboration of the current example.  An army Colonel promises an 
influential politician that his soldier, the agent in question, will clean the politician’s property.  
Not understanding promises very well, the soldier does not recognize that this promise is a 
reason to clean the politician’s property.  Ordered by the Colonel to clean the property because 
of the promise, the soldier comes to believe that the promise is a reason.  In time, the soldier 
comes to learn that fearing scandal the politician released the Colonel from his promise.  This 
does not change the soldier’s assessments of the reasons he has, which are after all based on 
the orders he received from the Colonel.  And indeed the soldier may be well justified.  For the 
Colonel may insist that whether or not he was released from his promise, he had made a 
promise and intends that it be carried out.  To the extent that the Colonel has authority, the 
soldier still has reason to clean the politician’s house.  Learning of cancelling conditions of the 
first order reason may not change the agent’s assessment of the reasons he has, for while he 
believes he has a first order reason, the reason he recognizes is a second order reason. 
 
Authority is also subject to limits and canceling conditions.  Alternatively, if the agent learns of 
cancelling conditions for the second-order reason, he may change his assessment of the 
reasons he has.  For example, if the soldier comes to believe that the Colonel’s order 
constitutes an abuse of his power and is beyond the limits of his authority or cancels his 
authority altogether, the soldier may well reconsider his reason for cleaning the politician’s 
property; this despite the independent merits of cleaning the politician’s property or fulfilling a 
promise.  Learning of cancelling conditions of the second-order reasons may change the 
agent’s assessment of the reasons he has.  For while he believes he has a first order reason, 
the reason he recognizes is not a first order reason, but a second order reason.  I.e., the soldier 
believes he has a reason, but does not recognize it as a reason. 
 
165 Korsgaard, Christine, Constitution of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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her that makes them normative for her.  We must explain how these reasons 
get a grip on the agent.”166 
 
For Korsgaard, in order for the reasons to ‘get a grip on the agent’ two things 
must take place.  First, the reasons must be capable of motivating the agent. 
And second, they must be capable of motivating the agent as a guide or a 
norm, which entails it must be possible for the agent not to be motivated by the 
reason.   
 
Internalists accounts, Korsgaard argues, meet the first of these requirements, 
but they do so by definition.  As a result, it is not possible for the agent to have 
a reason that he is not motivated by.  And therefore, internalist accounts are not 
able to meet the second of these requirements. 
 
On the other hand externalist accounts, Korsgaard argues, are able to meet the 
second criteria, for while external reasons offer norms, it is possible for agents 
to fail to be motivated by external reasons.  However, externalist accounts have 
trouble explaining force of reasons on the agent.   
 
In a move that is amicable to the account offered here, Korsgaard offers the 
following challenge ‘if what we mean when we say that the person is caused to 
act by his recognition of certain considerations as reasons, then we must say 
what it is that he recognizes.’167 
 
                                                
166 Korsgaard, Christine, Constitution of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2008, pg 52,3. 
167 Korsgaard, Christine, Constitution of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2008, pg 56. 
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This is, in part, the question that will be taken up in the next section as the 
discussion explores the unique character of recognition, how recognition differs 
from belief, and what makes it well suited to play this central role in an account 
of rationality. 
 
Consider two statements: 
• ‘I recognize the truth of that statement’ 
• ‘I recognize the error of my ways’ 
 
Each statement seems to have more force than simply saying: 
• ‘I believe that statement is true’ 
• ‘I believe that my ways were in error’ 
o Or in more common parlance ‘I believe I was wrong’ 
 
Plausibly the different force of the first statements stems from the force of 
recognition in deliberation.  To speak loosely, that which one recognizes does 
not stand as one proposition among many.  It stands with a different level of 
surety.  Possibly this stems from the veridical character of recognition.  From 
the third-person perspective it has already been noted that this veridical 
character has limits; and recognition should not be taken to be a mark of truth.  
But things differ from the first person perspective.  The agent is not only inclined 
to hold as true that which he recognizes, but it is difficult to not do so.  But the 
force of recognition seems to be more than this. 
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There is a sense in which recognition harkens back to something already 
established.168  In recognizing something, there is a sense in which the agent 
re-cognizes it; brings it before their mental faculty, as it were, anew in relation to 
something already established.  In so doing the force of that which was already 
established is conveyed to that which is recognized. 
 
Agents recognize many things, family members, old neighbourhoods, and the 
error of one’s ways.  In recognizing certain kinds of things, it is easier to see the 
force of recognition, as it is with the case of recognizing an old neighbourhood 
or the error of one’s ways.  For some, part of what it is to recognize one’s old 
neighbourhood is to re-cognize it as a place with the emotional attachments 
associated with it.  Part of what it is to recognize the error of one’s ways is to re-
cognize one’s actions as flawed in important aspects.  This re-cognizing 
forcefully changes one’s conception of that which is recognized.   
 
This characteristic of recognition has an important role in rationality.  For an 
agent, learning that he has the ability to make choices, that his actions can 
affect the world and bring about different outcomes, that there are facts that 
have bearing on the choices he (should) make, is part of his development.  It is 
part of his development as an agent.  This is part of what it means to become a 
creature with reason.  This is part of what it means to become a rational 
creature.  For an agent to recognize that considerations bear on his choices 
and the action he (should) take is part of what it is to recognize something as a 
                                                
168 For example an agent does not recognize someone he meets for the first time, whereas he 
can recognize someone he already knows.  Or if he does recognize someone totally new it may 
be in the sense in which there is a reference to something already established, such as when 
on meeting someone new the agent recognizes the person as someone with whom he shares a 
common friend or as a person of a certain political persuasion.  This need not only happen with 
something new.  It can also happen with something long familiar such as when an agent 
recognizes their sentimental attachment to an old desk. 
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reason.  Roughly put in short form, when an agent recognizes that something is 
a reason for him, he re-cognizes it as pertinent to him and to his making of a 
choice as a creature of reason.  When he recognizes something as a reason, 
an agent recognizes that it has a role to play in deliberation.  This is perhaps 
the most poignant sense in which recognition differs from belief; it is the means 
by which reasons ‘get a grip on the agent’.  It is in virtue of this that recognition 
has a special role to play in rationality. And it is in this sense that reason is 
directive when an agent recognizes a reason as a reason. 
 
This is an important part of the story, but it is only a partial description.  For if 
this is all reason involved, then reason would be impotent.  Reason would be 
directive without being efficacious.  It is not enough for an agent to recognize 
that a reason has a role to play in deliberation, the reason also needs to play 
that role, the appropriate role, in the agent’s deliberation.  That is to say, the 
agent needs to take the reason to be a reason.  Or, more specifically the agent 
needs to take the reason to be the reason he recognized it to be.  This is the 
topic to which the discussion will turn its attention next. 
 
Taking something as a reason 
To explore the possibility that rationality involves taking a reason to be a 
reason, it will helpful to address the several faces of a poignant challenge 
before moving on to offer reflections of the nature of deliberation. 
 
While the challenge may take many forms, the basic idea can be expressed 
simply: there is reason to think deliberation does not play the central role the 
suggested account describes.  
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First, consider the case of the agent reaching to catch the glass as it falls.  In 
many such cases the agent does not actively deliberate, he simply reaches for 
the glass.  While this may have been in accord with the agent’s reasons and 
even with his recognized reasons, it is not a case in which a recognized reason 
played a role in deliberation. 
 
Cases of this kind do not present a counter-example to the suggested view, but 
point to the limits of the account.  Cases of this kind are cases in which an 
agent acts, but his act is not an action.  It is merely a reflex.  The current 
account is concerned with intentional action, that is, action for a reason.  
Reflexes are beyond the scope of the current account. 
 
Even so, examples which show that action is removed from deliberation can 
cast doubt on the centrality of deliberation. 
 
For example, consider the agent who glances at his phone while waiting in line.   
This can occur as the result of active deliberation, but can also occur without it.  
In some instances it is not an action the agent decides to undertake, it is just 
something the agent does.  It is a habitual action, i.e., it is a result of habit and it 
is an actions.  That is to say, it is intentional under some description.  The agent 
does them for a reason, even if not directly as the result of active deliberation. 
 
This may seem to raise challenges for the suggested account and the emphasis 
it places on deliberation.  There is much to explore in cases of this kind and the 
role of habits in general; too much to be treated sufficiently in the current effort.  
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Nonetheless there are a few things about the nature of deliberation and 
characteristics of rationality that examples of these kinds bring to light. 
 
First of all it raises the need to distinguish between active deliberation and 
deliberation broadly defined.  Some deliberation is active in the sense that it is 
front of mind; i.e., the agent is aware of the deliberation.169  A quintessential 
case of such active or foreground deliberation is when an agent sets out to 
arrive at a decision.  Not all deliberation takes this form.  Perhaps most of it 
does not.  In many instances, in making a decision the agent is not even aware 
of his deliberation.  Indeed the situation is even more poignant.  Much of an 
agent’s deliberation is not immediately accessible or transparent.  Much of an 
agent’s deliberation happens in the background.  The distinctive character of 
introspection not withstanding, there are many cases in which an agent learns 
the outcome of his own deliberation through his choices or retrospectively.  This 
is reflected in the colorful advice sometimes offered to agents consciously 
wrestling with large decisions.  ‘Flip a coin’ the advice suggests ‘and as you see 
the result you will know what you really think’. 
 
This kind of deliberation is quite different than the conscious calculating of pros 
and cons that is so often the caricature of rational thinking.  This is the kind of 
reasoning in which agents respond to the often substantive reasons that they 
have through a host of their rational faculties, including their emotions.  Rather 
than a distinctive activity engaged in on rare occasions, deliberation broadly 
defined is, for many, an ongoing condition of conscious existence.   
 
                                                
169 This is similar to the distinction between foreground and background introduced by Pettit and 
Smith in “Backgrounding Desire”.  Pettit, P., Smith, M. “Backgrounding Desire”, The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), pp. 565-592. 
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This initial clarification of the relevant definition of deliberation may go some 
way to alleviating concerns about the centrality of deliberation in the current 
account.  For the claim at hand is quite different than the straw man view that 
agents actively deliberate on the basis of each reason they recognize. 
 
Nonetheless, even this weaker view may seem too strong in considering 
examples of habitual action, and this is for good reason.  Agents have limited 
rational capacities; and one role of habits is to economize the deliberation 
required.  Habits play this role by bundling actions; and agents often perform 
bundled actions together in relevantly similar circumstances.  For example, 
consider the case of the agent who habitually puts on his seat belt and checks 
his mirror every time he sits in the driver seat with the intention of driving the 
car.  The habit of doing this saves the agent the expense of deliberating about 
whether or how to take these steps each time he gets in the car.  In this way 
habits economize the deliberation required.   
 
Importantly however, habits themselves are responsive to reason and 
deliberation – some more immediately than others.170  For example the 
breaking old habits and forming new ones is possible through conscious effort, 
though difficult at times.  Interestingly, habits also demonstrate that the 
relationship between deliberation and the action which results from it can be 
quite temporally extended.  So much so that habits can outlive the reasons for 
which they were formed.  For example, it is a common experience as one 
proceeds through life that the habits one formed for good reason at one stage in 
life no longer serve him well as he enters different stages in his life.  Habitual 
                                                
170 Certainly the link between habits and reason is not entirely straightforward and is deserving 
of more attention than it will receive here.   
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actions, like those of the driver, are not examples of actions without 
deliberation.  However they do illustrate the fact that at times the relationship 
between deliberation and action is quite extended. 
 
There are other examples in which it can be quite difficult to see the connection 
between an agent’s action and his deliberations.  For example, when getting up 
from his seat an agent may take his first step with his right foot or his left.  
Taking a step is an intentional action, though in the majority of ordinary cases it 
is difficult to see that the agent had a reason to take a step with one foot rather 
than another, let alone that he would deliberate about which foot to step with.   
 
This, however, is not an example of an agent acting intentionally in the absence 
of deliberation.  It is an illustration of the saliency of the level of descriptions.  
While the agent may not have reason to take his first step with his left foot 
rather than his right foot, he may well have reason to cross the room, to go to 
the store or to get food.  Examples of this sort are something of a red herring.  
They do not provide distinct basis to be concerned that the current account calls 
for deliberation to play too central a role, for they are merely a description of 
common cases of practical reasoning at a level of description which obscures 
the relationship between reasons, deliberation and action. 
 
Taken together, these discussions of cases in which deliberation is not closely 
connected to action have hopefully assuaged the concern about the central role 
of deliberation on this account.  Doubtless it would be helpful to have a clear 
account of deliberation to make this point more clearly.  Unfortunately offering 
such an account of deliberation is beyond the current scope.  Deliberation is 
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complex.  It is properly the subject of a field or several fields of study, not the 
subject of a section of a chapter.  Nonetheless a sense of the complexity of 
deliberation can be offered by reflecting on the different questions to consider.  
This following discussion will seek to touch on aspects of deliberation at a basic 
level while drawing out several salient aspects that touch on the current 
account. 
 
There are a number of ways that one can carve up the vast terrain.  One 
simple, but fruitful way of doing so is to note that certain characteristics of 
deliberation have to do with what might be called the logic of reasons, whereas 
other characteristics have to do with the fact that it is agents that deliberate.  
Implications of each of these will be looked at in turn.   
 
To avoid explaining the obscure with reference to the more obscure, a few 
words should be said about the logic of reasons.  This is not a term of art, but a 
descriptive phrase.  Reasons, by and large, are prima facie reasons.  That is to 
say, though an agent may have a reason to take an action, it may not be the 
case that he ought to take that action all things considered, because he may for 
instance have more compelling reasons not to take the action or to take another 
action.  Here the ‘logic of reasons’ will be taken to mean the logic according to 
which the fact that an agent has a reason becomes the fact that an agent ought 
to do something all things considered.   
 
As a subject, the logic of reasons has yet to receive sufficient treatment.  Some 
areas, such as questions pertaining to instrumental reasons, have received 
more attention than others.  For example, if one action is far more likely to bring 
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about the same positive outcome for no greater cost then another action, then 
all other things being equal as far as these instrumental reasons are concerned, 
the agent has more reason to perform the first action then the second.  But 
such idealized comparisons of instrumental reasons are only a small fraction of 
the relationships between reasons. 
 
At times reasons compete.  The example of instrumental reasons just 
mentioned is an example of this.  It may also be the case that an agent has 
reason to bring about one valuable outcome, and reason to bring about another 
valuable outcome.  And to complicate matters, it may be the case that one of 
the outcomes is more valuable than the other, or it might be the case that the 
value of the outcomes is not commensurable.  Indeed, it may not even be 
comparable; or may only be incompletely comparable.  The question of how to 
tally up the competition between such reasons is deserving of attention in its 
own right. 
 
Further, there may be question of whom the outcome is valuable for.  I.e., the 
action an agent can take may be valuable for one person, while another action 
the agent can take would be valuable for another person.  Depending on the 
circumstances, it can be a substantive moral question of how these reasons 
compete. 
 
And the complexities can multiply.  For example, one and the same action may 
be good for some and bad for others.  Similarly it can be a substantive moral 
question to determine how the various effects should be tallied. 
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Not all question verge so closely to the terrain of value theory.  Some questions 
stem from the variety of relationship between reasons themselves.  For 
example, some have suggested a specification relation exists between reasons.  
I.e., the reason one has for going to the train station may be a specification of 
the reasons one has for keeping one’s promises of picking up a friend from the 
train station. 
 
As was discussed earlier, there are also second order reasons.  And some 
reasons may admit to a number of different cancelling conditions.  And 
admittedly this is likely only a sampling of the reasons that there are.  
 
The complications are multiplied by the fact that deliberation is done by agents.  
As such, deliberation is not merely a matter of working through the logic of 
reasons.  Deliberation is in part a creative activity171, and can reflect the values 
and character of the agent deliberating.  Further, agents have a variety of 
abilities, and are severely limited in the best of cases.  Assessing each of the 
reasons that pertain to agents during the course of a normal day is beyond the 
realm of possibilities for agents. 
 
As one would expect, deliberation is complex, intricate and sophisticated.  
While it would be helpful to have a clear prescription for what it would mean for 
a reason to play an appropriate role in deliberation, it is unlikely that any easy 
formulaic response will suffice.  Indeed there are cases in which it is appropriate 
for a recognized reason to play no role in deliberation. 
 
                                                
171 For example, what one considers while deliberating can be reflective of the agent’s 
intelligence and imagination. 
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Consider a few cases in which a reason that an agent recognized does not play 
a role in this deliberation.  For example, consider the case of the agent who 
knew that in order to fulfill his promise and pick up his friend at the train station, 
he would need to go to the train station.  The agent recognized that he had a 
reason to go to the train station to pick up his friend.  This reason can fail to 
play a role in deliberation for several different reasons.   
 
This might happen as the result of a failure of some sort.  For example, the 
agent may have forgotten his promise to his friend, or the fact that in order fulfill 
his promise he needed to go to the train station, or that his friend was arriving 
this afternoon.  However, the omission of the recognized reason from 
deliberation in this case is not a failure in deliberation, but a failure in the 
precondition for it.  Indeed, one might wonder whether it is apt to describe an 
agent in this position as recognizing a reason.  It may be the case that he had 
recognized the reason, but no longer does.  Therefore, not including this reason 
in deliberation may have been a failure, it is not a failure to take as a reason 
that which he recognized to be one. 
 
In addition, there may be many circumstances in which the question of going to 
the train station never came up.172  For example, the agent’s friend may not be 
arriving until some time in the distant future.  Given this, there is no call for an 
agent to deliberate about whether or not to go to the station at this point in time.  
As such, if there is no relevant deliberation173, then the agent has not failed to 
                                                
172 Care needs to be taken here, for in some cases not deliberating about a possible action can 
itself constitute not taking as a reason that which one recognized to be a reason. 
173 And the fact that there is no deliberation does not in itself constitute a failure on the part of 
the agent to take as a reason that which he recognized to be one. 
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take as a reason that which he recognized to be one, even if he did not 
deliberate on the basis of the reason he recognized. 
 
This points to an important aspect of what it is to give a reason an appropriate 
role in deliberation which is made more explicit by another example in which an 
agent does not fail to take a reason as a reason even if he does not deliberate 
on the basis of the reason he recognized.  Consider the example of the parent 
taking care of his child.  The parent knows that the law requires him to take care 
of his child, and recognizes that this is as a reason to take care of his child.  
However, in deliberating about how to act, the parent does not deliberate on the 
basis of this reason.  He simply takes care of his child because he is his child; 
or perhaps more aptly put because the child needs to be taken care of.  The 
fact that the law requires it never crosses his mind.  In this case, the parent’s 
actions are overdetermined – normatively overdetermined.  He has an over 
abundance of reasons to take care of his child.  He does not need to deliberate 
on the basis of each of these reasons in order to give each of these reasons its 
appropriate role in deliberation.  For in recognizing a reason, an agent 
recognizes that a consideration counts in favor of a proposition or an action.  In 
cases in which the agent’s action is normatively overdetermined, some of the 
reasons in favor of the action simply do not add more support for taking the 
action.  They have no possibility of affecting the agent’s balance of reasons, 
and therefore need not play a role in deliberation.  To give a reason its 
appropriate role in deliberation in part is to give it a role in deliberation if it has 
the possibility of affecting the balance of reasons.174  In other words, to take as 
a reason that which one recognized to be a reason is to incorporate that reason 
                                                
174 This also means that if there is overwhelming contrary reasons, it may be the case that an 
agent can fail to take a reason into consideration in deliberation without thereby failing to give 
the reason an appropriate role in deliberation. 
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in deliberation if doing so has the possibility of effecting the agent’s balance of 
reasons.   
 
This last example is revealing.  It points to the fact that playing an appropriate 
role in deliberation has to do with affecting the agent’s balance of reasons.  This 
is not to say that this is what constitutes playing an appropriate role in 
deliberation.  As was just illustrated, what role is appropriate for a reason to 
play will depend on the reason itself as well as the other reasons that pertain to 
the question at hand.  Nonetheless, this observation does present a standard 
that can be used to determine whether a given reason played an appropriate 
role in deliberation.  If a recognized reason would affect the balance of reason if 
it were to play an active role in deliberation then in order for the reason to play 
an appropriate role in deliberation, it needs to play an active role in 
deliberation.175  Needless to say, given that this pertains to deliberation broadly 
defined, this is not a criteria which can easily be applied since the agent himself 
may not be aware of the role a given reason played.  The real benefit of the 
criteria is a degree of conceptual clarity.   
 
Taken together an intricate and nuanced picture of rationality begins to emerge.  
This befits the complexities agents grapple with as they navigate a world with a 
multitude of possibilities that requires the ability to perceive alternatives and 
ultimately make choices.  As agents learn about themselves and the world 
around them they develop the ability to recognize that considerations bear on 
their choices.  They develop the ability to recognize reasons.  But this is the 
                                                
175 This also suggests that there is a degree of asymmetry to which reasons need to play an 
active role in deliberation in order to play an appropriate role in deliberation.  I.e., recognized 
reasons that count against the recommendation of the balance of reasons need to have played 
an active role in deliberation in order for the agent to have deliberated appropriately.  This same 
is not the case for reasons that count in favor of the recommendation of the balance of reasons. 
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beginning and not the end of the exercise of their rational faculties.  Agents 
must also take the reason to be a reason.  For in order to choose agents must 
deliberate amongst a multitude of such considerations which can have a 
complex relationship with one another, and agents must do all this with very 
limited resources in an on-going basis.  There are a variety of standards for 
success in how agent deliberate amongst the reasons they have.  Part of this 
depends on the logic of reasons, and part on the character of choice and 
deliberation as creative acts.  For example, the results of an agent’s 
deliberation can be in line with the balance of his reason, or in line with the 
balance of his recognized reasons; his choice could be the virtuous choices, 
loyal choice or creative choice.  A full description of the variety of possibilities 
would likely be encyclopedic.  Nonetheless in reflecting on rationality we can 
gain an understanding of these two distinct but important components of 
rationality.  I.e., reason is directive and efficacious.  Reason is directive when 
an agent recognizes something as a reason; and reason is efficacious when an 
agent takes a reason to be a reason. 
 
Stage 3: Irrationality 
With this understanding of the significance of directive and efficacious 
characteristics of rationality, the discussion can again turn to irrationality.   
 
There are a number of necessary conditions for an agent to be rational.  While it 
may be true that a failure to meet any of these conditions constitutes a failing of 
rationality, it is not true that each of these failings constitutes irrationality.  
Irrationality is a failing of a specific kind.   
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For instance, arguably consciousness is a necessary condition for rationality, 
however an agent lacking in consciousness is not irrational, but non-rational.  
Consciousness, one may think, is a precondition of rationality.  And, it seems 
reasonable to say that if an agent fails to be rational because she lacks a 
precondition for rationality, she is not irrational, but non-rational. 
 
A unique aspect of the two conditions that have been discussed so far is that a 
failure with regard to these conditions is a case of irrationality. 
 
Given that there are two conditions, they can be present in 4 combinations. 
1. P recognizes X as a reason, and takes X to be a reason. 
2. P does not recognize X as a reason and does not take X to be a 
reason. 
3. P does not recognize X as a reason, yet takes X to be a reason. 
4. P recognizes X as a reason, but does not take X to be a reason. 
 
Case (1) describes a situation in which two necessary conditions for rationality 
are met. 
 
Case (2) describes a situation in which two necessary conditions for rationality 
are apparently not met.  But this does not argue against their being necessary 
conditions, but reflects the relation between them.  A more explicit statement of 
the necessary conditions is: P is rational only if (P recognizes X as a reason, if 
and only if he takes X to be the reason he recognizes it to be).  Understood in 
this way, Case (2) describes a situation in which two necessary conditions for 
rationality are met. 
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Case (3) describes a failure on the part of the agent, but this is a failure of a 
very different kind.  Consider for a moment what such a case would be like.  
The agent takes as a reason that which he does not recognize to be one.  
Though the agent does not see the consideration as directive, it is efficacious in 
his deliberation.  This is not a case where the agent fails to be ruled by reason, 
but it is a case where he fails to be ruled by his reason.  This is not a case of 
irrationality, but a case of non-rationality.  This will not be argued further here.  
The best argument for it seems to be considering how strange it would be for a 
person to be in this situation.  But if some think it is better to describe this as a 
special kind of irrationality, nothing in this discussion should turn on that. 
 
Case (4) describes a particular failure on the part of the agent.  The agent’s 
reason is directive, but not efficacious.  Consider an example that would be of 
this kind.  I.e., an example in which the agent did not meet the criteria described 
above.  For example, imagine if the agent in question did not go to the station 
because when he deliberated about whether or not to go to the train station, he 
never considered the reason he had to go in order to pick up his friend from the 
station.  It is not that something intervened and he no longer recognized the 
reason that he had, nor that he had more reason not to go.  He simply failed to 
take the fact that he made a promise to be a reason; he simply failed to give it 
the appropriate role in deliberation.  If the agent recognized the reason, did not 
forget it, deliberated about the possibility, but did not give the reason its 
appropriate role in deliberation, his choice is in a way inexplicable.  There is no 
reason for it, in part because it is a failure of reason.  Cases of this kind, it is 
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suggested are cases of irrationality.  Rather than merely a failure of reason to 
rule, cases of irrationality constitute a failure in reason’s ruling.176 
 
Descriptive Requirement 
As a suggested account of irrationality, it is appropriate to ask whether this 
account meets the Descriptive Requirement articulated earlier.  I.e., will it offer 
a descriptive account of the failure of irrationality that is common to cases of 
irrationality.  The suggestion at hand is that: cases of irrationality are cases in 
which an agent P recognizes X to be a reason, but does not take X to be the 
reason he recognizes it to be. 
 
To completely satisfy the first requirement, one must also show that this failing 
is common to all cases of irrationality.  This is too ambitious for present 
purposes, but some progress can be made towards this goal by showing that 
the suggested view can accommodate Davidson’s descriptive account and 
serve as the basis for Broome-style rational requirements.  The hope is that by 
showing that the suggested view is compatible with the successful elements of 
each of these views, it will countenance its plausibility. 
 
One obvious point to address is that Broome-style rational requirements look 
very different than the current suggested view.  In this section, it will be argued 
that the current view is similar to and different from Broome-style rational 
requirements in important respects.   
 
                                                
176 To put this more explicitly, reason can fail to rule (i.e., an agent can fail to be rational) in two 
ways, reason can not rule (i.e., agents can be non-rational) or reason can fail in ruling (i.e., an 
agent can be irrational). 
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To see this it will be helpful to briefly look at a debate between Broome and 
Kolodny about rational requirements that has received considerable attention.  
In “Rationality and Reasons”177, Kolodny argues that, contrary to Broome, at 
least some rational requirements are narrow scope.178  Kolodny’s main 
argument is essentially comprised of two different claims: first, that at least 
some rational requirements are process-requirements; and second, that at least 
some of these process-requirements are narrow-scope.  
 
Kolodny distinguishes between “’state-requirements,’ which simply ban states in 
which one has conflicting attitudes, and ‘process-requirements,’ which say how, 
going forward, one is to form, retain or revise one’s attitudes so as to avoid or 
escape such conflict-states.”179  And he stipulates that “Any account of 
rationality that aims to capture our ordinary attributions cannot consist solely of 
                                                
177 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”. 
178 Note that the reason this seemingly esoteric topic has received so much attention is because 
of its significance to the normative question.  I.e., if it is the case that the requires relation (and 
rationality) is normative and rational requirements are narrow scope, then an agent can 
seemingly bootstrap himself into being normatively required to have a belief, preference, 
intention, etc.  Or conversely, since many seek to avoid this bootstrapping conclusion, if one 
can show that some rational requirements are narrow scope, one can pose a dilemma for one’s 
opponents by showing that they must either accept the bootstrapping conclusion or give up the 
claim that requires relation (and rationality) is normative.  
 
While this is a reason many have closely followed this debate, it is not a topic of particular 
concern here for two reasons.  The first has already been discussed in several different places 
in the current work.  Specifically, it has been argued that it is not sensible to ask whether 
rationality is normative simplicitor.  Rather, it is more fruitful to explore whether a given 
conception of rationality (normative or not) is feasible given a broader conception of practical 
reasoning.  This is a reflection of the extent to which concepts within a given conception of 
practical reasoning are inter-defined, as discussed extensively in Chapter 1: Introduction.  
 
The second reason this debate is not a particular concern for present purposes is that, as will 
be argued shortly, this debate focuses on a questionable characteristic of rational requirements.  
 
For reasons that will become apparent later in this dissertation, it is also worthwhile to note that 
while it is problematic to claim that rationality is normative and rational requirements are narrow- 
scope, there is no corresponding difficulty in claiming that rationality is not normative and 
rational requirements are wide-scope.  
179 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 6. 
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state-requirements, which say “Not that conflict!” It must consist, at least in part, 
of process-requirements, which say “Do this to avoid or resolve that conflict!””180 
 
Based on this stipulation, he then develops the “Reasoning Test” to explore 
whether a process-requirement is wide or narrow scope: “The process-
requirement governing conflict between A and B is wide scope – i.e., one is 
rationality required (either not to have A, or not to have B) – only if, from a state 
in which one has conflicting attitudes A and B, (i) one can reason from the 
content of A to dropping B and (ii) one can reason from the content of B to 
dropping A.”181   
 
And then he proceeds to show that a number of putative wide-scope 
requirements fail to meet the Reasoning Test.   For example, “I-WS: Rationality 
requires one (either not to believe that one lacks sufficient reason to X, or not to 
intend to X).”182  As Kolodny points out, one can reason from the contents of 
one’s belief that one lacks sufficient reason to X to dropping of one’s intention to 
X; but one cannot reason from the content of one’s intention to X, to the belief 
that one has sufficient reason to X.  One cannot reason upstream, as it were 
from ‘one’s attitudes to a reassessment of one’s reasons for those same 
attitudes’.183  Doing so would not be a case of reasoning but something else, 
possibly something like wishful thinking or self-deception.  As a result, this 
example fails the Reasoning Test, and should instead be considered a narrow-
                                                
180 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 6,7. 
181 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 9. 
182 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 10. 
183 Paraphrase of Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 11. 
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scope requirement or as Kolodny puts it: “I-NS: If one believes that one lacks 
sufficient reason to X, then rationality requires on not to intend to X.”184 
 
Since the suggested view endorses some of Broome’s characterization of 
rational requirements as wide-scope requirements, it must be at odds with 
some of Kolodny’s account, but to be clear there are also points in which the 
suggested view agrees with Kolodny’s view. For example, the suggested view 
accepts Kolodny’s suggestion that rationality is at least in part concerned with 
how one progresses - by reasoning - from one state to another.  This seems 
intuitively compelling, and the suggested view has no issue with the possible 
centrality of process-requirements as such, even if it does differ in the 
conception of those requirements.  Further Kolodny’s characterization of 
upstream reasoning as a kind of wishful thinking seems to aptly capture the 
strangeness of progressing in that fashion.  Given these points of agreement, 
the question is how does the suggested view resist the force of Kolodny’s 
argument? 
 
The answer is relatively straightforward.  First, it will be argued that Kolodny’s 
Reasoning Test reflects an artificial simplification of reasoning which is 
unwarranted.  And, second it will be suggested that it will be more fruitful to 
think of rational requirements in a somewhat different way than either Kolodny 
or Broome do.  These points will be taken up sequentially. 
 
To see this, it will be helpful to revisit the rational requirements Kolodny offered 
to serve as the basis for his argument that some rational requirements are 
                                                
184 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 11. 
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narrow scope process requirements.  Specifically, “I-: Rationality requires one 
not to intend to X, if one beliefs that one lacks sufficient reason to X.”185   
 
The first difficulty is that I- is not obviously a rational requirement.  It is not 
irrational to form an intention merely based on whim or whimsy despite 
believing that one lacks sufficient reason.   Kolodny discusses just such a 
concern in a footnote that attends the introduction of I-.   And he suggests that 
in such cases, I- is trivially satisfied for in such cases one believes that one 
does not need any reason to X.  But this clearly goes too far.  For one can act 
on whim or whimsy without needing to form a belief about what reasons one 
would need in order to X.  Indeed, such consideration of the matter would seem 
to fly in the face of exactly what it is to act on a whim or whimsy.   
 
While this characterization of I- may be reflective of the overall character of 
Kolodny’s treatment of reasoning that will be objected to, it is not itself the point 
at issue.  So for present purposes, a variation of I- can be offered that may be 
less objectionable.  Consider Ia: In forming an intention to F and G, rationality 
requires one not intend to G if one judges oneself to have more reason to F.  
 
Consider an agent in violation of this requirement.  For example an agent who 
judges himself to have more reason to F rather than G, but forms an intention to 
G rather than an intention to F.  Such an agent would be akratic, and such an 
agent’s intention would be irrational.   
 
If Ia is a wide-scope process-requirement, according to Kolodny’s Reasoning 
Test, then it must be the case that the agent can (i) drop the intention to G 
                                                
185 Kolodny, “Rationality and Reasons”, pg 10. 
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based on his judgment that he has more reason to F, and (ii) revise his 
judgment that he has more reason to F based on his intention to G.  But the 
latter would clearly be a case of impossible upstream reasoning that was 
discussed above.  And so, it appears Kolodny’s argument applies to Ia as 
neatly as it did to I-. 
 
The question is why is the Reasoning Test so restrictive.  An agent aware of 
having an intention that is at odds with his better judgment may well revisit his 
better judgment, but, as Kolodny points out, it would be wishful thinking if he did 
so based on his intention.  On the other hand, it would be perfectly rational for 
the agent to revise his judgment about the balance of reasons when he revisits 
the reasons for his intention.  An agent reconsidering the reasons on which he 
formed his intention may well arrive at a different conclusion about the balance 
of reasons.  For example, in this case, when the agent revisits the reasons on 
which he formed the intention to G he may conclude that he has more reasons 
to G than F.  In this way, when an agent finds himself in a situation which 
violates Ia, the agent can reason his way out of this conflict by either changing 
his intention or by changing his judgment about the balance of reasons.  
Contrary to Kolodny’s suggestion, Ia is a wide-scope process-requirement. 
 
This conclusion would seem to indicate that the suggested view sides with 
Broome rather than Kolodny, but there is more going on here that is worth 
noting.  Specifically, it will be helpful to make four points.   
 
First, similar to Kolodny, on the suggested view rationality is concerned with 
how one progresses from one state to another, that is to say, how one reasons.  
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In this sense, the two views share an orientation.  However, they differ in the 
conception of that process.  The Reasoning Test reflects a narrow and 
prescribed conception of practical reasoning, whereas the suggested view 
starts with the premise that reasoning rationally can be an intricate, iterative and 
nuanced activity.  
 
Second, the suggested view differs from both Broome and Kolodny’s views in 
its focus on the reasons an agent recognizes, rather than the agent’s mental 
states, such as beliefs and intentions.  This is the basis for the argument that 
Kolodny’s Reasoning Test is too restrictive.  I.e., Kolodny is correct to point out 
that an agent’s intention to G may provide that agent with no reason to 
conclude that he ought to G, or that he has sufficient reason to G.  But if the 
agent rationally formed his intention to G, then he did so on the basis of 
recognized reasons.  And those reasons may well provide him with the basis to 
conclude that he ought to G, or at least has sufficient reason to do so.   
 
This difference in focus is more important than it may at first appear.  As was 
already discussed, the propositional content of a mental state, and the mental 
state itself for that matter, may stand in an infinite number of different reasons 
relations.  And an agent may recognize that it stands in some of those relations, 
none of those relations, or he may mistakenly think that it stands in some other 
relations.  To focus on the agent’s beliefs and intentions, without also focusing 
on the reasons he recognizes is to obscure from vision the basis on which the 
agent reasons.  And as a result, attempts to enumerate rational requirements 
with this focus will often be stilted, over-prescriptive, and have a seemingly ad-
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hoc character dealing with specific characteristics of different circumstances in 
elaborate detail.  
 
This would seem to suggest that on the current view one might think that there 
is little virtue in Broome or Kolodny style rational requirements.  This is not the 
case.  It is just that one understands the significance of each view quite 
differently.  This brings us to the third point.  The debate about whether rational 
requirements are wide-scope or narrow-scope generally pertains to what might 
be considered the imperative to remedy an irrationality.  That is to say, given a 
circumstance in which an agent is irrational, say by having an akratic intention, 
the question seems to be whether the agent can cure or remedy the irrationality 
in more than one way.  The setting for this argument seems to be the implicit 
shared view that rationality requires one to cure or remedy cases of irrationality.   
 
While the current view shares many aspects with both Broome and Kolodny’s 
views, it does not share either views emphasis on the question of how one can 
cure or remedy cases of irrationality.  In some cases rationality may require an 
agent to remedy an irrationality, but in other cases – just like violations of other 
types of requirements - it may not.  Rather the focus on rational requirements in 
the current account is quite different and it sheds a different light on the 
significance of both Kolodny and Broome-style rational requirements.  To see 
this, it would be helpful to discuss a specific example, taking the opportunity to 
point out the places where the suggested view agrees and disagrees with 
Kolodny and Broome. 
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As was already mentioned the suggested view holds that rationality concerns 
reasoning correctly, in a specific sense.  This seems relatively close to 
Kolodny’s emphasis on process-requirements, though with two specific 
differences: first, the suggested view is concerned with the reasons an agent 
recognizes rather than the general content of his mental states, and second, 
that the suggested view concerns an understanding of reasoning which it would 
be difficult to narrowly prescribe in the way Kolodny does.  The suggested view 
of rationality can be codified in a fundamental requirement of rationality that is 
reminiscent of Kolodny-style process requirements, i.e., Rationality requires that 
if an agent recognizes something to be a reason, then he takes it to be the 
reason that he recognizes it to be.  An agent’s failure to meet this requirement 
of rationality makes it the case that the agent is irrational.   
 
The claim is that this fundamental requirement of rationality is violated in all the 
canonical cases of irrationality.  And, since Broome-style rational requirements 
can be articulated to codify these canonical cases of irrationality, these Broome-
style rational requirements codify situations in which this fundamental 
requirement would be violated.  To see how this might work, let’s suggest a fifth 
rational requirement that is similar to Broome’s fourth requirement. 
• Fifth requirement: Rationality requires of you that, if you are choosing 
between F and G and you believe you ought to F, then you intend to F, 
rather than G. 
 
Given the difference that has already been discussed between recognizing a 
reason and believing there is a reason, it will be helpful to offer a minor variation 
to clarify the role played by the outcomes of the agent’s deliberation.   
                   186 of 229 
• Fifth requirement′: Rationality requires of you that, if you are choosing 
between F and G and all things considered you judge that you ought to 
F, then you intend F, rather than G.186 
 
Consider a violation of this requirement, a case in which the agent intends to G. 
As Broome-style rational requirements are supposed to be, this requirement is 
strict.  Any agent who violates the requirement in this way would be irrational.  It 
is harder to see why one should think this requirement is broad.  It appears that 
the only way an agent can remedy this violation of the requirement would be to 
form the intention to F based on all the relevant reasons.  But this is too quick.  
The agent can also change his judgment about what he has most reason to do 
all things considered.  A look at the connection between the suggested view 
and this requirement can shed light on why this is the case. 
 
Recall that in cases of akrasia an agent forms an ATC-J based on r1 and r2, but 
forms his SP-J based on r1, for example.  In forming his intention on this subset 
of reasons, the agent fails to take r2 to be the reason that he recognizes it to be 
and is therefore irrational.  Such an agent can remedy this failing by forming an 
intention based on r1 and r2.  Alternatively he may retain his intention but cease 
to recognize r2187 as a reason.  In so doing, the agent would have remedied his 
violation; and so the suggested view can accommodate both the strict and 
broad character of Broome-style rational requirements.   
 
                                                
186 The clause ‘and if you believe you will not F unless you intend to F’ has been dropped for 
simplicity sake, but it is relatively easy to see how it can be included.  
187 As a side note, for those aware of the issue, contrary to Kolodny’s objection in “Why Be 
Rational” the agent could revise his judgment about r2 on the basis of the elements of the r2 
itself, or based on r1.  The agent has ample basis to revise hid judgment about r2. 
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Further, the suggested view will always generate rational requirements that are 
strict; i.e., any case in which an agent fails to take as a reason that which he 
recognizes to be one, the agent will be irrational.  And, since there are two 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in the suggested view, it will always 
generate rational requirements that are broad; i.e., it will always be possible for 
an agent to remedy an irrationality by taking the reason to be the reason he 
recognizes it to be, or cease to recognize it as a reason. 
 
By expanding the discussion of rational requirements in this section to not only 
include Broome-style rational requirements but also discuss Kolodny’s critique 
of Broome as well as his own suggestion, it is hoped that the distinct character 
of the suggested view was cast in starker relief.  Perhaps most distinctively the 
suggested view embraces aspects of each, disagrees with both, and argues 
that the debate between them centers on a question that is not deserving of the 
emphasis they both place on it.  
 
Specifically it was argued that there is a fundamental rational requirement that 
concerns how agents reason.  It was noted that this is evocative of, but different 
from, Kolodny’s focus on process-requirements.  It was also shown that the 
suggested view can plausibly generate Broome-style rational requirements that 
are both broad and strict.  In the process, it also showed why Kolodny’s 
arguments against wide-scope requirements are overly restrictive and should 
not be taken to be persuasive.  Further, by showing this in Davidson’s terms, it 
has also been shown that the suggested view is consistent with his descriptive 
account of akrasia. 
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Admittedly showing that the suggested view can generate Broome-style rational 
requirements that are broad and strict, reflects the intuitively appealing aspects 
of Kolodny’s process-requirements and is also consistent with Davidson’s 
descriptive account of akrasia is still far from showing that the suggested view 
points to a failure that is present in every case of irrationality, as is required by 
the Descriptive Requirement.  Nonetheless, by showing that it is consistent with 
these leading candidates, the hope is that it has been shown to be at least as 
plausible as each of these alternatives.  This point could be more firmly 
established by enumerating the canonical cases of irrationality in terms of the 
suggested view and pointing to the failure in each case.  One could also 
generate an extensive list of Broome-style rational requirements based on the 
suggested view188. 
 
Having argued that the suggested view may plausibly satisfy the Descriptive 
Requirement, the discussion can turn its attention to the Normative 
Requirement, i.e., the failure to take as a reason that which one recognizes to 
be one must be of a special kind that can explain the normativity of irrationality.  
This is the subject to which the discussion will turn to next. 
 
Normative Requirement 
To begin it will be helpful to make a few comments about the normativity of 
rationality/irrationality.   
 
                                                
188 One caveat needs to be mentioned.  The rational requirements one would generate would 
likely differ from Broome’s own.  To see this, simply consider Broome’s first requirement, the 
one associated with having contradictory beliefs.  Rather than seeing this as a failing of the 
suggested view, the promise of modifying Broome’s rational requirements, which are based on 
insightful intuition, seems a virtue of a principled account of irrationality. 
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Consider the following example: Were Tom to knowingly put petrol in the car he 
believed to take diesel, given that he intended to put the right kind of fuel in the 
car, Tom’s action would be irrational.  This is merely a description of Tom’s 
action, and bears no hallmark of normativity.  As such, it is consistent with the 
account of irrationality so far described. 
 
But claims about irrationality often carry the tenor of normativity, as would be 
the case if one were to admonish Tom by saying, ‘Tom that’s an irrational thing 
to do.’  Or more explicitly, if we were to advise him by saying ‘You ought to put 
diesel in the car.’  Claims about (ir)rationality in these contexts have a 
normative character.  The question is, what basis does the descriptive account 
of irrationality provide for understanding the source of normative claims of 
(ir)rationality? 
 
From the outset, the account of rationality (or irrationality) that has been 
described is an account of proper (or improper) functioning.  This might suggest 
that the normative criteria are already built in, as it were, to the descriptive 
account.  For example, one can easily imagine the following normative claim 
consistent with this descriptive account: function properly. 
 
But this does not capture the normative character of claims about rationality.  
Consider for instance the earlier example in which Tom was undertaking to put 
petrol in the car he believed took diesel.  Those who would admonish Tom to 
instead put diesel in the car may well point to Tom’s belief that it is a diesel car, 
but it seems very unlikely that they would admonish him to function properly.  It 
also points to the ways in which the soldier case differs from that of the smoker. 
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Rather, the normative character of rationality claims stems from the normativity 
of reasons.  Specifically, it stems from the normative force of the reason that the 
agent recognizes, but does not take to be a reason.  This is in line with 
Scanlon’s view and what Kolodny is suggesting in his Transparency Account.189   
 
To put the point more colorfully, when one admonishes Tom to put diesel in the 
car because he believes the car takes diesel, one is admonishing him to take as 
a reason that which he recognizes to be one.  Or, one is admonishing him to do 
that which by his own lights he sees himself as having most reason to do.   
 
In short, the suggested view offers the following answer to the Normative 
Requirement: the normative force of rationality/irrationality consists of the 
apparent normative force of reasons, nothing more.   
 
Insofar as the suggested view explains how this normativity arises based on its 
answer to the Descriptive Requirement, the suggested view offers a plausible 
answer to the Normative Requirement, and thus to the Riddle of Irrationality. 
 
Conclusion 
This is a modest step towards the ambitious goal of offering an account of 
rationality.  By focusing on the Riddle of Irrationality, it was possible to see the 
virtues and failings of accounts by Davidson, Scanlon and Broome.  It was 
argued that the suggested view, which identifies irrationality with failing to take 
as a reason that which one recognizes to be one, meets the Descriptive and 
                                                
189 Kolodny, N. “Why Be Rational”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 114, No. 455 (Jul., 2005) (pp. 509-
563). 
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Normative Requirements that make up the Riddle of Irrationality, while sharing 
the virtues of Davidson’s, Scanlon’s and Broome’s accounts.  Specifically, it 
was shown that the suggested view is consistent with Davidson’s account of 
akrasia, can generate Broome-style rational requirements, and provides a 
descriptive account that gives flesh to Scanlon’s suggestion that the normativity 
of rationality stems from the reasons an agent recognizes. 
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Chapter 4: Preferences 
 
The fact that there are multiple interpretations of ‘preference’ presents a 
challenge to Preference Theories; and undermines the justification of the 
completeness and transitivity conditions. 
 
Further, seeking to address these challenges by exploring possible justifications 
of the completeness and/or transitivity conditions as conditions of rationality 
relies on a conception of rationality and a larger conception of practical 
reasoning. 
 
As a result, the previous two chapters have begun to enumerate a conception 
of practical reasoning that has been emerging in philosophy of law, moral 
theory and philosophy of action.  It is a conception of practical reasoning which 
takes reasons to be the basic normative concept.  Reasons, on this view, are 
facts; which can be provided by value.  Agents in turn, form judgments based 
on the reasons they recognize given their subsidiary beliefs; and rationality 
governs their reasoning. 
 
With the backdrop established in previous chapters, it is now possible to begin 
to articulate a conception of preferences within this broader context of a 
conception of practical reasoning.  This chapter will proceed in three stages.  
The first will stage will briefly discuss important characteristics of preferences 
that the suggested account will share with other accounts in the literature.  The 
second stage will introduce the suggested account of preferences.  And the 
third section will seek to face the challenges discussed to this point.   
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Stage 1: Characteristics of Preferences 
While the account of preference suggested here is distinct from those 
discussed to this point, it shares commonalities with a number of them.  The 
following discussion succinctly points to aspects of preferences the suggested 
account will seek to accommodate.  It will also mention one account that has 
not been addressed to this point.  Several should be made explicit.  Specifically 
the following discussion will focus on the four concepts associated with 
preferences: choices, welfare judgments, value and all-things-considered 
judgments. 
 
Choices 
The connection between ‘preference’ and choice is perhaps the most 
fundamental.  If Preference Theories are to guide and explain actions there 
must be a connection between preference and choices. 
 
Indeed as was discussed earlier Revealed Preference Theory reduced 
preference to choices; as did the ‘forcing procedure’.  Though, both ran into 
difficulties because of this. 
 
The suggested account will seek to maintain a strong connection between 
preference and choices but avoid the associated difficulties by resisting the 
temptation to reduce preferences to choices.  Instead, it will take seriously a 
suggestion Sen made in criticizing Revealed Preference Theories, i.e., the 
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possibility of understanding ‘preference’ as the “attitudes or judgments that 
underlie choices.”190 
 
Welfare judgments 
As Sen writes “the normal use of the word permits the identification of 
preference with the concept of being better off.”191  And the Money Pump 
argument relies on an interpretation of ‘preference’ as welfare judgments. 
 
Yet there are those, like Mandler and Hausman who think that the association 
of ‘preference’ with welfare is a relic of the Utilitarian roots of Preference 
Theories whose time has passed.  E.g., "Still, much confusion and pointless 
criticism would be avoided if locutions such as “welfare” or even “better off” 
were dropped.”192 
 
While reducing ‘preference’ to welfare judgments is problematic – not least 
because of the tension it raises for the connection between ‘preference’ and 
choices discussed earlier – it is sometimes compelling to interpret an agent’s 
preferences as reflecting his welfare judgments in certain circumstances.  For 
example, it is natural enough to conclude that an agent’s preference for saving 
money for retirement reflects his judgment that doing so will make him better 
off.  The suggested view will seek to accommodate some connection between 
‘preference’ and welfare judgments while also providing for the possibility that 
an agent’s preferences may represent a broad range of other considerations. 
 
                                                
190 A.K. Sen, Choice Welfare and Measurement, (First Harvard University Press, 1998), 
Pages 54-73 
191 (Sen 1977: 329) 
192 Mandler, M. “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or 
Transitivity but Not Both”, pg 8. 
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Value 
In Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time193, Broome offers an 
intriguing possibility for sidestepping the debate about welfare judgments.  
Broome suggests that the formalism of Preference Theories can be applied to 
value itself by substituting the preference relation with the betterness relation.  
As a result the alternatives suggested by the formalism are the better 
alternatives, because they reflect the betterness relation itself.  But Broome 
establishes the connection between value and the formalism of Preference 
Theories by giving up the preference relation.  The subject of consideration is 
no longer an agent’s preferences, but value. 
 
Broome’s suggestion puts value at the center of questions about what ought to 
be done in a way that is rare in Preference Theories, and the suggested view 
will seek to maintain the focus on this relationship.  However, it will not follow 
Broome’s example of replacing the preference relation with the betterness 
relation for two reasons.  First, the current effort is concerned with offering an 
account of preferences, and so following Broome would be contrary its aims.  
And perhaps more substantively, there is good reason to think there is a 
plurality of value; and if this is the case it is unlikely that value can be cached 
out in terms of a betterness relation that satisfies the axioms of Preference 
Theories. 
 
All things considered 
                                                
193 Broom, J, Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time , Oxford : Cambridge, Mass. : 
Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
                   196 of 229 
In his forthcoming manuscript, Hausman194 recognizes the challenges that have 
plagued Preference Theories as the result of the multiple interpretations of 
‘preference’.  However, contrary to Sen, he suggests that rather than think of 
‘preference’ as admitting multiple interpretations, economists should legislate a 
canonical understanding of preferences as total comparative evaluations.  Such 
total comparative evaluations may reflect an agent’s welfare judgments, but 
they may also reflect an agent’s evaluation of the alternatives on any of a 
number of different grounds such as relative value.  Such total comparative 
evaluations, or all-things-considered judgments as they will be referred to here, 
are evaluations based on all the considerations the agent takes to be relevant.   
 
The ability of Hausman’s suggestion to accommodate both the common 
association of preferences with welfare judgments and the connection between 
preferences and value count in its favor.  If connected to choice through an 
appropriate conception of practical reasoning, Hausman’s suggestion presents 
a promising account of preference. 
 
It is on this last point that there is the greatest difference between Hausman’s 
account and the current suggested view of ‘preference’.  The suggested view 
will follow Hausman’s suggestions for the interpretation of ‘preference’, but 
locate it within the context of the conception of practical reasoning developed in 
earlier chapters rather than the belief-desire view enumerated by Hausman.  
Here is why. 
 
                                                
194 Hausman, D., Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, NY, 
NY, 2012. 
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The conception of practical reasoning Hausman relies upon is sketched briefly.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to infer what Hausman may have in mind from the 
few comments he does make and the broader literature. 
 
In discussing the relevant conception of practical reasoning, Hausman is 
predominantly concerned with explaining actions.  He notes two different 
perspectives from which an action can be explained, the first and third person 
perspective.  From the first person perspective, “The question agents ask 
themselves is not “Given my beliefs and desires, what do I predict that I will 
do?” but “What should I do” or “What do I have most reason to do?””195  An 
agent’s beliefs and desires may not be decisive, because the agent is aware 
that his beliefs may be faulty and his desires are open to revision based on his 
understanding of the relevant reasons.  From the agent’s perspective it is the 
facts and value that motivate his action. 
 
Yet from the third person perspective psychologists and philosophers explain 
the agent’s action based on a “belief-desire psychology”196.  The basic idea is 
that “Beliefs are linked to reasons, because beliefs purport to provide agents 
with facts, and facts can be reasons.”197 and “desire presents its object as in 
some regard valuable or “to-be-done”. 198 
 
The belief-desire psychology Hausman presents may be a conception of 
practical reasoning that is consistent with Preference Theories.  Chapter 1: 
                                                
195 Hausman, D., Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, NY, 
NY, 2012, pg 5. 
196 Hausman, D., Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, NY, 
NY, 2012, pg 5. 
197 Hausman, D., Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, NY, 
NY, 2012, pg 6. 
198 Hausman, D., Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, NY, 
NY, 2012, pg 6. 
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Introduction acknowledged that there may be many such views of practical 
reasoning.  However, one difficulty with this view, and the reason it will not be 
pursued in the current effort, is that it precludes asking perhaps the most 
compelling question by omitting normative reasons.   
 
People occupy a normatively complex world and employ their judgment in order 
to navigate.  A fruitful conception of rationality and practical reasoning should 
seek to explain, predict and guide people’s choices in light of this.  By omitting 
the concept of normative reasons, Hausman’s account does not have a 
meaningful way to inquire about what agents should do.  To be clear, the point 
is not that Hausman omits reference to normative reasons in his account of 
preferences.  Since his goal is largely explanatory and predictive this would be 
an unfair criticism to level against him.  Rather the point is that on the belief-
desire psychology Hausman describes, the possible answer to normative 
questions would merely be based on value (or the believed value) of the 
outcome constrained by beliefs.  This seems to substantially reduce the 
normative to the evaluative; and there is far more to the normative than just 
this.199 
 
As a result, while the suggested view will follow Hausman’s lead in interpreting 
‘preference’ as all things considered judgments200, it will not adopt his belief-
                                                
199 For further elaboration on this see the description of the types of reasons and the ways in 
which they compete in Chapter 2: Reasons. 
200 Minor differences remain between the Hausman’s interpretation of ‘preference’ and that of 
the suggested view.  For example, Hausman takes preferences to be inherently comparative.  
The suggested view can accommodate the possibility of an agent simply preferring an 
alternative, rather than necessarily preferring an alternative over another.  Further, Hausman 
would likely object to the characterization of ‘preference’ as judgments, and rather refers to 
them as evaluations.  And for Hausman beliefs play a distinct role from preferences, whereas 
on the suggested view preferences reflect an agent’s beliefs.  As a result, it may be more fruitful 
to associate the suggested view of ‘preference’ with Hausman’s concept of ‘final preference’. 
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desire psychology.  Rather, it will attempt to situate the concept ‘preference’ 
within the conception of practical reasoning developed to this point. 
 
Characteristics of Preferences 
Taken together this discussion presents four characteristics of preferences that 
the suggested view will seek incorporate: 
• a fundamental connection between preference and choice 
• a connection between preferences and welfare judgments 
• a connection between preferences and evaluation of value 
• preferences as a reflection of an agent’s all things considered judgments. 
 
Stage 2: Suggested Account of Preferences  
Recall that one of the virtues of Davidson’s account of irrationality discussed in 
the previous chapter was that it offered a description of the extenuated 
relationship between an agent’s judgments and his choices.  It could 
accommodate the fact that an agent may arrive at a number of different 
judgments conditional on relevant considerations, yet arrive at an unconditional 
judgment about how to choose.  Davidson identifies the second of these 
judgments with intentions.  The following section will explore the possibility of 
identifying the first of these judgments with preferences.   
 
To do so, it may be helpful to have a brief restatement of the key elements in 
Davidson’s account:  
 
“In deliberating about whether to S, an agent considers her reasons for S-ing.  
She may believe she has reasons for and against S, though the conditional 
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form of the agent’s attitudes, Davidson suggests, ensures that even in such 
cases the agent will not thereby be entertaining a contradiction. Following 
Davidson, these attitudes can be called prima facie judgments (PF-J’s), and 
they can be represented as follows: pf(evaluative judgment; evidential grounds) 
or as pf(action type; reasons).   
 
An agent may simultaneously arrive at conflicting PF-J’s such as pf(s, r1) and 
pf(not s, r2).  In such cases, the agent resolves the conflicts by arriving at an all 
things considered judgment (ATC-J), which is a single conditional attitude 
based on all the relevant reasons, i.e., pf(s, r1 and r2). 
 
In contrast, intentions, the attitudes on which an agent acts, are unconditional in 
form.  Such intentions, or sans-phrase judgments (SP-J’s), can be represented 
as follows: sp(s).”201 
 
Further it was argued, that in cases of rational choice an agent chooses, and 
forms his SP-J’s, based on the reason which ground his all-things-considered-
judgments.202 
 
With this brief reminder of Davidson’s account, it is possible to cache out the 
suggestion more explicitly.  Whereas Davidson identifies SP-J’s with intentions, 
the current suggestion is to identify ATC-J’s with preferences.  Note, since an 
agent’s ATC-J is a PF-J that is based on all the relevant considerations, at 
times preferences will be discussed in terms of PF-J’s. 
 
                                                
201 From Chapter 3: Rationality. 
202 Recall the discussion of akrasia in Chapter 2: Rationality. 
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With this brief reminder of Davidson’s account, it is possible to cache out the 
suggestion more explicitly.  Whereas Davidson identifies SP-J’s with intentions, 
the current suggestion is to identify ATC-J’s with preferences.  Note, since an 
agent’s ATC-J is a PF-J that is based on all the relevant considerations, at 
times preferences will be discussed in terms of PF-J’s. 
 
On first glance, this may be a surprising suggestion, for it may not be obvious 
why this should be an account of preferences.  A few reflections should help 
allay those concerns.  Let’s take a simple case, for example an agent’s 
preference for ice cream over fruit for dessert.  Using the current vocabulary 
one can describe this agent as having arrived at a PF-J for ice cream over fruit 
for dessert.  The agent may have arrived at this PF-J based on the fact that the 
agent likes the taste of ice cream better than he likes the taste of fruit, which he 
recognized to be a reason.   
 
Further, given that there are no other reasons that the agent takes to be 
relevant, the agent’s PF-J reflects all the relevant considerations, and as such is 
the agent’s ATC-J.  Were the agent ordering dessert, he may well form the 
rational intention to have ice cream, rather than fruit, for dessert. 
 
Imagine the agent in this circumstance becomes aware of new information.  
The agent comes to learn that it is healthier to have fruit than ice cream for 
dessert.  The agent recognizes that this fact is a reason for having fruit, rather 
than ice cream, for dessert.  And in so doing he recognizes it as a relevant 
consideration.  He forms a conditional judgment, a PF-J, for fruit over ice cream 
for dessert.   
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Whereas the agent had previously arrived at an ATC-J, he now has two distinct 
PF-Js.  In this circumstance, the agent does not need to revise either judgment.  
They do not conflict.  He has one PF-J for ice cream over fruit for dessert based 
on taste; and another PF-J for fruit over ice cream for dessert based on health 
considerations.  Both of the agent’s PF-J’s are conditional. 
 
Note that the same would not be true if the judgments in question were 
intentions rather than preferences.  For example, if the agent intended to have 
ice cream, rather than fruit, for dessert, and intended to have fruit, rather than 
ice cream, for dessert, then the agent would have had conflicting judgments.  
This is a reflection of the unconditional nature of intentions; and points to one of 
the ways in which intentions and preferences differ. 
 
However, were the agent in question to consider what to order for dessert, 
rationality would require the judgment he arrived at to reflect both of the 
reasons he understood to be relevant.  That is to say it may be rational for the 
agent to arrive at a preference for ice cream over fruit for dessert, or for fruit 
over ice cream for dessert, but rationality would require whichever judgment he 
arrived at to reflect both of the reasons he recognized.  And this is a result of 
the fundamental requirement of rationality discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
If this discussion helps shed light on the conditional nature of preferences, it 
also provides the basis for addressing two related concerns about the 
suggested view.  The first is that preferences, understood as ATC-J’s, do not 
seem to share much in common with the desires often associated with 
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preferences.  Hopefully the example just discussed illustrates why these 
concerns can be put to rest.  There are times when one’s preferences reflect 
one’s desires, tastes, likes, etc.  Preferences between vanilla and chocolate ice 
cream may be a ready example.  And many of one’s preferences may be 
formed on the basis of such considerations.  However, as one becomes aware 
of other considerations, one’s preferences may change.  As in the earlier 
example, the agent may like the taste of ice cream more than the taste of fruit 
yet form a preference for fruit over ice cream because of health considerations.  
Indeed there may be a wide range of such considerations that come to form the 
basis of an agent’s judgments.  It is not that the suggested view does not give a 
significant role to such things as desires, tastes and the like, but that the current 
account suggests that they have a place within a much larger normative 
context; and this is reflected in the basis for agents preferences. 
 
A related concern may be that ATC-J’s are not sufficiently different from beliefs 
to be distinguished from them.  Does the suggested view merely reduce 
preferences to conditional beliefs?  It is easy to see why this concern is not 
warranted either.  Recall the discussion in Chapter 3: Rationality about the 
distinction between recognizing a reason and believing that there is a reason.  
In that discussion it was shown that the two are strictly separable.  Similarly in 
this context, the differences between the two comes to the fore.  To see this, 
consider the earlier example, but substitute beliefs about conditional 
relationship for PF-J’s.  To make the example explicit, the agent has a belief 
that for health reasons it is better to choose fruit over ice cream for dessert.  
And the agent has a belief that for taste reasons it is better to choose ice cream 
over fruit for dessert.  When choosing what to order for dessert, it would be 
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sensible for the agent to do so on the basis of both of these beliefs, but there is 
no rational requirement for him to do so precisely because he recognizes 
neither as reasons for his choice.  It is in part the conditional nature of 
preferences as all things considered judgments that distinguish them from 
beliefs, and makes them uniquely suited to play this distinctive role.203 
 
Further, the suggested view has several of the attractive features of an account 
of preference discussed earlier.  For example it offers a way of understanding 
Sen’s suggestion: ATC-J’s are the judgments which underlie choices, and by 
extension, preferences understood as ATC-J’s are the judgments which 
underlie choices.  Further, on this reading there is an intimate connection 
between preferences and choices, yet preferences do not reduce to choices.  
Rather, the connection between preferences and choices is rationality 
governed.  For example, recall that on Davidson’s account if an agent chooses 
contrary to his ATC-J, he makes an irrational choice, i.e., his choice is akratic.  
Described in terms of preferences, this can be restated to say that if an agent 
chooses contrary to his preferences, his choice is irrational. 
 
In addition, on this suggestion, preferences reflect an agent’s evaluation, 
without being narrowly reduced to welfare judgments.  An agent forms an ATC-
J based on an evaluation of all the considerations he takes to be relevant.  The 
                                                
203 Note that for those still reluctant to understand preferences as ATC-J’s, it is possible to 
suggest that preferences are somehow a distinct mental state from ATC-J’s, but rationally 
related to them.  Nothing in the argument presented here precludes that possibility.  After all, as 
discussed at length in the introduction, the focus of the current effort is to enumerate a potential 
account of preference situated against a rich backdrop of a conception of practical reasoning; 
rather than argue against the possibility of other plausible accounts.  That said, it should be 
noted that alternative plausible accounts are not yet readily available.  And, further, if one 
sought to distinguish preferences from ATC-J’s in the way described, it would seem incumbent 
to argue that this new ontological category is significantly distinct from ATC-J’s to warrant 
independent consideration.  And, if the new suggestion shares the same advantages as the 
current account, explain how it does so.  While this may be entirely plausible, at present it is 
difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for such an approach. 
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agent’s ATC-J reflects his evaluation of the alternatives he is confronted with.  
As a result, identifying an agent’s preferences with his ATC-J, the agent’s 
preferences reflect his evaluation of the alternatives.  So the suggested view is 
able to accounts for the fact that an agent’s preferences reflect his evaluation of 
the alternative, without thereby reducing preferences to welfare judgments 
narrowly prescribed.   
 
If these considerations recommend the suggested view, the pressing question 
is whether the suggested view can meet shed light on the justification of the 
completeness condition, offer a justification of the transitivity condition and 
address the possibility of fine individuation. 
 
Stage 3: Facing the Challenges 
With this brief statement of the suggested account, it is possible to explore the 
challenges raised to this point.  Specifically this stage will be comprised of three 
sections.  The first will explore the possible justification for the completeness 
condition.  The second will seek to address the challenge posed by the 
prospect of fine individuation.  And the third will suggest a possible justification 
for the transitivity condition as a condition of rationality. 
 
Completeness Condition 
The earlier discussion of the completeness condition in Chapter 1: Introduction 
questioned the justification for the completeness condition as a condition of 
rationality for two reasons.  First, the standard argument for justifying the 
completeness condition, i.e., the ‘forcing procedure’, relies on a different 
interpretation of ‘preference’ than the associated conception of rationality.  And 
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second, the completeness condition itself is too demanding for a condition of 
rationality.  Both will be looked at briefly before suggesting a different way of 
thinking about the completeness condition.   
 
Recall that the ‘forcing procedure’ relied on an interpretation of ‘preference’ as 
choice.  It suggests that any agent whose preferences are possibly incomplete 
can be forced to choose between two alternatives by putting them in a situation 
in which he will end up with a less preferred third alternative if he does not 
make a choice.  Since the third alternative can be made sufficiently unattractive, 
it is suggested that a choice will always result; and this choice can be 
interpreted as the agent’s preference between the two alternatives.   
 
The difficulty is that the ‘forcing procedure’ is a poor fit for the associated 
consequentialist conception of rationality.  The basic idea was that features of 
an agent’s preference could be shown to be irrational, if those features led the 
agent to suffer harm.  If the agent failed to make a choice when faced with the 
‘forcing procedure’ his preferences would be incomplete and he would suffer 
harm as a result.  Therefore having incomplete preferences is irrational.   
 
The issue with this is that in order to establish that the agent in question 
suffered harm, this justification would need to rely on an interpretation of 
‘preference’ as welfare judgments.  Since the ‘forcing procedure’ relied on an 
interpretation of ‘preference’ as choice, it cannot establish that the agent in 
question suffered harm.  And as a result, the ‘forcing procedure’ does not justify 
the completeness condition as a condition of rationality.  
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Further, it was suggested that there is independent reason to think that this is 
not necessarily a failure of the ‘forcing procedure’ or the associated conception 
of rationality.  The completeness condition, if taken literally, is extremely 
demanding.  There are an infinite number of possible alternatives.  To suggests 
that rationality requires an agent to form a preference between all possible pairs 
of alternatives is excessive and possibly a reductio of the associated conception 
of rationality.  For an agent can rationally fail to form a preference between two 
alternatives by merely failing to be aware of them as alternatives.204 
 
The suggested view will fare little better in offering a justification for the 
completeness condition as a condition of rationality.  And the reason for this is 
straightforward.  Recall the discussion in Chapter 3: Rationality of the case in 
which the agent fails to recognize a consideration as a reason, and therefore 
does not take it to be a reason.  It was argued that this was not a case in which 
the agent was irrational, though it may include cases in which the agent was 
unreasonable.  If the agent rationally fails to recognize a reason that pertains to 
an alternative, and therefore fails to form a preference related to the alternative, 
it would seem there is nothing in the suggested view that could justify 
considering the agent irrational. 
 
Based on this it was suggested that it may be more fruitful to think of the 
completeness condition as an idealizing assumption; i.e., an assumption that is 
not literally true, but the stipulation of which makes the subject matter formally 
                                                
204 This is only one way in which an agent’s preferences may be rationally incomplete.  There 
are others.  For example, it is possible that there are hard choices.  i.e., choices in which 
reasons do not answer the question, what ought to be done?  There may well be circumstances 
in which the agent has sufficient reason to do x, and sufficient reason to do y, and yet there is 
no conclusion about what one ought to do. “ Sophie’s Choice” is one likely example.  The 
question is subject to serious debate.  For a detailed discussion of this topic see Levi, I, Hard 
Choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. 
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tractable.  Specifically, in “Unreal Assumptions in Economic Theory”205, 
Musgrave surfaces an interesting possibility. 206  He notes that different types of 
assumptions play different roles in economic theories207.  For example, some 
assumptions point to factors, which might be expected to have an effect on the 
subject of the theory, and claim that they will have negligible effect.  Musgrave 
refers to assumption of this sort as “negligibility assumptions”.208  The 
completeness condition is not a negligibility assumption.  For if it turned out that 
agents did not have complete preferences, preferences would not easily admit 
to the orderings which are the currency of much of Preference Theory.   
 
In contrast to negligibility assumptions, Musgrave also introduced the notion of 
domain assumptions.  Domain assumptions “specify the domain of 
applicability”209 of a theory by pointing to factors that must be present, or 
absent, for a theory to be applied.  The completeness condition has the 
hallmarks of a domain assumption.  That is to say that Preference Theories can 
                                                
205 Musgrave, A., “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted”, Kyklos 
34: 377-387 August 1981. 
206 There are of course other attempts to justify the completeness conditions.  For example in 
his forthcoming book, Hausman presents an intriguingly concise explanation for the relationship 
between rationality and the completeness condition.  “Completeness is a boundary condition on 
rational choice. An inability to compare alternatives is not itself a failure of rationality, but when 
people are unable to compare alternatives, they are unable to make a choice on the basis of 
reasons.” (Hausman 2012, pg19)   
 
Unfortunately it is unsuccessful for two reasons.  First, the claim that agents who are unable to 
compare alternatives are unable to make a choice on the basis of reasons is false.  The mere 
fact that an agent is unable to compare x and y does not mean that he does not recognize that 
there are reasons for x and reasons for y.  He can choose x based on the reasons for x.  And 
he can similarly choose y based on the reasons for y.   
 
Second, it appears to rely on a conflation of completeness and comparability, which are strictly 
different.  There are many reasons an agent may have incomplete preferences.  For example, 
an agent may simply not be aware of the available alternatives.  Or the alternatives may be 
incommensurable yet comparable.  An agent’s inability to compare alternatives may be only 
one reason why an agent would have incomplete preference. 
 
As a result, Musgrave’s suggestion seems more promising. 
207 Presumably Musgrave’s insights apply more broadly to theories in other domains as well. 
208 Musgrave, A., “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted”, Kyklos 
34: 377-387 August 1981, pg 378.   
209 Musgrave, A., “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted”, Kyklos 
34: 377-387 August 1981, pg 381. 
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be applied in circumstance in which agents have, or may have, complete 
preferences.210 
 
As a domain assumption the justification for the completeness condition no 
longer relies on the associated conception of practical reasoning in the same 
way.  Rather the justification of a domain assumption rests on its ability to 
demarcate those domains in which the theory may apply.  Since the 
completeness of agents preferences are implied by the fact that the agent’s 
preferences admit to an ordering, the completeness condition is one of the 
ways to demarcate a domain in which an agent’s preferences admit to an 
ordering and become formally tractable within Preference Theories.  If this is 
true, it suffices as a justification for the completeness condition as a domain 
assumption. 
 
Here the role of the associated conception of practical reasoning is quite 
different.  Rather than justifying the completeness condition, it sheds light on 
what will be required to satisfy the condition.  In this sense the suggested view 
has an advantage over views such as MHV.  For the suggested view offers an 
account of how agents form preferences based on recognized reasons.  For 
example on the suggested view an agent can rationally fail to form a preference 
between two alternatives, if he is unaware of them as alternatives.  As a result, 
satisfying the completeness condition will likely require that agents have full 
knowledge of, or at least awareness of, the available alternatives.  Further, 
since an agent may also rationally fail to form a preference between two 
                                                
210 This is admittedly a significant claim.  The current trend is to apply Preference Theories ever 
more broadly.  And, if the completeness condition is a domain assumption, this would suggest 
that some current applications go beyond the domains to which the theory can be fruitfully 
applied. 
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alternatives if they rest on incommensurable or incomparable values, the 
completeness condition may obtain in circumstances in which the agent 
recognizes reasons based on a single value.  It is not coincidental that version 
of these requirements are often associated with the application of Preference 
Theories.  And the fact that the suggested view can shed light on these aspects 
of a completeness condition justified as a domain assumption should count in 
its favor. 
 
Fine Individuation 
In two influential works211, Broome showed that the prospect of fine 
individuation poses a challenge to the transitivity condition.  For if any apparent 
instance of intransitivity could be explained away as a case in which the agent 
had transitive preferences over more finely individuated alternatives, then 
transitivity would not meaningfully constrain an agent’s preferences.  The 
transitivity condition would be vacuous. 
 
The claim to fine individuation rested on the conjunction of two further claims.  
First, that while two alternatives appear to be identical, they are in fact different 
alternatives.  And second, that it is rational to have preferences between these 
alternatives.212 
 
                                                
211 Broome, John, “Can a Humean be moderate?”, in: Frey, R G (ed), Value, Welfare, and 
Morality, Cambridge University Press : New York, 1993.  And, Broome, John, Weighing Goods, 
Oxford : Cambridge, Mass. : Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
212 Broome introduced to Principle of Individuation by Justifiers and the Rational Requirements 
of Indifference to address these respective claims and address the challenges presented by the 
prospect of fine individuation. 
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The suggested view has the resources for addressing the challenge posed by 
the prospect of fine individuation by offering a principled means for denying 
claims of the first kind in cases of irrationality.213   
 
The basic idea can be expressed in the Normative Identity Claim (NIC), which is 
the conjunction of two further claims.   
• Claim 1: if two alternatives are identical, or are to be treated as identical, 
then they must be normatively indistinguishable.  Or equivalently: if on 
the other hand, there is a normatively salient difference between two 
alternatives, then they should not be treated as identical.214     
• Claim 2: if two alternatives are normatively indistinguishable, then they 
will be recommended by the same relevant reasons with the same force; 
and if two alternatives are not recommended by the same relevant 
reasons with the same force, then they are not normatively 
indistinguishable.215   
 
As a result of NIC, one can establish the identity of alternatives by establishing 
the identity of relevant reasons.  This yields the following variation of Broome’s 
Principle of Individuation by Justifiers, PIJ′: alternatives should be individuated 
from one another, if and only if they differ in terms of relevant recognized 
reasons.   
 
There are a couple of things about this that are worthwhile to note.  First, the 
current discussion is interested in how PIJ′ applies to alternatives as the agent 
                                                
213 This is essentially the role of Broome’s Principle of Individuation by Justifiers (PIJ) discussed 
earlier. 
214 This will be taken to be analytic. 
215 This is a result of the status of reasons as the basic normative concept. 
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understands them, not necessarily to the actual alternatives216.  The reason for 
this is simple.  PIJ′ applies to either actual alternatives or to the alternatives as 
the agent understands them.  If PIJ′ is based on the actual reasons, it will serve 
as an identity condition for the actual alternatives.  If on the other hand it is 
based on the recognized reasons, it will serve as an identity condition for the 
alternatives as the agent understands them.  Since the current discussion is 
interested in the transitivity condition as a condition of rationality, it is interested 
in the agent’s reasoning based on recognized reasons217. 
 
The second thing to note is that the identity conditions as described are 
recursive.  In other words, establishing the identity of alternatives depends on 
establishing the identity of recognized reasons.  And, given the discussion of 
the Complete Reasons Identity Relation (CRIR)218 in Chapter 2: Reasons, 
establishing the identity of recognized reasons depends on establishing the 
identity of the agent’s beliefs about the elements of complete reasons.  As a 
result, on this account preferences are deeply intensional, not only in their 
issue, but in their object. 
 
                                                
216 NB: PIJ′ applies to both alternatives as the agent understands them, and alternatives as they 
are. 
217 In case there is any doubt about this, simply consider the two relevant counter-examples.  
E.g., the agent’s preferences are apparently intransitive.  In the first case it is possible to 
establish the identity of the alternatives as the agent understands them, but the actual 
alternatives are distinct; and the case in which the alternatives as the agent understands them 
are distinct, while it is possible to establish the identity of the actual alternatives.   
 
In the second case, the agent would be guilty of two errors.  First, he is guilty of having 
intransitive preferences.  And second, he is guilty of making a mistake about the nature of the 
alternatives.  In the first case, the agent would not be guilty of having intransitive preferences 
though he would be guilty of making a mistake about the nature of the alternatives. 
218 Complete Reason Identity Relation (CRIR).  CRIR: the complete reason R'' (a1),ov1,x1 is 
identical with the complete reason R'' (a2),ov2,x2 if an only if a1 ≡ a2, ov1 ≡ ov2, and x1 ≡ x2.  Where 
R'' (a),ov,x can be understood as: agent’s, x’s, taking an action, a, brings about an outcome or 
increases the likelihood of, o, which realizes or preserves some value, v. 
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One consequence of this is that establishing that an agent has intransitive 
preferences can be a difficult affair.  It depends not just on the choices he 
makes, but on how he understands the alternatives he is choosing over, the 
considerations that he views as relevant and his beliefs about the facts of the 
matter.  Rather than a drawback of the suggested account, this seems a virtue.  
For convicting an agent of irrationality is a high charge, one that may be leveled 
too quickly against an agent may who may instead simply have different beliefs 
about what is at stake in a choice situation.  Without an articulated account of 
how agents choose, too many faults may get wrapped under the banner of 
irrationality. 
 
Of course, in many situations it is not necessary to go to such lengths to 
understand an agent’s preferences.  Much of the information may be supplied 
by common knowledge or a shared context. 
 
This also suggests another possibility that makes too little appearance in the 
literature.  Given that people are generally rational and that preferences reflect 
an agent’s views about the considerations that are relevant to choice situations, 
cases of apparent intransitivity may convey important information about the 
choice situations themselves.  This is information which may be too quickly 
discarded if the agents are hastily convicted of irrationality.219 
 
Returning to the question of fine individuation, this discussion shows that while 
the question of how to individuate alternatives in specific choice situations 
presents challenges, the suggested account offers a principled means for doing 
so that reflects the nuances of how agent’s form preferences.  As a result, 
                                                
219 The Sure-Thing Principle and its associated paradoxes seems a quintessential example.   
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further individuation is not always possible, and there is no threat of rendering 
the transitivity condition vacuous.  In this way the suggested account can 
address the challenges posed by the prospect of fine individuation and defend a 
meaningfully transitivity condition. 
 
Justifying Transitivity: 
The transitivity condition is widely regarded to be a condition of rationality220, yet 
it lacks a compelling justification.  For example the discussion in Chapter 1: 
Introduction showed that the Money Pump, which is often relied on to justify the 
transitivity condition is more effective as a poignant example than a justification.   
 
This section will explore the possibility of offering a justification of the transitivity 
condition against the backdrop of the suggested conception of practical 
reasoning.  The discussion will begin by examining a case of intransitivity in a 
stipulated idealized situation.  Then it will render a case of intransitivity in-line 
with the suggested account of preferences and seek to locate the rational 
failure associated with intransitivity.  Relying on the account of rationality 
offered in the previous chapter, it will claim that failures of this type constitute an 
irrationality, and as such suggest that the transitivity condition is a justified 
condition of rationality in idealized circumstances.  It will then relax the 
idealizing assumptions and explore whether this holds robustly in different 
circumstances. 
 
                                                
220 For example: “The details of decision theory are not universally agreed.  Different versions 
have different axioms.  But they do all agree at least on the axiom of transitivity.  Transitivity is a 
minimal condition of consistency: if consistency does not require transitivity, it requires nothing 
(footnote omitted).  So we may take it that all moderate Humeans believe rationality requires a 
person to have transitive preferences.” Broome, John, “Can a Humean be moderate?”, Ethics 
Out of Economics, Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, pg 70. 
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Intransitive preferences – The generic case 
Consider the generic case of violations of the transitivity condition in which the 
agent is presented with three sequential choices between x and z, z and y, and 
y and x, respectively.  As before, the agent chooses z over x, y over z, and x 
over y.  The agent’s preferences can be represented as violations of the 
transitivity condition: x > y, y > z, z > x.   
 
As before, incorporating the challenge posed by fine individuation, this can be 
restated as follows: x3 > y3, y2 > z2, and z1 > x1. 
 
Now consider the associated judgments.  The agent forms a preference, that is 
to say an all-things-considered judgment, for x over y based on his conditional 
judgments for x and his conditional judgments for y.  These can be represented 
as pf(x3, rx3) and pf(y3, ry3)221.  And the associated all-things-considered 
judgment can be represented as atc(x3, rx3 and ry3).  The agent’s other 
preferences admit to similar representation yielding the following statements of 
the relevant judgments: 
• Choice 1: atc(z1, rz1 and rx1) based on pf(z1, rz1) and pf(x1, rx1) 
• Choice 2: atc(y2, ry2 and rz2) based on pf(y2, ry2) and pf(z2, rz2) 
• Choice 3: atc(x3, rx3 and ry3) based on pf(x3, rx3) and pf(y3, ry3) 
 
As before, this would be a violation of transitivity if: x1 ≡ x3 , y2 ≡ y3, and z1 ≡ z2.  
And by PIJ′, x1 ≡ x3, y2 ≡ y3, and z1 ≡ z2, if  rx1 ≡ rx3 , ry2 ≡ ry3, and rz1 ≡ rz2. 
 
                                                
221 The formalism has been augmented to reflect the fact that the reasons at hand are reason 
that are relevant to the alternatives in question.  The possibility of indexing the alternative to the 
choice situation, which posed the problem of fine individuation, has also been maintained so as 
not to presume that all the associated challenges have been addressed.  
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Since the goal is to explore possible justifications of the transitivity condition by 
considering violations of it, assume rx1 ≡ rx3 , ry2 ≡ ry3, and rz1 ≡ rz2, and as a 
result x1 ≡ x3, y2 ≡ y3, and z1 ≡ z2, which would yield the intransitive preferences: 
x > y, y > z, z > x222. 
 
Idealizing assumptions 
On the suggested view, the rationality of preferences depends on the reasons 
an agent recognizes.  As a result, whether it is rational for an agent to have 
intransitive preferences will depend on the reasons an agent recognizes and 
judgments he forms on that basis.   
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2: Reasons, there are a multitude of reasons and 
they compete in a variety of ways.  There are first order reasons and second 
order reasons.  There are reasons to perform an action for its own right and 
reasons to perform an action because of the consequences it will bring about.  
There may even be reasons based on deontological considerations.  While it 
was acknowledged that the issue of how reasons compete is deserving of 
considerable attention, to make the issue tractable for the moment assume the 
reasons at hand are consequentialist first order reasons to take an action based 
on the valuable outcome that will come about. 
 
Even so, it is possible that there is a plurality of value in the world.  And if there 
is, reasons may also compete based on the kind, as opposed to merely the 
extent, of value that the outcome will realize.  Once again, to make the issue 
tractable, assume that there is a single kind of value that is relevant to the 
choice situation considered.   
                                                
222 Relying on the assumed identity, the subscripts have been omitted. 
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Justifying the transitivity condition 
Consequentialist first order reasons for an agent to take an action can still 
compete in more than one way.  Two different outcomes may realize one and 
the same value to a greater or lesser extent.  And the agent may regard two 
different actions as having a higher or lower likelihood223 of realizing the 
valuable outcome.   
 
In considering whether to x or y, the agent considers which alternative is more 
likely to bring about the more valuable outcome.224  Similarly in considering 
whether to y or z, the agent considers which alternative is more likely to bring 
about the more valuable outcome.  And in considering whether to z or x, the 
agent considers which alternative is more likely to bring about the more 
valuable outcome. 
 
As before, these judgments can be rendered to make explicit the relationship 
between the agent’s judgments regarding an alternative and the grounds they 
are based on.  For the sake of simplicity, focus on the agent’s judgments of the 
individual alternatives, i.e., 
• x: pf1(x1, rx1) and pf3(x3, rx3) 
• y: pf2(y2, ry2) and pf3(y3, ry3) 
• z: pf1(z1, rz1) and pf2(z2, rz2) 
 
                                                
223 Here it is the agent’s view of how likely an action is realize the value of the outcome that 
matters, as opposed to how likely it is that an action realize the value of the outcome, because it 
is the agent’s recognized reasons that are at issue. 
224 For present purposes the question of how the likelihood and the value of the outcome 
combine can be left up to the agent.  What is important is that the agent arrives at a way 
judgment based on the reasons he recognizes. 
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Since this is a case in which PIJ′ and CRIR hold, this can be re-stated as 
follows: 
• x: pf1(x, rx) and pf3(x, rx) 
• y: pf2(y, ry) and pf3(y, ry) 
• z: pf1(z, rz) and pf2(z, rz) 
 
Either the agent arrived at the same PF-J when considering the same 
alternative in each choice situation225 or he did not226.  If he deliberated based 
on the same reasons, but arrived at different judgments, then the reasons on 
which he deliberated played a different role in his deliberations.  Even if the 
agent gave the recognized reason the appropriate role in deliberation in one 
instance, he did not give it the appropriate role in deliberation in both instances.  
This is a violation of the fundamental requirement of rationality enumerated in 
the previous chapter, and the agent is guilty of an irrationality.227 
 
Further if z > x, x>y, and y>z, then it cannot be the case the agent arrived at the 
same judgments about the same alternatives based on the same reasons.  I.e., 
it cannot be the case that: 
• x: pf1(x, rx) ≡ pf3(x, rx) 
• y: pf2(y, ry) ≡ pf3(y, ry) 
                                                
225 For example, this can be represented as follows: 
• x: pf1(x, rx) ≡ pf3(x, rx) 
• y: pf2(y, ry) ≡ pf3(y, ry) 
• z: pf1(z, rz) ≡ pf2(z, rz) 
226 For example, this can be represented as follows: 
• x: pf1(x, rx) ≡ pf3(x, rx) 
• y: pf2(y, ry) ≡ pf3(y, ry) 
• z: pf1(z, rz) ≢ pf2(z, rz) 
227 Of course it is possible for the agent to rationally form different judgments about x in the 
subsequent choice situation, if for example his preference was based on a different reason.  
But, by AIC, in that case the agent would be considering a different alternative, and so would 
his preferences would not be intransitive.  
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• z: pf1(z, rz) ≡ pf2(z, rz) 
 
So, if the agent’s preferences were intransitive, then the agent’s ATC-J’s must 
have tracked at least one instance of an irrational PF-J.  I.e., at least one of the 
agent’s ATC-J’s must have been irrational.  In this instance, given the 
consequentialist first order reasons to realize a single kind of value, having 
intransitive preferences would be irrational.  In this instance, given the idealizing 
assumptions, the suggested view can justify the transitivity condition.   
 
It appears the suggested view satisfies a key desiderata of an account of 
preferences.  However, to leap to this conclusion may be too quick.  For only a 
narrow subset of reasons were considered.  What happens if the restrictive 
conditions are relaxed?   
 
Relaxing the assumptions – a plurality of values 
Given the multitude of different reasons and ways in which reasons can 
compete, it is not feasible to walk through each dimension in which the 
conditions can be relaxed.  Nonetheless, it is informative to look at one 
possibility.  What happens if there is a plurality of value? 
 
If there is a plurality of value, this justification of the transitivity condition does 
not hold.  The reason for this is simple.  Consider the following three choice 
situations.  Michael is presented with the choice between staying home (h) and 
going out with friends (f), then the choice between going out with friends and 
going to the museum (m), and finally the choice between going to the museum 
and staying home.  In each case Michael chooses the first option.  His reasons 
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are as follows.  In the first instance Michael chooses to go out with friends, 
because it has been a long-time since he has done so and he would like to 
maintain the friendships he values.  In the second instance, Michael chooses to 
go to the museum because it has a rare display of painting that would be 
valuable to engage with.  And in the third instance, he chooses to stay home, 
because he has a regular routine with his family that he cherishes and would 
like to perpetuate.  Michael’s preferences can be represented as follows: h > f, f 
> m, and m > h.  Michael’s preferences in this example are intransitive.228  Yet 
Michael’s preferences may be rational all the same.  For if there is a plurality of 
value it is possible that in each instance Michael chose the more valuable 
alternative and the alternative he had more reason to choose.  If there is a 
plurality of values, value itself may be intransitive229.  And the balance of 
                                                
228 In this example the challenge posed by fine individuation can be assumed away. 
229 It is worth noting that to some this statement may not be uncontroversial.  For example, in 
Weighing Lives, Broome claims that the ‘better than’ relation, the comparative relation for value, 
is transitive.  He does not argue for the claim, he merely asserts that comparative relations, like 
the betterness relation, are transitive. E.g., “That comparative relations are transitive is 
self-evident. It is an axiom that lies at the foundation of our arguments. It does not itself need to 
be supported by argument, and not much argument is available to support it directly.” (pg 52.) 
 
As is the case with many unsupported assertions, the force of Broome’s claim is questionable.  
If the earlier example is not persuasive, consider this simple example.  Assume that there is a 
plurality of value.  Specifically, for present purposes assume value has three dimensions 
designated A, B and C respectively.  These values are manifest in three candidates X, Y and Z 
to different extents.  This can be represented as follows: 
 A B C 
X 10 - 5 
Y 5 10 - 
Z - 5 10 
 
Here the higher number the more valuable the candidate has in that dimension, and the dash 
represents that the candidate does not exhibit value of this kind.   
 
In this situation, X is more valuable than Y, Y is more valuable than Z, and Z is more valuable 
than X.  Or X is better than Y, Y is better than Z, and Z is more valuable than X.  The betterness 
relation is intransitive. 
 
Proponents of Broome’s view may argue that this is not one comparative relation, but three 
different ones.  And to a certain extent that is a natural enough way to read things.  But this is 
exactly point of acknowledging that there may be a plurality of values.  If this is the case, then 
the betterness relation may reflect betterness along multiple dimensions.  And as a 
consequence, the betterness relation may be intransitive. 
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reasons may recommend having intransitive preferences.  If Michael rationally 
formed his preferences based on the reasons that there are, Michael’s 
preferences would be intransitive.   
 
A successful account of preferences, it would seem, should offer the basis for 
justifying the transitivity condition in situations in which it applies, such as 
situations in which a single type of value is relevant.  And it should not offer the 
basis for justifying the transitivity condition in situation in which it does not 
apply, such as situations in which value itself is intransitive because there is a 
plurality of value.  This nuance can be incorporated into the goal for this section.  
For example: Offer a justification for the transitivity condition only in situations in 
which the transitivity conditions is a condition of rationality. 
 
Since it has already been shown that the suggested view can justify the 
transitivity condition in situations in which it does apply, it only remains to show 
that it does not justify the transitivity condition in situations in which it does not 
apply.  To see this, merely consider a case in which value is intransitive, and 
the balance of reasons recommends having intransitive preferences.  The agent 
has true beliefs about the elements of the reasons that there are, recognizes 
the reasons as reasons and gives each of the reasons an appropriate role in 
deliberation.  If the agent deliberated correctly, then the agent’s preferences 
                                                                                                                                          
Broome may seek to argue that there are not a plurality of values.  Or that all values are 
commensurable.  If either of those are the case, then value would be transitive.  Two points are 
worth mentioning about this.  First, the question of whether or not there are a plurality of values 
is quite different then the question of whether it is self-evident that comparative relations are 
transitive.  There would be reasons for concern if one relied on conclusions about the former 
based on assertions regarding the latter.   
 
Second, if it turns out that there is not a plurality of value, all the better for the suggested view.  
It can offer the justification of the transitivity condition discussed in the previous section.  The 
point of the current discussion was to recognize the real possibility that there are a plurality of 
values, to point to the complexities this would create for the suggested view and acknowledge 
its limitations. 
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would be intransitive; and rationally so, for he satisfied the fundamental 
requirement of rationality.230  
 
As a result, the justification of the transitivity condition offered by the suggested 
view meets this augmented variation of the goal for this section. The suggested 
account offers a justification of the transitivity condition only in situations where 
the transitivity condition is a condition of rationality.   
 
While there is more to explore about the suggested view of preferences, having 
looked at whether the suggested account can offer justifications for the 
completeness and transitivity conditions as well as meet the challenge posed by 
the prospect of fine individuation, the current discussion can come to a 
conclusion. 
 
                                                
230 Note: the mere fact that there is a plurality of values does not mean that an agent’s 
intransitive preferences are rational.  The agent is still subject to the fundamental requirement of 
rationality.  It only means that there is a limitation to the applicability of the transitivity condition. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The fact that there are multiple interpretations of ‘preference’ creates a 
challenge for Preference Theories in part because it threatens to undermine the 
justification for the consistency conditions on which it relies. 
 
Building on the conception of practical reasoning enumerated in previous 
chapters, this discussion suggested an account of preferences as all things 
considered judgments.  Such judgments have a rationally governed connection 
to choices and can reflect an agent’s assessments of his own welfare and other 
values that his choices may realize.  As such, it was suggested, this account 
shared many of appealing characteristics of standard interpretations of 
‘preference’, yet avoided the pitfalls of reducing ‘preference’ to choices or 
welfare judgments. 
 
Employing this account, the discussion turned to investigate possible 
justifications for the completeness condition.  It noted that the standard 
argument for justifying the completeness condition, the ‘forcing procedure’, did 
not justify the completeness condition as a condition of rationality; and 
acknowledged that the suggested view of rationality would not fare any better.  
For an agent may rationally fail to have complete preferences by simply being 
unaware of the available alternatives.   
 
This prompted the discussion to reconsider the role of the completeness 
condition in Preference Theories and suggested it bears the hallmarks of a 
domain assumption.  As a domain assumption the justification of the 
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completeness condition rests on its ability to demarcate those domains in which 
the theory may apply.  The role of the associated conception of practical 
reasoning in justifying the completeness condition as a domain assumption is to 
shed light on the characteristics of circumstances in which it will apply.  For 
example, the suggested conception of practical reasoning suggests 
completeness conditions is a justified domain assumption that would likely 
obtain in situations in which agents were fully aware of available alternatives 
and in which a single type of value was at stake. 
 
The discussion next turned to the challenge posed by the prospect of fine 
individuation.  Building on Broome’s suggestion that the challenge could be 
addressed by stipulating a Principle of Justification by Justifiers, PIJ, the 
discussion introduced the Normative Identity Condition to justify a variation of 
Broome’s articulation, namely PIJ′.  PIJ′ stated that alternatives should be 
individuated from one another, if and only if they differ in terms of relevant 
recognized reasons. 
 
While PIJ′ addresses the challenges posed by the prospect of fine individuation, 
it also brought to light a noteworthy characteristic of the current account.  On 
the current account preferences are intensional.  Preferences are judgments of 
the agents, and as such it is the agent’s understanding of their judgments, the 
alternatives they are choosing over, and the reasons for doing so which matter.  
As a result, in some instances convicting an agent of an irrationality, such as 
having intransitive preferences, or even understanding what transitive 
preferences call for, will require understanding the choice situation as the agent 
sees it.  Rather than a drawback of the current account, it was suggested this is 
                   225 of 229 
a virtue.  For the suggested account offers a principled means for addressing 
the challenge of fine individuation while acknowledging that what rationality 
calls for depends in part on the agent’s understanding of the choice situation. 
 
With this, the discussion turned to the question of justifying the transitivity 
condition.  It began by stipulating an idealized situation to make the question 
tractable.  It was assumed that only consequentialist first order reasons were 
relevant and only one type of value was at issue.   
 
Appealing to the conception of practical reasoning developed to this point, the 
discussion then showed that in these ideal situations cases in which an agent’s 
preferences are intransitive are cases in which the agent fails to give a reason 
he recognizes an appropriate role in deliberation.  This is a violation of the 
fundamental requirement of rationality.  And as a result, in these ideal 
situations, the transitivity condition is a justified condition of rationality.  
However, when the idealizing assumptions are relaxed the situation changes. 
 
The discussion quickly noted that in situations in which there is a plurality of 
value, value itself may be intransitive.  And, as a result, in situations in which 
there is a plurality of value an agent can rationally have intransitive preferences.  
Further, it was shown that in such circumstances the suggested account did not 
justify considering intransitive preferences irrational.  So the suggested view 
offered a justification of the transitivity condition only in situations in which it 
applies. 
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Cumulatively this chapter and those that came before it suggests an account of 
preference and a conception of practical reasoning that can serve to anchor 
Preference Theories by offering a justification of the completeness and 
transitivity conditions and addressing the challenge posed by the prospect of 
fine individuation.  Yet the picture of Preference Theories that emerges is both 
broader and narrower then commonly conceived.  On the one hand the 
justifications of the consistency condition offered apply within specified 
domains.  On the other, Preference Theories can be seen as crucial component 
in a broader conception of how people navigate a normatively complex world 
and make choices.  This has the potential to expand the boundaries to which 
Preference Theories can fruitfully apply without threatening to reduce one’s 
understanding of new domains to fit the dictates of the formalism. 
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